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and extends the material discussed in the 2001
European competitiveness report. The two comple-
mentary parts concern, respectively, the importance
of human capital in European economic and
productivity growth and productivity performance
in European services. These complete the overview
of European productivity performance and its prox-
imate determinants in the period since the 
mid-1990s initiated in last year’s competitiveness
report.
Two other parts of the present report are new to
this reflection. First, the report discusses the rela-
tionship between enterprise policy and competition
policy and the synergy that exists between the two
policies. Maintaining and strengthening this
synergy is important because there is a clear link
between the intensity of competition in an
economy and its competitiveness on a global scale.
Second, a possible conflict exists in the unrestrained
pursuit of economic and productivity growth and
the respect for sustainability constraints. The report
reviews the performance of the manufacturing
industry in the European Union from the perspec-
tive of environmental sustainability.
Human capital 
and productivity growth
Last year’s report explored the causes of the
widening of the productivity gap of the European
Union vis-à-vis the United States by focusing, basi-
cally, at the innovative capacities of EU and US
manufacturing. It highlighted the role of R & D but
also of investment, particularly in ICT, in output and
productivity performance.
This year’s report extends the scope of the analysis
to human capital developments. Indeed, given the
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crucial complementarity between physical and
human capital formation, the EU’s underperfor-
mance might be rooted also in inadequate supply
of human capital.
The report found that, in general, and at European
Union level, this was not the case but trends do
point to possible problems ahead. At country-level,
a wide variety of situations exist and some imbal-
ances are already present.
Skills and labour demand
From the point of view of labour demand, an
overall skill upgrading of EU employment has taken
place in recent years, with a shift from the low to
the intermediate level of educational attainment
within sectors and a sustained net growth in the
demand for highly-educated workers.
The structure of labour demand in the European
Union has changed in important ways in recent
years. For every new job creation in manufacturing
corresponded eight in the services sector. By 2000,
two out of every three jobs in the European Union
were in the service sector.
However, data for 1995–2000 suggest that the
changing nature of labour demand in the European
Union is accounted for largely by changes in the
skill content of jobs rather than changes in the
sectoral location of employment growth.
Over the period 1995–2000 employment growth
was largely confined to jobs for medium- and high-
skill workers. The demand for skilled workers
continues to be strongest in high-tech and high-
education sectors, which accounted for more than a
third of net job creation between 1995 and 2000.
In contrast, the number of low-skill workers in
employment fell in almost all sectors.
Executive summary
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The data also suggest that the growth of medium-
and high-skill demand (as measured by employment)
in the European Union has outstripped the growth of
the supply of employees with the corresponding
attainment levels. With the exception of Austria and
Sweden, all Member States display a higher growth
of employment of high-skill workers that the corre-
sponding attainment growth, suggesting that the
tightening of the labour market for high skills is a
general phenomenon across the European Union.
Considering that the participation rates are already
highest for this group, the scope for filling this gap by
increasing participation looks rather limited.
Supply trends, accumulation 
and mismatch
From the point of view of labour supply, a first
finding is that the average years of schooling in the
European Union has been rising and, in 1999,
reached 87 % of the corresponding US level, up
from around 70 % in 1971.
How well the distribution of educational attainment
for the adult population matches the skill content of
labour demand is an indicator of the extent to which
the various national education systems and labour
market institutions are able to match skills to jobs.
The evidence suggests that the overall efficiency of
the matching process, thus defined, has been better
in the European Union than in the United States. The
skill composition of employment and that of the
wider population (aged 15–65) was closer in the
European Union than in the United States in recent
years. This implies that the educational attainment of
(potential) labour supply fits better the skill content
of labour demand in Member States than in the
United States. Since 1995, however, the United
States has seen a more pronounced improvement in
the employment efficiency of education output than
the European Union as a whole.
The match between skills demand and the skill
endowments of the younger generation (aged
25–34) is substantially better than for the overall
population, suggesting that the matching perform-
ance in the European Union may improve further in
the future if this trend is sustained. Realising this
potential, however, requires that labour mobility
within the European Union in increased because the
aggregate relationship between the distribution of
attainment for the young age cohort and skills
demand does not hold equally strong across indi-
vidual Member States.
Between the skill composition of those aged 15–64
not participating in the labour market and the skill
content of demand the fit is rather poor, both in the
European Union and in the United States, reflecting
the skill selectivity in employment growth in the
latter half of the 1990s, which has been skewed
towards the employment of high-skill professionals.
Even so, the performance of the European Union,
both at an aggregate level and for individual
Member States, is better than the United States and
may improve further following the development
and implementation of policies and programmes to
promote social inclusion and enhance labour
market participation.
Skill gaps
The combination of these factors — growth in high-
skilled employment, low levels of unemployment
amongst the high-skilled and relatively low growth
in the attainment of tertiary education — suggest
that tertiary-level skill gaps, which already have
appeared in some Member States, may emerge
more widely in other Member States’ economies as
demand exceeds the supply of high-skilled workers.
Skill gaps, reflecting the tightness of the labour
market for high-skilled workers, are most significant
in the fastest growing sectors of the economy
(general business services, and health and social
work) across the EU, with particularly high values
for Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. Skill shortages have already appeared in
Germany, France, Italy and the UK, despite high
unemployment in the first three (around 70 % of
the EU science and technology employees are
found in these Member States). Skill gaps are preva-
lent in manufacturing across all Member States,
following significant structural changes in the skill
content of jobs as production has been shifting to
more high-tech, innovative, manufacturing
processes. The effect of this shift was particularly
pronounced in Austria and the United Kingdom.
Data also show that, compared to the US, the Euro-
pean Union has a higher proportion of non-partici-
pants in the labour force with tertiary-level skills
relative to the skills of those employed. This indi-
cates that there is a potential, if limited, pool of
skilled labour that is not currently active in the
labour market and that increased participation may
ease some of the pressures exerted by prevailing
skill gaps. Furthermore, it is clear that the potential
for a better spatial allocation of labour in the Euro-
pean Union will require measures to support labour
mobility across EU borders.
The comparison of recent trends raises suspicions of
an imperfect match between human and physicalExecutive summary
9
capital formation in the European Union, despite its
convergence in terms of the stock of human capital
towards the level of the United States. Indeed, the
rate of growth in ‘physical’ capital intensity was lower
in most Member States in the 1990s compared with
the earlier decade, while ‘human‘ capital growth
tended to increase. However, in most Member
States for which comparative data exist for the two
periods hourly labour productivity growth declined
in the 1990s relative to the previous decade. In
contrast, the United States during these periods saw
an acceleration in labour productivity growth, an
increase in the rate of accumulation of physical
capital and a modest deceleration in the growth of
employment and in human capital accumulation.
As recognised and highlighted by the European
Council in Lisbon, the access for all to appropriate
education and training is fundamental to meet the
ambitious objectives set for the EU. Following Lisbon
the EU Education Ministers reported to the Council
on the concrete future objectives of education and
training systems. The three main objectives were
identified as: increasing the quality and effectiveness
of education and training systems in the EU; facili-
tating the access of all to the education and training
systems; and opening up education and training
systems to the wider world. The Barcelona European
Council (March 2002) has confirmed these proposals
and has set the objective of making its education and
training systems a world quality reference by 2010.
Whereas education (school, university) and initial
vocational training are focusing on younger people,
continuing vocational training aims at updating and
upgrading the skills of those that are or have already
been in the labour market. For the time being
however, the % of people that have regularly access
to continuing vocational training in Europe, is too
low. Therefore it is important to define and imple-
ment the appropriate measures and incentives that
will it make more attractive for the companies, organ-
isations and the individual worker to participate in
continuing vocational training to maintain or
improve their skills and competence. It also needs to
be recognised that the EU definition of lifelong
learning goes beyond vocational training to include
broader competencies such as social skills, languages
and, above all, learning how to learn. The objective is
to create a genuine learning culture.
Productivity growth in EU
services
This year’s report completed the exploration of the
causes for the productivity gap with a survey of
developments in the services sector. Indeed, the
problem of weak productivity growth in the Euro-
pean Union in recent years is particularly acute in
the service sector.
Services are the most important sector in our
economies, accounting for some 70 % of all jobs
and of GDP. The demand for services tends to rise
faster than incomes, indicating a continuous
increase in the share of services in the total
economy.
Productivity developments in business
sector services
Many service industries are highly labour intensive,
with allegedly limited scope for raising productivity
through investments in physical capital. Tradition-
ally, productivity growth in services has indeed been
slower than in manufacturing industries — though
sectoral differences across service industries are
large. Simultaneously, employment in services has
increased at a faster rate than in other sectors.
Clearly, developments in the service sector will be
the key to economic growth in the future.
The vigorous introduction of many ICT applications
in this sector has not contributed, apparently, to
rapid productivity growth, or its acceleration.
Indeed, the slowdown in aggregate productivity
growth in the European Union during the second
half of the 1990s compared to earlier years, and the
small acceleration in productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector, suggest that the service
sector will have seen a notable slowdown in labour
productivity growth during this period. The
problem is, of course, compounded by the fact that
the share of services in EU GDP has been rising over
time even though it remains considerably lower
than in the US economy.
Productivity growth in business sector services in
the United States accelerated from an average of
1.3 % in the period 1990–95 to an average of
3.1 % in the period 1995–99. In contrast, in the EU,
with the exception of two (France and the United
Kingdom) of the seven Member States for which
comparable data are available, service sector
productivity growth in fact declined during the
second half of the decade, and where it rose it did
so by a modest 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points. In
contrast to productivity, employment growth accel-
erated in both regions.
Analysis of the individual sectors that constitute the
market services reveal that the stronger US perform-
ance in the aggregate market services productivityEuropean competitiveness report 2002
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results from their very strong productivity gains in
the wholesale and retail trade sector, which
compare with weak growth on the European side.
On the other hand, the European Union witnessed
a very strong productivity growth in telecommuni-
cations, in the late 1990s, while in financial inter-
mediation and in the transport sector, some — but
not all — EU countries also recorded solid produc-
tivity growth. Productivity developed very weakly,
and even declined in some countries, in the
hotel. and restaurant sector as well as in the whole-
sale and retail trade sector.
For three sectors within market services, produc-
tivity growth seems to be negatively correlated
with employment growth: hotels and restaurants,
post and telecommunications, and transport and
storage. Clearly, in the case of the post and
telecommunications sector, the negative correla-
tion is a reflection of the possible dominance of the
post component of the data; modern post and
telecommunications encompass very different
activities and data that refer to this unrepresenta-
tive composite sector may not be entirely trust-
worthy. For the other sectors, the evidence of any
correlation is less clear. For the sectors where a
trade-off between employment and productivity
growth seems to exist, one finds an upward shift in
this relationship between the first and the second
half of the 1990s: at present, a given productivity
growth rate seems to be associated with higher
employment growth.
It is possible that measurement errors conceal the
underlying productivity performance of the service
sector. Measuring accurately the output of this
sector, especially in a period of rapid technological
change, is extremely difficult. If the inflation in the
service sector is overstated (invariably because of
difficulties in accounting for quality improvements
following innovations and organisational changes)
then the implicit productivity growth is under-
stated. Extended to the economy as a whole, this
suggests that European productivity growth may
not have been as weak as prima facie the data
suggest.
Factors influencing productivity 
in services
Among the possible determinants of productivity,
innovation — introduction of new products,
applying a new technology, organisational changes
etc. — is an important one. However, innovation in
services may be poorly captured by traditional
measures such as R & D spending, since services
innovations tend to be closely linked with the way
in which the services are delivered, and may result
from the interaction between the service supplier
and the customer. Survey data nonetheless indicate
that high-technology service firms, such as
computer services and telecommunications, carry
out innovative activities even more often than
manufacturing firms.
Typically innovations in this sector are introduced
through acquired technology — ICT, organisational
changes and human capital — rather than through
direct R & D spending by service firms themselves.
The service sector is an important user of ICT and,
as mentioned earlier, lower levels of ICT expendi-
ture are at the source of the recent slowdown in
productivity growth in the EU. Institutional factors
(bargaining conventions, part-time work arrange-
ments, length of working day etc.) could play a
crucial role in this process.
The service sector is generally characterised by
below average productivity growth and at the same
time, an increasing share in GDP. Yet, the implied
greater employment growth has not materialised
sufficiently in the European Union to make a deci-
sive difference to Europe’s employment perform-
ance. Because of the rising demand for services as
incomes grow, the European Union must ensure
that the potential employment gains associated
with the growth of the service sector are realised.
This requires that obstacles to the growth of the
service sector be removed.
Market liberalisation, by increasing competition and
making markets more responsive to change, tends
to increase the speed of diffusion of new produc-
tivity-enhancing innovation across the economy.
Recent initiatives already, or to be, undertaken
within the Lisbon/Barcelona framework ought to
contribute to raising productivity growth and
employment growth in the service sector. Examples
from the Member States where early liberalisation
and deregulation has occurred (utilities in the
United Kingdom, Finland and Germany, for
example), tend to confirm this. Productivity has not
only been faster than in others but it has also accel-
erated during the second half of the 1990s. Thus,
market liberalisation measures as well as steps
towards a single market in financial services ought
to be pursued vigorously.
Finally, and following the example of what
happened in the United States, there seem to be
important, and as yet untapped, reserves of produc-
tivity in the distribution and retail sectors. Releasing
them would necessitate easing of the environmentExecutive summary
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determining the performance of this sector,
including rules that govern the entry of new firms.
Enterprise policy 
and competition policy
Competition and enterprise policies complement
each other. They share the aim of increasing social
welfare. The main objective of competition policy is
to prevent distortions of competition, thus enabling
the competitive process to function. Enterprise
policy aims at increasing competitiveness of firms
and entire industries by creating a favourable busi-
ness environment and by addressing particular
market failures. Both policies play a significant role
in the creation of the world’s most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy capable of
sustainable economic growth, the goal set out by
the Lisbon European Council.
Competition and enterprise policies are closely
entwined in the EC Treaty. Enterprise policy focuses
on the conditions necessary for safeguarding
competitiveness, and the Treaty specifies that this
objective should be achieved through the policies
and activities pursued under all other provisions set
out in it. However, no measure can be introduced
which could lead to distortions of competition. The
Treaty provisions on competition policy enable the
Commission to balance the anti-competitive effects
of a given agreement or state aid measure against
their economic benefits. However, such balancing is
not possible for abuses of dominant position and
cartels. The EC Treaty and secondary competition
law provide opportunities to take enterprise policy
considerations into account.
Even though enterprise and competition policies
share a basic view of market–led growth and are
mutually reinforcing, each policy has its own
emphasis. They need to be balanced, as the
following examples make clear:
(1) Proper product and geographic market delin-
eation is crucial for competition decisions. This
is so because it makes it possible to calculate
market shares that convey meaningful informa-
tion regarding market power. While market
definition is not required for enterprise policy,
its instruments — such as internal market legis-
lation, standardisation and benchmarking —
may speed up changes in market structures
which should be reflected in the appropriate
market delineation of competition decisions.
(2) Enterprise policy emphasises the need to foster
innovation by creating widespread and closely
entwined knowledge pools, which in particular
help to raise the R & D potential of SMEs. From
a competition perspective, certain cooperation
agreements may imply anti-competitive behav-
iour such as market foreclosure or hampering
rivals’ innovation capability.
(3) Concentrations and cooperation agreements
between enterprises have the potential to
increase productive efficiencies and thus
competitiveness. Most cooperation agreements
are not problematic for competition and
benefit from antitrust exemptions due to effi-
ciency considerations. For the same reason, the
large majority of mergers is also approved
without raising any competition concerns.
(4) Technological development and innovation, the
drivers of increased productivity, are by their
nature uncertain. Assessing their effects for
future market dynamics and for future compet-
itive conditions is a permanent challenge.
Competition decisions can take such develop-
ments into account to the extent that their
consequences can be predicted with sufficient
certainty.
(5) Overall reduction of State aid to a minimum is
a generally agreed objective in light of their
potential market distortion effects. Yet, market
failures occur and justify targeted public
support mechanisms at a European, national or
regional level. A balance between State aid
control and overcoming market failures needs
then to be struck.
The situation in the United States is somewhat
different from that in the European Union. This is
the case for both institutional and substantive
issues, as concerns the synergy between competi-
tion and enterprise policies. For example, the US
competition authorities do not supervise aid
granted by federal or state institutions. Subsidies in
the fields of SMEs and venture capital, R & D in
‘strategic sectors’ like aerospace or semi-conductors
appear to have been more generous and targeted
than in the EU. The Commission and the authorities
of third countries must continue to work for more
coherence between the differing competition and
related economic policies and to minimise scope for
incompatible outcomes and for conflicts.
Currently, major parts of EU legislation governing
competition law are being reviewed. This providesEuropean competitiveness report 2002
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an occasion to consider further ways to balance
enterprise and competition policies.
The Green Paper on the review of the merger regu-
lation opens a debate on the issue of merger-
specific efficiencies. In particular, the question is to
what extent verifiable efficiency gains resulting from
a proposed merger can offset negative effects such
as price increases caused by the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position. Mergers in
innovative sectors are a case in point, because
economies of scale in R & D achieved through
mergers must be balanced against the need to
preserve sufficient R & D competition.
The modernisation of antitrust procedures will
remove the need to notify certain agreements in
advance, but companies will themselves have to
check whether their agreements and practices
comply with competition law. This will help to avoid
time-consuming administrative procedures, but will
also increase the necessity for rules guaranteeing suffi-
cient legal certainty. In this context, emphasis must be
also on the coherent application of Community law.
The challenge of the review of the technology transfer
block exemption regulation is to create a regulatory
environment that fosters R & D cooperation and
innovation while preventing anti-competitive prac-
tices that may reduce consumer welfare.
In its Communication on State aid and risk capital,
the Commission has recently established new criteria
enabling measures for the promotion of venture
capital to finance the start-up and early stages of
SMEs. The next step will be to evaluate to what
extent this and other instruments have permitted an
acceleration of entrepreneurial activity.
In sum, the interaction between the competition
and enterprise policies of the European Union
shows their synergy. Both policies need to adjust
continuously to new challenges: new markets, new
ways of doing business, new drivers of growth and
of dynamic competition. The reformulation of
enterprise policy in the light of the strategy adopted
at the Lisbon European Council and the ongoing
revision of competition legislation highlight the
need to be constantly attentive to maintaining and
strengthening this synergy.
Sustainable development and
the EU manufacturing industry
At the June 2001 Gothenburg summit, EU leaders
endorsed a strategy for sustainable development
relating to economic, social, and environmental
aspects of development. In this context the Euro-
pean Council stressed the importance of decoupling
economic growth from resource use.
Manufacturing industry, directly involved in the
transformation of materials into products, has often
been considered one of the major contributors to
environmental degradation. To examine the sustain-
ability of growth requires taking a broader defini-
tion of productivity to include the concept of envi-
ronmental productivity or ‘eco-efficiency’. This
notion takes into account the impact of production
on material resource use and the emission of 
pollutants.
The presence of distortions in resource use and the
absence of obvious market mechanisms for the
reduction of emissions of pollutants make public
action necessary. This can take different forms.
The major finding of this report is that EU manufac-
turing industry has very largely achieved decoupling
its growth from pressures on resources and the
environment. These substantial improvements in EU
industry’s eco-efficiency have been achieved
through increased regulation and stronger market
competition (Single Market programme, deregula-
tion), but also through increased investment and
better management of resources by industry itself.
Thus, despite the rise in manufacturing production
over the last 20 years, emissions of acidifying gases
declined by 67 % . Industrial emissions of ozone-
precursors (local air pollutants) have been reduced
in absolute terms by some 25 %. Production of
ozone-depleting gases in the European Union has
now almost ceased. Meanwhile energy consump-
tion has remained broadly constant and industrial
minerals consumption rose in line with production
until 1993 but less rapidly since then. A fall has
occurred in climate changing greenhouse gases
since the Kyoto baseline date of 1990.
Environmental policies have had a clear role in these
developments. For example, the most significant
decoupling of acidifying gases from economic
growth followed the Large Combustion Plants
Directive of 1988. Environmental policy played a
key role also in the phasing out of CFC ozone-
depleters. Policy progress has also been made on
local air pollution, albeit at a slower pace. Manufac-
turing industry has responded by developing new
technologies, improving its management practices,
and greater investment in pollution prevention
technologies. It is clear that the additional resources
made available by increased growth and produc-Executive summary
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tivity have been essential for the successful
financing of environmental progress.
Internationally, the performance of EU industry
compares favourably with that of US industry. In the
extreme case of acidifying emissions, the eco-effi-
ciency of EU industry has increased almost twice as
quickly as in the United States.
To achieve these improvements EU industry has had
to substantially increase its environmental protec-
tion expenditures that now stand at some 2 % of
the value-added of the manufacturing and energy
sectors. It is clear that this represents an aggregate
average and that in some sectors the cost has been
significantly higher. Also, these expenditures do not
include all costs of environmental protection since
some will be classified as higher input prices or
investment in new capital equipment.The present 2002 competitiveness report comple-
ments and extends the material discussed in the
2001 European competitiveness report. The two
complementary parts concern, respectively, the
importance of human capital in economic and
productivity growth and the productivity perform-
ance in European services. These, together with the
discussion of the determinants of productivity
performance in European manufacturing undertaken
in last year’s Report, provide an overview of European
productivity performance and its proximate determi-
nants in the period since the mid–1990s.
Two other parts of the report extend the discussion in
other directions. First, the growth of knowledge-
based industries, the central role of information and
communications technologies (ICT) and the
increasing importance of innovation in competitive
performance in recent years have important implica-
tions for the conduct of policies in the EU. One partic-
ular aspect is the synergy between enterprise and
competition policies. The report discusses the rela-
tionship between these two policies in their applica-
tion in the EU.
Finally, in recent years it has become evident that
success in increasing productivity, employment and
economic growth will only be temporary unless it
respects long-term sustainability constraints. These
are often associated with environmental sustain-
ability but the Gothenburg European Council
endorsed a broader concept involving economic and
social sustainability as well. While all sustainability
aspects are crucial to Europe’s future, the report
examines only progress made by EU manufacturing
industry in conforming to the environmental dimen-
sion in recent years.
The report is organised as follows:
Chapter I updates the evidence of productivity
growth in the European Union and the United
Introduction
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States during 2001 on the basis of recent data. The
discussion in last year’s report was based on provi-
sional and forecast data. What has been particularly
notable according to recent data is the mild slow-
down in economic activity relative to initial expec-
tations during 2001 and, especially in the United
States, the continuing growth in labour produc-
tivity. While less strong than in previous years, US
productivity growth continued during a year of
recession, a feature that is at variance with the
historical pro-cyclical performance of productivity
growth. One interpretation of that is that it consti-
tutes evidence suggestive of a structural break in
the determination of productivity growth. In the
European Union, productivity growth remained
positive but a substantially weaker rhythm.
Chapter II examines the issue of human capital and its
relationship to economic and productivity growth in
the European Union. The issue of skill formation has
been of great importance in the European Union and
many initiatives have been developed to encourage
it. Nevertheless, in recent years there has been, in
parallel with the acceleration of economic growth, a
concern that the demand for skilled employees
cannot be met within the present EU labour markets.
Some Member States appear to have experienced
severe shortages. Not only national labour markets
have been inefficient in providing the skills that firms
require but also the persistently limited labour
mobility in the European Union has not provided the
necessary workers through migration. Yet, a key
question is whether the under-performance of the
European Union in productivity and employment
growth during the second half of the 1990s could be
attributed in part to problems associated with skill
imbalances. This chapter gathers and discusses the
evidence on this and related questions.
Chapter III reviews the performance of productivity
growth in Europe’s service sector. The problem of
IntroductionEuropean competitiveness report 2002
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weak productivity growth in the European Union in
recent years has been particularly acute in the
service sector. Productivity in this sector is more
difficult to estimate and, despite the fact that many
ICT applications have been introduced vigorously in
services, this apparently has not contributed to
rapid productivity growth, or its acceleration, here.
Indeed, the slowdown in aggregate productivity
growth in the European Union during the second
half of the 1990s compared to earlier years, and the
small acceleration in productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector, suggest that the service
sector will have seen a notable slowdown in labour
productivity growth during this period. The
problem is, of course, compounded by the fact that
the share of services in EU GDP has been rising over
time even though it remains considerably lower
than in the US economy.
In the European Union, strong productivity growth
in telecommunications was recorded during the late
1990s. In financial intermediation and in the trans-
port sector, some Member States have also
recorded solid productivity growth. The stronger US
performance in the aggregate market services
productivity results from their very strong produc-
tivity gains in the wholesale and retail trade sector,
which compare with weak growth on the European
side. For the sectors where a trade-off between
employment and productivity growth seems to
exist, one finds an upward shift in this relationship
between the first and the second half of the 1990s:
at present, a given productivity growth rate seems
to be associated with higher employment growth.
Innovations in services may be poorly captured by
traditional measures such as R & D spending, but
survey data indicate that high-technology service
firms, such as computer services and telecommuni-
cations, carry out innovative activities even more
often than manufacturing firms.
Many services sectors have been traditionally highly
regulated, but the general trend in the past two
decades has been towards extensive liberalisation
and regulatory reform. Evidence on market liberali-
sation points to enhanced productivity and higher
growth following liberalisation measures. Structural
reforms put forward at the European Council
meeting in Lisbon in March 2000 call for a continu-
ation of this process. The creation of a genuine
internal market in services is a major challenge for
the European Union.
Chapter IV reviews the relationship between enter-
prise policy and competition policy and, in partic-
ular, the way in which they complement each other.
This complementarity is crucial for any coherent
policy framework. High and sustainable productivity
growth depends on a regulatory environment that
enables enterprises to access new markets and to
turn inventions into innovations; this is a key objec-
tive of enterprise policy. At the same time, this envi-
ronment must also ensure that all market partici-
pants are subject to uniform rules, an objective
pursued by competition policy. In principle, both
policies are reinforcing each other. Safeguarding
effective competition induces firms to search for
efficiency-enhancing solutions that raise produc-
tivity and lead to product and process innovation,
whereas enterprise policy corrects market failures
and enables more firms to engage in market trans-
actions, thus increasing the population of poten-
tially innovative firms.
While enterprise and competition policies share a
common of market-led growth, the reformulation
of enterprise policy in the light of the strategy
adopted at the Lisbon European Council, and the
ongoing revision of competition legislation high-
light the need to be constantly attentive to main-
taining and strengthening this synergy.
Chapter V discusses the progress made by the
manufacturing industry in the European Union in
meeting the environmental sustainability objectives
set out in the Gothenburg Council. As real incomes
increase, emissions of pollutants at first increase but
subsequently peak and begin to decline at higher
income levels, and this has clearly been seen over
the last 20 years in the case of the manufacturing
enterprises in the European Union. The data
suggest that the manufacturing industry has been
able to achieve higher economic growth without
increasing environmental pressure and it appears
that, far from increasing, environmental pressures
from manufacturing are generally declining.
The role of environmental policy has been crucial in
these developments. For example, the most signifi-
cant decoupling of acidifying gas emissions from
economic growth followed the Large Combustion
Plants Directive of 1988 and environmental policy
has also played a key role in the phasing out of CFC
ozone-depleters. In addition to environmental
policy, stronger market competition, increased
investment in pollution prevention technologies,
developing new technologies and better manage-
ment of resources by industry have also contributed
to this progress.I.1 Introduction
The present chapter discusses some evidence on
productivity, output and employment growth in the
European Union during 2001, thus updating the
evidence presented in 2001 European competitive-
ness report, and reviews some ideas that were
central to the 2001 Report. In essence, the purpose
of this chapter is to set the stage for the discussion
in the rest of the present report.
The 2001 competitiveness report stressed that the
decline in productivity growth during the second half
of the 1990s in the EU, which contrasted markedly
with the experience of the United States, was related
to the slow take up of ICT and the timid and frag-
mented innovation record of Europe. The role of ICT
in these developments, and after some initial doubts
about the interpretation of the evidence, is now
widely accepted1. A variety of factors could explain
these developments, and the diversity of perform-
ance between the smaller EU Member States and the
larger ones, suggests that country-specific elements
may be decisive. Partly as a consequence of the slow-
down in productivity growth, but also because of
slow employment growth, the standards of living in
the European Union have grown at slow pace and
relative to the United States there has been a decline
throughout the previous decade.
The role of firms, as the 2001 report saw it, is crucial
in economic growth. Growth of firms is determined
by their ability to innovate, which is closely related to
their ability to develop and utilise technological
advances and exploit the commercial opportunities
of their innovations. The environment where firms
Chapter I — Productivity growth in the European Union in recent years
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emerge and develop, a wide network of relationships
between industry and the scientific base of a nation
and among researchers, as well as the stock of
internal-to-the-firm capabilities play also a crucial
role. These innovations are facilitated and stimulated
by the employment of new techniques in production
and by corresponding organisational changes associ-
ated with the deployment of new information and
communications technologies2. A clear example is
the use of ICT in making possible the growth of the
life sciences sector and, in particular, biotechnology.
Biotechnology also offers clear evidence of the need
for the European Union to develop new instruments
and approaches to support the growth of this sector3.
The report also stressed, among other considera-
tions, that productivity growth in manufacturing in
the United States and in the European Union alike is
dependent upon these factors and on the firms’
R & D activity. The report found that high R & D
intensity is never associated with low productivity
growth while low R & D intensity is usually associ-
ated with low productivity growth4. R & D intensity
and productivity growth are significantly related
across sectors and it is possible that spillover effects
are also present. Technology-driven industries have
invariably been the leaders in productivity growth
in both the European Union and the United States
and the sectoral patterns of productivity growth is
becoming similar over time. Clearly, the larger size
of the technology-driven sectors in the US economy
than in the European Union implies that the contri-
bution of these sectors to overall productivity
growth is more marked.
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2 Evidence is now emerging about the character and reasons for firm restruc-
turing across various nations. In Canada, for example (no comparable studies
are easily available for the Member States), the most common form of
restructuring has been the adoption of new technologies, which, in turn, has
been driven primarily by the availability of new technologies and less by their
cost; see Kwan (2002). 
3 In acknowledging the importance of biotechnology for Europe’s future the
Commission adopted in January 2002 an action plan to support it; see Euro-
pean Commission (2002).
4 See European Commission (2001), chapter 4.
1 Among various difficulties in assessing unambiguously the role of ICT in US
growth has been the issue of quality adjustment of investment. Pakko
(2002), however, concludes that ‘tests for evaluating how important high-
tech investment is in explaining the rapid growth rates of the late 1990s are
largely invariant to (this) accounting for quality’.European competitiveness report 2002
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Another strand of literature is now emerging
concerning the character of the new economy and
the role of ICT and knowledge in economic growth.
Quah (2002) argues that, unlike the conventional
supply-side view that ICT affects productivity
growth, ICT affects economic growth through the
demand side. ICT, and the new economy with
which it is virtually synonymous, does not simply
affect cost conditions and the supply of goods and
services but, more fundamentally, the nature of
goods and services which are now beginning to
resemble knowledge. This means that these goods
have ‘all the relevant economic properties of knowl-
edge, infinite expandability and disrespect for geog-
raphy’ (Quah, p. 10). Such goods are now crucial
both because they constitute a rising fraction of
consumption and because they are available directly
to a large and increasing number of consumers.
This implies that the spread of ICT and of the new
economy may be constrained by not only existing
rigidities in modern economies and by low tech-
nical expertise among potential users but, more
crucially, by reluctance of consumers to participate
in it. Ignorance and poor appreciation of scientific
knowledge may be at the root of the slow diffusion
of ICT in some Member States.
I.2 Output, employment and
productivity growth in 2001
Recent data show that labour productivity growth in
the United States has continued to advance through
2001 despite the recession, albeit at a pace weaker
than in recent years. For the year as a whole, labour
productivity growth advanced at 1.2, indicating that
fundamental factors that have affected productivity
in recent years are continuing to play a role in US
economic performance5. While it is possible that
during the recovery phase unanticipated increases in
demand could lead to higher levels of capacity utili-
sation and, thus, productivity growth, the persist-
ence of strong productivity growth in the United
States during a year of recession indicates that invest-
ment in new technology and innovation assets are
producing benefits for the firms that have under-
taken them and for the economy as a whole.
In the EU, labour productivity growth was only 0.5 %
in 2001, persisting on the path of slow growth that
began in the mid-1990s. The contrasting experience
of the European Union and the United States in 2001
shows the importance of technological and other
innovations in supporting productivity growth even
during weak economic conditions. It appears that the
US economy is enjoying considerable flexibility to be
in a position to accommodate positive productivity
growth during a recession period, suggesting that
perhaps a structural change in the behaviour of
labour productivity has occurred which could have
significant implications for the medium term growth
prospects of the US economy6.
Such evidence has not emerged conclusively for the
EU economy yet, even though it is possible that the
effects are currently operating in the background7,
possibly resembling the same difficulties in
detecting the impact of ICT on the economy as in
the United States in previous years. During the
second half of the 1990s, the importance of ICT
capital accumulation in the European Union has
undoubtedly increased8 and the euro area is begin-
ning to experience these benefits. However, a
decline in total factor productivity growth during
this period indicates that spillover effects from ICT
to the rest of the economy have yet to be seen9.
Graph I.1 shows trends in the standards of living in
the United States and the European Union over the
period 1970–2003 (the data for 2002 and 2003 are
based on the Commission’s autumn 2001 fore-
casts), measured by GDP per capita in PPS in 1995
prices as well as the ratio of the two variables (lower
panel). Although both variables have trended
upwards during the period in question, the Euro-
pean Union variables has grown at a markedly
slower pace than the US variable. As a result, the
ratio has stagnated within a narrow range of
between 65 % and 70 %. In 2001 this ratio was
68.6 %. Table I.1 shows the ranking of the Member
States in terms of US GDP per capita.
Clearly, under present circumstances, the global
ambitions of the Lisbon strategy will be difficult to
realise. Nevertheless, the performance of selected
Member States is comparable or even better than
the United States. Table I.2 presents relevant data
on economic growth for the Member States and
5 The Bureau of Labour Statistics estimated that in the last quarter of 2001
(2001:Q1) non-farm business productivity advanced at an annual rate of
5.2 % bringing the annual average to 2.0 %. Productivity growth is 
pro-cyclical, that is, it slows down during periods of slow growth and accel-
erates in the recovery, a reflection of labour hoarding behaviour on the part
of firms. It is possible, however, that an over-adjustment of employment
following the September 2001 terrorist shock may also have contributed to
the productivity growth in 2001:Q4. 
6 The Council of Economic Advisers suggests that the structural component of
labour productivity growth since 1995 in the United States averaged to
3.07 % and it contributed 1.7 percentage points to measured labour produc-
tivity growth of 2.60 % during the period 1995 to 2001; see Council of
Economic Advisers (2002), chapter 1, p. 61.
7 See Vijselaar and Albers (2002) for this suggestion.
8 Vijselaar and Albers (2002) estimate that ICT capital accounted for 21 % of
output growth in the euro area in the period 1996–99, up from 13 % in
1991–95.
9 Again, Vijselaar and Albers (2002) estimate that total factor productivity
contributed 92 % of output growth in the euro area in the period 1991–95
but only 33 % in the period 1996–99.Chapter I — Productivity growth in the European Union in recent years
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Table I.3 data on the employment growth. The
Member States are ranked according to the best
performance in the second half of the 1990s.
In 2001, GDP growth in the European Union was
1.6 % and employment growth 1.1 %. In the
United States, the corresponding data are 1.1 %
and – 0.1 %, while in Japan both employment and
productivity growth resulted in a decline in GDP
growth of 0.6 %. It is likely that the growth in
labour productivity during the slow growth of last
year in the United States effectively prevented the
recession from becoming worse. Productivity
growth kept disposable incomes, which typically
slump during a recession, growing and consumer
spending supporting domestic and international
demand growth. While it is difficult to forecast
developments in productivity growth in coming
years, it is possible that the structural improvement
in US productivity growth, suggested by the data,
will augur well for income and wealth growth. It is
clearly important that the European Union moves
towards a similar growth trajectory to improve its
medium-term income and wealth prospects.
The accompanying tables indicate that the perform-
ance of the Member States was diverse in 2001,
however broadly matching that of previous years.
Ireland registered the fastest growth in real GDP in
2001 (6.5 %) followed by Greece (4.1 %) and
Luxembourg (4.0 %). Of the largest EU economies,
the United Kingdom grew at 2.3 %, France at 2.0 %,
Italy at 1.8 % and Germany at 0.6 %. Compared the
ranking in terms of GDP growth in the 1995–2001
period, Finland experienced the largest decline in
GDP growth falling to 0.5 % in 2001.
Graph I.1: GDP at 1995 market prices per head of population
(left scale in 1995 PPS; 2001estimate; 2002–03 forecasts; right scale EU/US ratio)
Source: AMECO databank update 25.02.2002 (DG ECFIN).
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Table I.1: GDP per capita in EU Member States, US and Japan in 2001 (US=100)
Luxembourg 137 Germany 72 Spain 57
Ireland 83 Italy 70 Portugal 50
Denmark 83 Finland 70 Greece 49
Netherlands 79 United Kingdom 70 EU–15 69
Austria 75 Sweden 69 United States 100
Belgium 73 France 68 Japan 72
Source: Commission services.European competitiveness report 2002
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Table I.3: Employment growth in EU Member States, US and Japan in 1975–2001; 
employment rates in 2001
(average growth (%), ranked according to performance in 1995–2001)
1975–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2001 2001 Employment 
rate in 2001
Ireland 0.0 1.1 1.9 5.1 2.3 67
Spain - 1.6 3.3 - 0.5 2.7 2.3 58
Netherlands 0.5 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.0 76
Luxembourg 0.0 1.4 0.5 2.5 5.5 65
Finland 0.5 0.3 - 3.8 2.1 1.4 67
France 0.2 1.0 - 0.2 1.3 1.6 63
United Kingdom - 0.2 1.8 - 0.9 1.2 0.7 72
Belgium - 0.4 1.0 - 0.2 1.1 1.2 60
Italy 0.8 0.8 - 0.7 1.1 1.5 59
Denmark 0.5 0.1 - 0.2 1.0 0.4 78
Sweden 0.5 1.0 - 2.2 0.9 1.8 75
Germany 0.2 1.4 - 0.8 0.6 0.1 69
Portugal - 0.3 1.1 - 0.6 0.5 1.5 73
Greece 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.1 55
Austria 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.0 73
EU–15 0.1 1.4 - 0.6 1.2 1.1 66
United States 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.3 - 0.1 74
Japan 0.9 1.0 0.8 - 0.1 - 0.3 77
Source: Commission services.
Table I.2: Growth of real GDP in EU Member States, US and Japan in 1975–2001
(average annual growth (%), ranked according to performance in 1995–2001)
1975–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2001 2001
Ireland 3.5 4.6 4.7 9.3 6.5
Luxembourg 2.4 6.4 3.9 6.0 4.0
Finland 2.9 3.3 - 0.7 4.3 0.5
Spain 1.6 4.5 1.5 3.6 2.7
Greece 2.1 1.2 1.2 3.5 4.1
Portugal 3.0 5.7 1.7 3.5 1.7
Netherlands 1.9 3.3 2.1 3.3 1.5
United Kingdom 1.9 3.3 1.8 2.8 2.3
Sweden 1.6 2.5 0.6 2.7 1.4
Belgium 2.1 3.2 1.4 2.6 1.3
Denmark 2.1 1.3 2.0 2.4 1.3
France 2.4 3.3 1.1 2.4 2.0
Austria 2.4 3.2 2.0 2.3 1.1
Italy 3.0 2.9 1.3 1.9 1.8
Germany 2.2 3.4 1.5 1.6 0.6
EU–15 2.3 3.3 1.4 2.4 1.6
United States 3.4 3.2 2.4 3.6 1.1
Japan 3.8 4.9 1.4 1.1 - 0.6
Source: Commission services.Chapter I — Productivity growth in the European Union in recent years
21
Employment growth moderated significantly across
the European Union in 2001 but the ranking of the
Member States remains broadly similar as during
the 1995–2001 averages. However, in some cases
employment growth accelerated considerably. In
Luxembourg, it advanced at a rate of 5.5 %; in
Sweden, at 1.8 %; in Portugal, at 1.5 %; and in
Greece, at 1.1 %. These growth rates are twice as
high as those corresponding during the 1995–2001
averages are.
Table I.4 updates the data on labour productivity
growth. There were marked changes in the pattern
of productivity growth across the Member States
especially those that had a stellar performance
during the 1995–2001 period. Portugal, Finland,
Sweden, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands
saw a sharp decrease in the rate of productivity
growth and, with the exception of Portugal, these
also had negative productivity growth last year.
These developments mirror the employment
growth seen in these countries. Nevertheless,
productivity growth substantially exceeding the EU
average was recorded in Ireland, (4.1 %), Greece
(3.0 %), Austria (1.1 %), the United Kingdom
(1.6 %) and in Denmark (0.9 %).
The remaining ten Member States saw positive
growth of labour productivity and of employment
during 2001. Table I.5 tabulates the Member States
according to positive or negative productivity
growth in 2001. An encouraging feature of this
tabulation is that a majority of Member States
realised both job creation and positive productivity
growth last year10. Such a configuration of these
variables is, clearly, the ultimate objective of the
Lisbon strategy.
The decline in ICT stock values in recent months has
led some to suggest that the ‘new economy’ has
come to an end. It is important to recall, however,
that the recent cycle of boom and bust in ICT invest-
ment is not exceptional but consistent with the
historical experience associated with new technolog-
ical breakthroughs. As noted earlier, the modernisa-
tion of those economies that have succeeded in
entrenching the role of ICT in productive life has
Table I.4: Labour productivity in EU Member States, US and Japan in 1975–2001
(average annual growth of GDP/employed person (%), ranked according to performance in 1995–2001)
1975–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2001 2001 Labour
productivity 
in 2001
(US=100)
Ireland 3.5 3.5 2.7 4.0 4.1 90
Greece 1.0 0.5 0.7 3.0 3.0 64
Portugal 3.3 4.6 2.3 2.9 0.2 49
Finland 2.4 3.0 3.2 2.1 - 0.8 77
Austria 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.1 89
Sweden 1.1 1.4 2.8 1.7 - 0.4 69
United Kingdom 2.1 1.5 2.7 1.5 1.6 73
Luxembourg 2.2 3.1 1.2 1.5 - 1.4 108
Belgium 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.4 0.1 92
Denmark 1.6 1.2 2.2 1.4 0.9 78
France 2.4 2.4 1.5 1.2 - 0.2 87
Germany 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.4 74
Italy 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.9 0.3 83
Spain 3.2 1.2 2.0 0.7 0.4 73
Netherlands 2.0 1.1 1.2 0.7 - 0.4 94
EU–15 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.2 0.5 78
United States 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.9 1.2 100
Japan 2.9 3.8 0.6 1.2 - 0.3 67
Note: Growth rates were calculated on the basis of GDP at constant 1995 prices and national currencies, while the 2001 productivity levels are 
based on GDP at current market prices and PPS.
Source: Commission services.
10 The characteristics of employment, productivity and GDP growth in recent
years were discussed extensively in European Commission (2001), chapter 2.
Vijselaar and Albers (2002) note that the effects of ICT on European produc-
tivity may already be ‘discretely operating in the background’ but because of
long gestation periods they are not immediately apparent. If this is true, then
estimates of potential output growth in the Euro area over the medium term
should be skewed towards the upside.European competitiveness report 2002
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made it possible to cushion the impact of the slow-
down on income and spending growth. Sustained
productivity growth has permitted private disposable
incomes to grow, thus supporting economic activity
and mitigating the effect of the recession. The ICT-
based transformation of economic activity has led to
a structural break resulting in a higher rate of produc-
tivity growth. The experience of the United States,
but also of some of the EU Member States, suggests
strongly that a new era of higher structural produc-
tivity growth may be under way11.
The Lisbon and subsequent European Councils have
also stressed the importance of the technological
modernisation of the European Union and a more
comprehensive and supportive approach to encour-
aging innovation. The Barcelona Council re-affirmed
that target of modernising the economic and social
structures to enhance productivity and employment
growth and put special emphasis on encouraging
the growth of frontier technologies12. It remains to
be seen, however, whether entrepreneurs will
consider these reforms as sufficient to spur the
necessary modernisation and innovations to set EU
productivity growth on a permanently higher path.
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Table I.5: Labour productivity growth in 2001
Positive productivity growth Negative productivity growth
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Greece, Ireland,  France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Italy, Portugal, Austria, United Kingdom Sweden
Source: Tables I.3 and I.4II.1 Introduction
The issue of skill shortages has gained prominence in
the European Union specifically because it has
emerged in the context of continuing high unemploy-
ment and because it concerns skills in areas where the
European Union has ambitions to excel. According to
recent evidence, the United States continues to domi-
nate the world’s knowledge economy while the Euro-
pean Union is trailing behind13. The advance towards
a knowledge-based economy, such as visualised by
the Lisbon European Council, must be characterised
by a process of accumulation of scientific and tech-
nical skills and by a general upgrading of the stock of
human capital in the EU. Furthermore, it is also neces-
sary that the proper flexibility in the allocation of
human capital, in those occupations where its
marginal product is highest, be present.
This chapter reviews mismatches in skills and their
importance in hampering productivity growth in
the EU. Section II.2 discusses briefly the importance
of human capital in economic growth; section II.3
discusses the changing structure of the demand for
skills in the EU; section II.4 discusses the issue of the
supply of skills and, finally, Annex 1 provides a brief
review of the literature on schooling, earnings and
economic growth.
In recent months, evidence of skill shortages has
characterised the European Union in a revealing
manner. In spring 2002, for example, the German
government debated the introduction of legislation
that would permit foreign scientific and technical
personnel to work in the high-technology industries
Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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of Germany. It appears that the implications of skill
imbalances in some EU Member States is now
threatening the growth prospects of new technolo-
gies in Europe and the prospects of economic
growth more generally.
The coexistence of unfilled skill vacancies14 and of
unemployment is indicative of the presence of,
perhaps severe, labour market imbalances. In a
recent review, the European Central Bank stressed
that despite an average unemployment rate of 8.1 %
in 2001 in the euro area, many employers reported
difficulties in recruiting workers. This constitutes
evidence of difficulties in matching demand for and
the supply of labour. In particular, the Beveridge
curve15 for most of the euro area Member States for
which unfilled vacancy data are available16 appears
to have shifted outwards over the period 1980–2000.
Compared to 1980, the Beveridge curve has shifted
outwards in Belgium, Germany, Greece and, to a
lesser extent, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. Such
a movement is also suggested to have taken place in
France and in Italy. In the Netherlands there was an
inward shift of the curve while in Spain and Portugal
and, as suggested, in Ireland no discernible move-
ment has taken place.
At the background of these shifts there is, first, a
mismatch suggested by the demand for and supply
CHAPTER II
Human capital and productivity growth 
in the European Union
14 The lack of reliable and comprehensive statistics concerning vacancies consti-
tutes a major obstacle in analysing labour demand and the occurrence of skill
shortages. 
15 The Beveridge curve plots the rate of unemployment against the vacancy
rate. A priori, the relationship is expected to be negative, so that an increase
in vacancies would correspondingly lead to a reduction in unemployment,
and vice versa. Thus, movements along the curve reflect the influence of the
business cycle. However, when the curve shifts away from the origin, this is
suggestive of structural problems as, for a given level of vacancies, for
example, corresponds a higher level of unemployment. On the contrary,
shifts towards the origin suggest an allocational improvement in the labour
market. Movement of the Beveridge curve over time can be used to indicate
whether the efficiency of the matching process in the labour market is
improving or deteriorating; see European Central Bank (2002). 
16 These are Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal and Finland; no vacancies data for France, Ireland and Italy
were available.
13 See Robert Huggins Associates (2002). This Report provides a ranking of the
top 90 world’s most knowledge competitive regions in 2002. In total, 49 US
regions are included in this group of the 90 world regions, and of these 45
are present in the top 50 performers. There are 32 European regions in the
group but only 4 (Stockholm, Switzerland, Uusimaa in Finland and London)
feature in the list of the top 50 performers. European competitiveness report 2002
24
of skills/employees along educational
attainment–educational mismatch. This appears to
have been particularly pronounced during the
1997–2000 growth spurt but, more generally,
educational mismatches in 2000 have worsened
when compared to 1992. This has been most
notable in Germany, France, Ireland and Austria but
also, albeit less so, in Belgium, Italy and Finland. On
the other hand, educational mismatches have
declined sharply in the Netherlands and in Portugal.
Second, there is an occupational mismatch which in
ten of the euroarea Member States (data for France and
the Netherlands are not available) worsened substan-
tially between 1992 and 1997. However, between
1997 and 1999 the extent of the occupational
mismatch decreased. Moreover, it appears that occu-
pational mismatches were present not just in high-
technology areas but also in areas requiring lesser skills.
Finally, there is a regional mismatch, a characteristic
and consequence of labour immobility. This plays
an important role in Belgium, Germany and Italy
where this mismatch is particularly pronounced. In
the euro area as a whole, regional mismatch
increased during the 1997–99 period after consider-
able reductions in the 1990–97 period17.
The issues suggested by these phenomena are
crucial to the good functioning of labour markets
and to attaining sustainable economic growth.
Educational mismatches, in particular, are also crit-
ical in the adoption and diffusion of new technolo-
gies and for future income opportunities in a
knowledge-based economy.
II.2 The role of human capital
in economic growth
There is a substantial body of literature that examines
the role of human capital in economic and produc-
tivity growth. A growing economy depends in a
crucial manner on the rate of accumulation of human
capital, and the latter depends on raising the private
return to investing in this knowledge. Also, some
models emphasise the role of the stock of human
capital in economic growth because this constitutes
the basis on which innovations are built18. Ultimately,
the continuous process of human capital accumula-
tion, as well as the stock of human capital, as
reflected in the growth of new technological and
educational opportunities, sustain economic growth.
Human capital plays a crucial role in economic
growth due to the externalities associated with it19.
The presence of these externalities implies that the
social rate of return to education exceeds the private
rate of return. Such externalities occur when knowl-
edge accumulation leads to innovations and an
expansion of technological possibilities, where knowl-
edge is a complementary factor in the introduction
and efficient use of new technologies, or where
threshold effects in human capital accumulations
stimulates the creation of new knowledge and
expands the range of economic and scientific possi-
bilities. Nations with a high level of education are able
to absorb new technologies developed elsewhere
faster and with less cost compared to those nations
with a lesser stock of human capital; moreover, these
nations have a greater potential to produce domesti-
cally scientific, technological and commercial innova-
tions. Higher levels of human capital, which are
invariably associated with R & D intensive activities,
increase the rate of technological progress and the
introduction of newer vintages of capital, thus raising
the rate of economic growth. Finally, increases in the
level of education are invariably associated with
higher labour force participation rates, especially
among females, a point of particular importance in
the European Union considering present trends in this
variable and in view of the Lisbon goals20.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide empirical
evidence21 on the role of human capital, among other
variables, in economic growth within a convergence
framework22. In two samples of 87 and of 97 coun-
19 The more recent theories of economic growth, where knowledge is a central
factor, were reviewed in the European Commission (2001a), Annex II.1.
20 However, it is also possible that higher levels of education may not
contribute to output growth when education is simply a credential signalling
an individual’s productivity, or when there is widespread unemployment
among the educated in which case increases in the level of education could
reduce output growth; clearly, in these cases the social rate of return to
education is lower than the private rate of return. 
21 See Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), chapter 12, p. 431–432 in particular. The
Barro and Sala–i–Martin reference is chosen here partly because it represents a
good summary of the material but also because the empirical literature
supports the hypothesis that the level of human capital, as formulated by Barro
and Sala–i–Martin, rather than the rate of its accumulation, as proposed by
endogenous growth theories, affects economic growth. The significant impact
of the stock of human capital on economic growth suggests that large exter-
nalities are present and that this variable stands in for the potential to absorb
and diffuse technology rather than being just a factor of production in itself. Bils
and Klenow, on the other hand, find that the causality runs from growth to
education rather than the other way around; see Bils and Klenow (1998).
22 Specifically, the convergence framework postulates that the growth rate of
GDP per capita over a particular period is inversely related to the initial level
of GDP per capita, a hypothesis that finds support in a variety of data sets.
The underlying reason for this is the fact that diminishing returns to repro-
ducible factors characterise the economy so that the richer countries would
tend to grow slower than the less wealthy ones. Krueger and Lindahl (2001)
attempt a reconciliation between the macroeconomic (social rate of return to
education) and the microeconomic (private rate of return to education)
approaches to the question of the contribution of human capital to
economic growth. The microeconomic approach, of course, is not interested
in the economy–wide implications of education.
17 See the discussion in European Central Bank (2002) of the evidence on the
three types of labour market mismatch.
18 See, for example, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a survey of the empirical
evidence. The authors are sceptical about whether there is reliable formal
evidence on the impact of education on economic growth; also for a discus-
sion of the theoretical and empirical issues see Barro and Sala–i–Martin
(1995), especially chapter 12, and also Romer (1996), especially chapter 3.Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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tries covering a broad spectrum of growth experi-
ences, they test whether lagged values of educational
variables affect the growth rate in the current period.
The initial values of the sample cover the period
1965–75 and 1975–85. The empirical results suggest
that the initial state of school-attainment variables
positively affects growth rates in subsequent periods.
In particular, secondary and higher level schooling for
males and females observed at the start of the decade,
in 1965 and in 1975, enter the equations with statisti-
cally significant positive coefficients while primary
level attainment variables are insignificant.
The gender disaggregation is also found to be jointly
statistically significant. The results suggest that for the
decade 1965–75, an increase in male secondary
schooling by 0.68 years raises the subsequent growth
rate by 1.1 percentage points per year and an increase
in higher schooling by 0.091 years raises the growth
rate by 0.5 percentage points per year. However, the
Barro and Sala-i-Martin results find that the initial
levels of female secondary and higher education tend
to affect negatively the rate of economic growth in
subsequent periods. Barro and Sala–i–Martin note
that this puzzling evidence may be suggestive of the
possibility that wide differences between male and
female educational attainment reflect the backward-
ness of the nations in question, with the consequence
that less female educational attainment signifies more
backwardness and, therefore, greater convergence
potential. Finally, the results indicate that the speed of
convergence is positively and significantly affected by
the presence of human capital in the economy, so that
the higher the stock of human capital the faster the
convergence process. 
However, some empirical evidence has questioned
the presumption that human capital has played an
unambiguous role in productivity and economic
growth, thus casting doubt on the theoretical predic-
tions based on the accumulation effects of human
capital. It is possible that, in addition to accumulation
effects, allocation effects as well as the matching
process between skills and jobs are crucial23. The
purpose of this chapter is to review these aspects.
The 2001 competitiveness report has already
suggested that the deceleration of European
productivity during the second half of the 1990s be
related to the under-performance in investment in
new technologies, in R & D and in innovation.
Graph II.1 shows that the sources of Europe’s
23 Quah (2002) considers that the absence of such evidence derives from the
misunderstood nature of the new economy. The rise in the importance of total
factor productivity in economic growth is a reflection of a successful economy
where the science and knowledge base is expanding rather than a mismeasure-
ment of factor inputs. In one class of models human capital can determine the
level of productivity but not its growth rate, which depends on the growth of
technology but not on human capital decisions; in another class, human capital
determines productivity growth. As mentioned in chapter I, the characteristics
of goods and services in the ICT-based new economy resemble those of knowl-
edge and depend to a large extent on the behaviour of the demand side. 
Graph II.1: Average years of education of the working population, 1971–99
(Average years of US education = 100)
Source: Calculated from de la Fuente and Domenech (2001) and extended using OECD (2001) data and de la Fuente and Domenech’s (2001)
perpetual inventory method and graduation weights.
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under-performance relative to the United States
may be deeper-seated and related also to educa-
tional attainment. The data suggest that for the EU,
throughout the past 30 or so years, there has been
a convergence process in the formation of human
capital towards the higher level attained by the
United States. It is possible that the lower level of
educational attainment of the European Union
compared to the United States has coalesced with
various other aspects that play a role in the intro-
duction and diffusion of new technologies to result
in slower productivity growth. Technological
modernisation and the stimulus to innovation
depend crucially on the availability of skilled profes-
sionals to facilitate and take advantage of the
opportunities that emerge. Even though Europe has
made significant strides in raising the average level
of education in the working population throughout
the past 30 years, there still remains a significant
gap relative to the United States to be bridged. The
evidence of skill imbalances indicates a failure to
take full advantage of new technologies and to
sustain an increase in economic growth.
By 1999 average years of schooling in the working
population of the European Union had risen to
around 87 % of the corresponding US level (Japan’s
performance is virtually identical to that of the US
with average years of schooling approaching the
same level as in the US), up from just over 70 % in
1971. The data suggest that it took the European
Union around 15 years from 1971 to halve the
initial difference in the average level of education
against the United States. It is clear that Europe’s
ambition for a knowledge-based economy should at
least be to cover the remaining distance in the
shortest period of time. The competitive race for
growth in the knowledge economy is a challenge
that Europe must confront without delay.
II.3 Skills and employment
growth
The structure of labour demand in the European
Union has changed in important ways in recent
years. The coexistence of skill shortages and the
under-performance of most EU economies with
respect to the resurgence in US productivity growth
has led to the notion that a broadening of invest-
ment in education, training and research may serve
to fulfil the growth potential. This section reviews
the skill content and relative factor intensity of
changes in EU employment and output in recent
years. What exactly is the nature of the change in
labour demand with respect to educational attain-
ment, what are the differences by Member State
and how does the growth of employment relate to
the accumulation of capital and knowledge? This
information is essential to be in a position to
adequately weigh the supply response and evaluate
the role of matching efficiency in comparative
growth performance.
II.3.1 Employment growth 
in the European Union
A first question in the changing structure of EU
labour demand concerns the extent to which devel-
opments in employment parallel systematic sector
differences that reflect the asymmetric labour
market effects of technological change24.
As technological innovations are often labour saving,
jobs in some sectors are lost while others are created
in emerging branches of economic activity. In the
second half of the 1990s, employment growth in the
European Union was heavily dominated by service
sector activities, which created 11.4 million jobs in
net terms25. Over half of employment creation in the
service sector reflected job creation in general busi-
ness services and health and social work. About 1.4
million jobs were created in industry in the same
period, roughly divided between manufacturing
(especially in high-tech sectors) and construction.
However, this growth was offset by significant job
losses in agriculture, fishing, mining and utilities. By
2000, two out of every three jobs in the European
Union were in the service sector.
Overall employment growth between 1995 and
2000 at the sectoral level, disaggregated on the
basis of skill content, shows that job growth was
largely confined to jobs for medium- and high-skill
workers. There was strong growth in the employ-
ment of high-skill workers across all sectors, except
fishing and mining, with especially high rates of
growth in transport, general business services and
private households with employed persons. The
demand for medium-skill workers was also strong
across the service sector, but experience in industry
has been much more varied. More specifically,
employment of medium-skill workers increased in
those sectors where the demand for high-skill
workers was also strong: in manufacturing,
construction and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. In
fact, the demand for skilled workers continues to be
24 Needless to say, recruitment difficulties have been reported in lower-skilled
occupations in several Member States so that the skill imbalances and recruit-
ment difficulties that have received most attention, those in the high-tech-
nology, high-human capital occupations, constitute only part of the picture.
25 Due to definition differences in the minimum number of hours, these esti-
mates differ from those quoted in European Commission (2001b), p. 29,
which puts overall net job creation at just under 10 million.Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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strongest in high-tech and high-education sectors,
which accounted for more than a third of net job
creation between 1995 and 2000. In the previous
year alone, these sectors created a net total of 1.6
million jobs26. In contrast, the number of low-skill
workers in employment fell in almost all sectors, but
it was particularly pronounced in the non-manufac-
turing parts of industry and in financial intermedia-
tion (shedding no less than one-eighth of its low-
skill employment per year). Only construction,
general business services and private households
exhibited employment growth for low-skill workers,
albeit at very moderate rates — see Table II.127.
The general consequence of these sector-specific
developments is that since 1995 and for the Euro-
pean Union as a whole, the proportion of medium-
and high-skill employees has increased while the
share of low-skill workers in employment has fallen.
In 2000, medium-skill employees represented the
largest group in the EU, accounting for some 45 %
of all employees.
The distribution of employees’ educational attain-
ment across sectors follows a pattern that is broadly
similar to that of employment growth. Overall,
highly skilled workers account for a larger propor-
tion of the service sector’s employment compared
with agriculture and industry. The main exceptions
to this are hotels and restaurants and private house-
holds, where employment is characterised by rela-
tively low wages. High skill workers account for a
very low share of these sectors’ employment in the
26 See European Commission (2001b), p. 29–44.
27 Given the persistently high level of unemployment in the EU, it is important
to stress that job creation across all skill categories would have contributed
decisively to reduction in joblessness. Note also that the data of the present
table, based on the Labour force survey, differ slightly from those reported in
chapter I where the source is the national accounts statistics.
Table II.1: Employment growth by NACE 1 digit sector, 1995–2000
Total Total  ISCED 1–2  ISCED 3–4  ISCED 5–6 
employment  annual rate  annual rate  annual rate  annual rate 
absolute of growth of growth of growth of growth
growth
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry - 1 270.3 - 3.8 - 6.2 0.4 2.1
Fishing - 46.9 - 4.5 - 4.5 - 4.4 - 4.7
Mining, quarrying - 153.8 - 5.6 - 9.1 - 4.8 0.0
Manufacturing 705.0 0.5 - 2.9 2.2 3.7
Electricity, gas and water 
supply - 143.4 - 2.3 - 6.2 - 2.0 0.4
Construction 750.0 1.3 0.2 1.8 3.6
Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair 1 343.9 1.2 - 3.9 4.3 4.9
Hotels, restaurants 429.1 1.5 - 2.6 5.8 5.1
Transport, storage, 
communication 696.1 1.6 - 3.8 4.1 6.4
Financial intermediation 259.6 1.0 - 12.5 2.1 5.7
Real estate, renting 3 656.6 6.5 0.9 7.5 8.4
Public administration, 
defense 954.8 1.7 - 2.8 2.4 4.4
Education 910.1 1.9 - 5.5 3.9 2.5
Health and social work 2 179.0 3.3 - 3.7 5.8 4.4
Other community, social, 
personal service activities 775.8 2.3 - 4.3 5.1 5.1
Private households with 
employed persons 182.5 2.4 0.2 8.2 8.3
Extra-territorial organizations 
and bodies - 4.1 - 0.6 - 11.0 - 1.0 4.1
Total 11 224.0 1.5 - 3.2 3.6 4.6
Note: Total employment growth is in thousands; on ISCED definitions of educational attainment see Table II.5 below.
Source: Computed from Eurostat: Labour Force Survey, 1996–2001.European competitiveness report 2002
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EU, as shown in Graph II.2. Yet, as can be seen from
Table II.1, even in these sectors employment
growth was strongly biased towards a higher level
of skills, suggesting structural changes in the skill
content of employment. Even in agriculture, where
1.3 million net jobs were lost, an increased demand
for high-skill labour was registered.
In those sectors where highly-educated workers
already dominate employment, an even greater
concentration of skills is taking place, as reflected in
the comparatively high growth rates for employees
with tertiary educational attainment. In business serv-
ices, transport and communication, finance, trade and
health and social work — all ‘knowledge intensive’
sectors — the growth rate of high-skill employment
exceeded the overall average rate of growth of
employment. Moreover, obscured by the general
‘manufacturing’ heading is the differentiated perform-
ance of various production industries. As emphasised
in Employment in Europe 2001, employment growth in
high-tech manufacturing industries since 1995
accounted for 16 % of total net job creation in the EU,
reaching annual growth rates of almost 5 % in 200028.
In general, in addition to the sectoral concentration
of skilled labour in knowledge-intensive and ICT-
using services and in high-tech manufacturing
industries, an overall skill upgrading of EU employ-
ment has been taking place in recent years. In
particular, there has been an underlying shift from
the low to the intermediate level of educational
attainment within sectors and a sustained net
growth in the demand for highly-educated
workers.
II.3.2 Skills and employment growth 
in the European Union and the Member
States
This section reviews evidence on the growth of skills
in the Member States between 1995 and 2000
which is at the base of the aggregate data seen
previously. The European Union economies still
exhibit wide differences in economic structure, poli-
cies and institutions that are likely reflected in the
composition of labour demand. However, recent
28 See European Commission (2001b), especially chapter 2. On the basis of
NACE rev. 1 Eurostat defines the following manufacturing sectors as
Graph II.2: Distribution of educational attainment of employees by economic activity; EU–15 in 2000
(NACE 1 digit sectors)
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey, 1996–2001.
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developments in the skill content of employment
growth have been fairly similar across the Member
States, as can be seen in Table II.2. The data suggest
that there has been an upgrade of skills in employ-
ment across the Member States in the second half
of the 1990s, which appears to be unrelated to
differences in their economic structure.
Table II.2 presents data on the average change of
employment by three categories of skills, the
average change in the population aged 15–64
according to educational attainment and the differ-
ence between the two variables.
With the exception of Denmark and Portugal,
where employment creation was confined to low-
and medium-skilled jobs, all Member States have
registered significant growth in high skilled jobs
against a widespread decline of low-skill employ-
ment. Austria, Finland and Spain recorded particu-
larly strong growth in the employment of high-skill
workers during the period under consideration.
Demand for medium-skill labour was strongest in
the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Spain.
Changes in the employment of low-skill workers
were much more varied. Austria, Luxembourg and
the United Kingdom saw sharp rates of decline in
low-skill employment compared to the European
Union as a whole, while modest growth occurred in
Belgium and Spain.
The national rates of change in educational attain-
ment of the population aged 15–64, however, do
not match the change in employment at EU level,
providing a first indication of the structure and
extent of possible imbalances in the labour market
with respect to skills. The last three columns of
Table II.2 show the difference between the change
in employment and the change in educational
attainment29.
The data suggest that the growth of medium- and
high-skill employment in the European Union has
outstripped the growth of the supply of employees
with the corresponding attainment levels. The
imbalance appears to be particularly pronounced in
the intermediate, medium-skill, level where 
29 Caution should however be used in reading the data in the last three
columns, for two reasons. First, the attainment growth is only a rough
approximation of skills supply since it refers to the population rather than to
the labour force, as a consequence, if labour force participation becomes
more biased towards some skill level, these figures will overstate the relative
supply growth of those skills less prone to participation. Second, even
ignoring the previous difficulty — or alternatively, reading the attainment
figures as an upper bound on potential skills supply — a positive value for the
difference between employment and attainment growth can only be inter-
preted as a skill gap if the starting situation was balanced or presented
already a skill gap. With these caveats in mind, a significant positive differ-
ence for high skills seems more likely to translate a shortened supply of high
skills relative to demand than would be the case for low skills (implicitly
assuming that in 1995 the situation for high skills was already displaying a
supply shortage, or at least was not characterised by excess supply). An even-
tual decrease of participation in the low skill group relative to the high would
reinforce the argument. In fact, in the case of low skills it is harder to assess
whether a positive difference reflects a correction of a previous excess supply
or adds to an existing excess demand.
Table II.2: Developments in the skill composition of labour demand, 1995–2000
(percentage change, annual averages, and difference between the two series)
Employment growth Attainment growth (15-64) ‘Difference’
low medium high low medium high low medium high
Austria - 5.3 - 0.1 11.6 - 3.2 0.1 12.3 - 2.2 - 0.3 - 0.7
Belgium 0.5 0.9 3.8 - 1.3 - 0.1 3.0 1.8 1.0 0.8
Germany 1.7 - 0.8 1.3 - 2.3 - 1.0 1.2 4.0 0.2 0.0
Denmark 2.2 0.5 - 0.4 0.8 - 0.4 - 0.8 1.4 1.0 0.5
Spain 0.7 6.6 8.7 - 2.6 1.5 6.9 3.3 5.1 1.8
Finland - 0.5 1.2 9.7 - 3.2 - 1.1 9.2 2.7 2.3 0.6
France - 0.6 0.7 4.5 - 0.5 0.1 4.0 - 0.1 0.6 0.5
Greece - 3.3 4.4 4.0 - 2.7 3.6 3.6 - 0.5 0.8 0.3
Italy - 3.3 5.0 4.2 - 3.7 3.7 4.3 0.3 1.3 0.0
Luxembourg - 6.5 9.7 4.5 - 7.7 9.5 4.0 1.2 0.2 0.6
Portugal 0.4 1.9 - 3.8 - 1.6 - 0.9 - 4.2 2.1 2.8 0.4
Sweden - 3.2 0.9 2.1 - 2.2 0.9 3.2 - 1.0 0.0 - 1.1
United-Kingdom - 23.9 10.2 4.1 - 21.3 9.6 3.5 - 2.6 0.7 0.5
EU–15 - 3.2 3.6 4.6 - 3.9 2.6 4.2 0.7 1.0 0.4
United States 0.4 0.5 1.8 - 0.5 0.3 1.9 0.9 0.2 - 0.1
Japan - 3.8 - 0.6 1.4 - 3.0 - 0.1 1.8 - 0.8 - 0.5 - 0.5
Note: Due to lack of data for Ireland and the Netherlands prior to 1997 the EU average has been calculated using 1998–2000 and 1997–2000
growth rates for these countries, respectively, applied to the full-year period.
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey 1996–2001.European competitiveness report 2002
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attainment growth in the European Union has fallen
short of employment growth by 1.0 % during the
1995–2000 period.
For the two upper attainment categories, these
imbalances stand in contrast with the experience of
the United States where a widening shortage of
medium-skill workers and a modestly declining pres-
sure in the market for high-skill workers has been
recorded. In contrast to these, Japan saw an overall
attainment surplus across all categories of skills as the
pace of skill formation exceeded employment
growth during the second half of the 1990s, due to
Japan’s weak employment performance.
In terms of national experiences, in Austria and
Sweden the growth of attainment in the population
was greater than the growth in the corresponding
employment across all groups. Concerning possible
high-skill shortages, Spain, and to a lesser degree
Belgium, appear to be more vulnerable than the
other Member States, with a difference value well
above the one for the European Union as a whole.
With the exception of Austria and Sweden, all
Member States display a higher growth of employ-
ment of high skill workers than the corresponding
attainment growth, suggesting that the tightening
of the labour market for high skills is a general
phenomenon across the European Union. Consid-
ering that the participation rates are already highest
for this group, the scope for filling this gap through
raising the participation rate is limited30.
II.3.3 The skills content of jobs and 
the sectoral distribution of employment
An important question is whether the changing
patterns of labour demand in the European Union
in recent years reflect changes in the skill content of
jobs rather than changes in the sectoral distribution
of employment. In other words, the question posed
is whether the overall human capital intensity in the
European Union has increased in recent years or
whether changes in the sectoral allocation of
employment, given the level of skills, have domi-
nated the picture.
Table II.3 reports data on this issue for the year
2000. The data presented in the first three columns
30 In the EU, the participation rate (in the 15 to 64 years of age population) of
those in the high-skill category is around 86 percent, against 76 % for
medium skilled and 57 % for low-skilled population.
Table II.3: The structure of employment and job turbulence within the EU, 2000
Educational Sectoral 
Attainment job Output  sector job  Labour
turbulence turbulence productivity
Primary/ Upper Tertiary 1995-2000 Industry Services 1995–2000
lower sec secondary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Austria 20.3 64.2 15.6 1.36 30.0 63.9 0.75 96
Belgium 30.9 35.9 33.3 0.67 25.8 72.3 1.00 126
Germany 17.2 57.2 25.6 0.55 33.5 63.8 0.82 97
Denmark 21.9 53.4 24.8 0.33 25.5 70.8 0.84 104
Spain 53.9 18.8 27.3 1.72 30.8 62.4 0.74 89
Finland 22.8 43.7 33.5 1.86 28.0 65.8 0.93 104
France 30.0 44.7 25.3 0.78 26.3 69.5 0.44 107
Greece 43.1 37.0 19.9 1.88 22.5 60.5 0.95 81
Ireland 33.9 26.7 39.4 3.42 28.7 63.4 1.71 119
Italy 45.1 42.7 12.2 2.04 31.8 63.3 0.99 113
Luxembourg 33.0 45.6 21.4 3.46 20.8 76.8 1.50 198
Netherlands 29.9 44.5 25.6 2.74 21.6 75.1 0.87 99
Portugal 76.7 13.1 10.2 0.45 36.2 55.8 1.54 66
Sweden 20.5 49.2 30.3 0.79 24.4 72.7 0.79 92
United Kingdom 13.2 57.5 29.4 5.91 25.4 73.1 0.76 98
EU–15 29.6 46.3 24.1 1.57 29.0 66.9 0.62 100
Note: Turbulence is measured as 1⁄2 ∑  ∆ (Ni/N) , where Ni/N is the employment share of category i (according to educational attainment or sector),
and then standardised to average changes per year (see Layard et al. (1997)); indices of labour productivity are for 2001 (see European 
competitiveness report 2001, op. cit.). The data show the percentage of jobs changing between the categories (educational or sectoral) per year
Sources:Eurostat, Labour force survey, 2001 and OECD, Employment outlook, 2001.Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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of the table concern the educational attainment of
workers by three categories of education (primary
and lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary)
in percent of all employees. An index of educational
job turbulence is presented in the fourth column.
This index summarises shifts from one educational
attainment category to another and is measured by
the sum of the absolute changes between 1995 and
2000 of each educational attainment category in
employment, measured in percent (see note in
Table II.3). Output shares in percent, based on the
17 sectors of the NACE 1-digit classification and
divided into two categories, industry and services,
are presented in the fifth and sixth columns of the
table. A corresponding measure of job turbulence
across the 17 sectors is reported in the seventh
column and the last column shows the level of
labour productivity in 2000.
As noted previously, with strong growth in
medium- and high-skill employment, there has
been a notable shift from one skill group to another
(1.57 % per year, see column (4)) in the European
Union as a whole. Those countries with negative
rates of growth in high-skilled employment
(Denmark and Portugal) are also the ones with the
lowest overall rates of job turbulence with respect
to skills. On the other hand, the overall extent of
industrial change was relatively low, with 0.62 % of
jobs shifting between sectors. The changing nature
of labour demand at EU level is, therefore,
accounted for largely by changes in the skill content
of jobs rather than changes in the sectoral location
of employment growth. This was particularly true in
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
compared with higher rates of employment change
between sectors in Belgium, Germany, Denmark
and Portugal. However, Ireland, Luxembourg and
— to a lesser extent — Italy, exhibit relatively high
rates of structural change due to changes in both
the skill content of jobs and in the sectoral distribu-
tion of employment.
A summary of the evidence on skill shifts, sectoral
employment shifts, and productivity growth, can be
obtained from Tables II.3 and II.4. It is clear that those
Member States that have experienced significant
shifts in labour demand across sectors and across skill
groups, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, display a
high level of labour productivity and have experi-
enced high labour productivity growth — see Table
II.4 below. Productivity growth is slower in cases
where the labour market has been dominated by
changes in the skill content of employment alone
(relatively high rates of sectoral job turbulence and
stable skill content, as in Greece and Spain, corre-
spond to low levels of labour productivity and
modest rates of productivity growth).
Table II.4: Productivity growth, employment growth and factor accumulation 1980–99
1980–90 1991–99
Hourly Employment Change Change Hourly Employment Change Change GDP per
labour growth in in labour growth in in capita,
productivity physical human productivity physical human 2001
growth capital capital growth capital capital (EU–15  =
intensity intensity 100)
Belgium 2.1 0.1 2.0 0.5 2.4 0.5 1.8 1.0 112
Denmark 2.8 0.3 1.1 0.4 1.6 0.4 1.0 0.4 120
Germany 2.5 0.5 1.5 1.2 1.9 0.0 2.2 0.3 104
Greece 1.2 1.0 2.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.7 69
Spain 3.1 0.8 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 2.1 2.1 82
France 2.9 0.3 2.3 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.5 0.8 98
Ireland 4.1 - 0.2 3.5 1.0 4.5 4.1 - 0.6 1.0 123
Italy 2.0 0.6 2.0 1.4 1.9 - 0.1 1.9 1.8 102
Luxembourg 4.8 0.7 0.5 4.9 1.5 1.3 196
The Netherlands 2.8 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.9 0.2 0.6 118
Austria 0.1 2.6 0.8 0.3 3.2 0.6 110
Portugal 0.2 4.0 0.4 3.7 - 0.4 4.0 0.8 74
Finland 3.0 0.5 2.4 0.8 2.3 - 0.4 0.4 0.9 104
Sweden 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9 2.0 - 0.6 1.2 0.5 102
United Kingdom 2.7 0.5 1.2 0.8 2.3 0.6 1.2 1.1 103
United States 1.4 1.8 0.6 0.3 1.7 1.5 1.0 0.2 154
Note: Changes in human capital are measured as annual percentage change in average years of education.
Source: European Commission (2001b), and source used in Graph II.1.European competitiveness report 2002
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II.3.4 Productivity, employment 
and capital intensity
The skill intensity of employment growth depends
in part on the growth of demand for other comple-
mentary factors, in particular capital. Table II.4 pres-
ents data on the experience of the EU Member
States, and on that of the United States, for the rela-
tion between relative factor intensities, productivity
growth and employment performance. It is evident
that, compared to the United States, productivity
gains were generally higher across the European
Union in the 1980s compared with those achieved
in the 1990s, although the former are partly associ-
ated to losses in employment rather than to
changes in capital intensity. Moreover, the rate of
growth in physical capital intensity was lower in
most Member States in the 1990s compared with
the earlier decade (except in Austria, Germany and
Luxembourg), while human capital tended to
increase more in the last decade.
In the 1990s compared to the previous decade in
eight Member States (Belgium, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom) human capital grew faster, while in two
countries (Denmark and Ireland) it grew at the
same rate as before. In the remaining Member
States, there was a slowdown in the rate of human
capital accumulation. Concerning the rate of accu-
mulation of physical capital during the same
periods, three Member States (Austria, Luxembourg
and Germany) saw an acceleration, and three
Member States (Sweden, Portugal and the United
Kingdom) recorded the same rate of growth as
previously. The remaining Member States recorded
a decelerating growth in physical capital accumula-
tion. Thus, only two Member States (Portugal and
the United Kingdom) recorded a simultaneous
acceleration in physical capital intensity and human
capital during the 1990s.
In a majority of Member States (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Spain and the United Kingdom) employment
grew faster during the 1990s compared to the
previous decade but in the remaining it declined.
However, in the Member States for which compara-
tive data exist for the two periods, in only three
(Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg) was hourly
labour productivity growth faster in the 1990s
compared to the previous decade.
Finally, the United States during these periods saw
an acceleration in labour productivity growth, an
increase in the rate of accumulation of physical
capital and a modest deceleration in the growth of
employment and in human capital accumulation.
This discussion suggests that, despite the conver-
gence of the European Union in terms of the stock
of human capital towards the level of the United
States, its underperformance in the 1990s, both in
terms of output, employment and productivity
growth, could perhaps reflect an imperfect match
between human and physical capital formation. The
complementarity between these factors, especially
in recent years when the transition of economies to
a state where human capital and knowledge play a
prominent role, is undoubtedly crucial in making
possible the realisation of the gains from the divi-
sion of labour and its effect on innovation.
II.4 Supply trends,
accumulation and mismatch
The previous section suggested that the general
upgrading of the skills of the labour force in the
European Union should be expected to have been a
significant contributor to economic and produc-
tivity growth. Yet, to explain the weak performance
recorded in recent years it is essential to ask
whether the supply of human capital played a role.
The emergence of skill imbalances suggests that this
is a reasonable hypothesis to examine. Has the
supply of human capital been effective? This section
reviews, first, the character and extent of human
capital accumulation in the EU; it then examines the
matching efficiency of schooling and employment
at the national and sectoral level; next, it seeks to
establish national differences in skill supply and on
productivity performance; and, finally, some
evidence on the extent and location of skill gaps in
the Member States is provided, and the impact of
such gaps on recent growth performance is 
examined.
II.4.1 Comparative human capital
accumulation in the European Union
Prior to any discussion of comparative human
capital formation, it should be noted that the meas-
urement of the amount of knowledge and skills
embodied in a typical member of the labour force,
has been the subject of considerable methodolog-
ical debate.
Three different approaches can be distinguished
(OECD, 1998, chapter 1). First, that seeking to
measure the number of school years per employee;
second, that reflecting the percentage of theChapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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working population with a given degree of educa-
tional attainment (mostly upper secondary and
higher); and third, that based on observed differ-
ences in earnings (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin,
1995). Given the problems in interpreting wage
outcomes as reflecting schooling differentials and
the need for an arbitrary benchmark in the second
case, international comparisons of aggregate
human capital formation have typically been made
in terms of the number of years of schooling31.
Table II.5 summarises recent OECD data on the
composition of this accumulation according to the
ISCED categorisation of general education32 while
Graph II.3 shows the latest data for the first two
approaches on the comparative accumulation of
human capital within the EU.
These data show that, in spite of a prolonged
convergence in educational attainment relative to
the United States (suggested in Graph II.1 previ-
ously), there still are considerable differences
among the various Member States. Educational
attainment in Greece and Portugal was particularly
low in 1999 (the latest year for detailed informa-
tion), with over 40 % of the 25–64 age group
educated to pre-primary or primary level only.
While Spain also has a high proportion of the adult
population with low levels of education there is
growing evidence of polarisation; a comparatively
low proportion of the 25–64 age group held inter-
mediate qualifications in 1999 alongside a relatively
high proportion with tertiary-type A education and
advanced research programmes. 
Attainment in Germany, Austria and the United
Kingdom tends to cluster around intermediate
levels of educational achievement, where over half
of the adult population has upper secondary or
post-secondary, non-tertiary, education. In contrast,
over a quarter of the adult population in Belgium,
Denmark, Finland and Sweden had completed
high, tertiary, level education.
The aggregation of these compositional effects into
average years of schooling logically reflects the same
31 See Barro and Lee (1993) and de la Fuente and Domenech (2001).
32 ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education, first
designed in the 1970s by Unesco.
Table II.5: Distribution of the population 25 to 64 years of age by level of educational attainment in 1999
(percent of the population according to the highest level attained)
Pre-primary Lower Upper  Post- Tertiary- Tertiary- Average
and  secondary secondary  secondary  type B type A and years of
primary education education non-tertiary  education advanced education
education education research (labour
programmes force)
ISCED 0/1 ISCED 2 ISCED 3 ISCED 4 ISCED 5B ISCED 5A/6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Austria1 x(2) 26.1 56.9 6.1 4.7 6.1 12.5
Belgium 19.9 23.3 30.7 x(3) 13.9 12.1 11.8
Denmark n 20.3 53.1 x(3) 19.9 6.6 12.9
Finland x(2) 28.5 40.2 x(3) 17.4 13.9 12.5
France 20.0 18.1 40.2 n 10.5 11.0 11.2
Germany 2.2 16.7 53.3 5.0 9.9 13.0 13.3
Greece 40.6 9.5 26.8 5.4 5.5 12.2 10.6
Ireland1 23.1 25.6 30.2 x(3.5) 10.5 10.6 11.1
Italy 24.7 31.8 29.8 4.5 x(6) 9.3 10.9
Luxembourg 24.2 13.5 43.9 a 6.6 11.7 11.1
Netherlands 12.3 23.0 42.1 x(3.5) 2.5 20.1 12.4
Portugal 66.7 12.1 11.5 x(3) 2.7 7.1 8.0
Spain 42.2 22.7 14.1 x(5) 6.2 14.8 9.9
Sweden 10.9 12.4 47.8 x(5) 15.6 13.2 12.0
United Kingdom x(2) 18.0 57.2 x(total) 8.2 16.6 12.5
United States 4.7 8.4 51.2 x(3) 8.3 27.5 12.8
Japan x(2) 19.1 49.3 x(total) 13.4 18.3 12.6
Note: x(•) denotes the categorisation of results in a different column due to diverging definitions in types of schooling, where the number 
between brackets indicates the present column number.
Source: OECD (2001) and calculated using de la Fuente and Domenech (2001).European competitiveness report 2002
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pattern. While average years of schooling in Germany,
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, the
Netherlands and Sweden are generally comparable
with those in Japan and the United States, countries
such as Italy, Spain and most notably Portugal still
exhibit considerable education gaps. The average
duration of education within Portugal is only eight
years, at least four years less than most of its EU coun-
terparts and almost five years shorter than the average
length of schooling in the United States.
Despite this result for Portugal, there is no clear
relationship between the length of schooling and
educational attainment across the EU. Only
Sweden, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom
follow a similar pattern to the United States and
Japan, where the proportion of the adult population
with upper secondary or higher education is rela-
tively high in comparison to the average time spent
in education. Elsewhere in the EU, medium and
especially high-level educational attainment relative
to the duration of schooling lags behind the United
States and Japan, particularly in Germany, the
Netherlands Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Spain.
One element in the explanation of this divergence
lies in the length of graduation periods. In the
absence of a harmonisation of educational
programmes, it is difficult to say whether such
differences matter to the quality of human capital
(i.e. is a four-year secondary education equal or less
effective than a five-year tuition period?). Another
source for the difference between the two measures
relates to the distribution of primary versus lower
secondary education in the population. The two
measures shown in Graph II.3 reflect the extreme
positions of either upper-secondary achievement or
counting the number of years spent in school,
serving to emphasise the difficulties in measuring
human capital alluded to earlier.
II.4.2 The matching efficiency of schooling and
employment
As noted previously, the general skill upgrade of the
European labour force is going on in parallel with a
strong concentration of job creation in high-tech
and knowledge-intensive sectors. However, does
the supply of education meet the changing struc-
ture of labour demand? How efficient is the
combined matching process of education output
and labour market allocation that ties education to
jobs? A first indication of this process is gained from
data on unemployment rates according to educa-
tional attainment. Structural changes in labour
demand towards higher skill jobs could be reflected
in unemployment rates. In general, employees with
low levels of education are more likely to be unem-
ployed in the European Union than those with
medium or high levels of attainment, as Graph II.4
suggests. This was true across all Member States in
2000 except for Greece and Portugal where unem-
ployment was highest amongst medium-skilled
workers. At the same time, unemployment of high-
Graph II.3: Two measures of educational attainment of the adult population (1999)
(highest level of attainment and average years of schooling)
Source: OECD (2001) and calculated using de la Fuente and Domenech, (2001).
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skill labour was relatively low in all Member States
with the exception of Spain, Greece and Italy.
The extent to which the various national education
systems and labour market institutions are able to
match skills to jobs can be gained by comparing the
distributions of educational attainment for different
populations. Calculating the variation in educational
attainment for the population of working age, for
the unemployed and for those aged 15–64 not
participating in the labour force relative to the skill
content of employment tells us how adequate the
fit of educational attainment for each of these
groups is. The results are presented in Table II.6.
To make this comparison possible, an adjusted
version of the coefficient of variation is computed
using the ratio of those with a particular level of
educational attainment in employment to those
with the same educational attainment in each of
the other categories (working-age population,
unemployed and those aged 15–64 not partici-
pating in the labour force). This is discussed more
precisely in Box II.1. While such a comparison
between the skill content of those in employment
and the distribution of attainment among the entire
working-age population only compares labour
demand with ‘education output’, the comparison
against the other two groups, the unemployed and
those not participating in the labour force, indicates
the selectivity of the labour market matching
process. To what extent are differences between the
distribution of attainment among the population of
working age and the skill content of employment
reinforced by the matching process itself?
The data used in this comparison derive from Euro-
stat’s most recent Labour force survey, which
contains information on the highest level of educa-
tional attainment achieved for 2000 at three ISCED-
defined levels: pre-primary up to lower secondary,
upper secondary and tertiary. Since for those in
employment it also defines the sector in which they
are active, it is also possible to decompose the
overall extent of mismatch into its sectoral compo-
nents, indicating the extent to which labour
demand in individual sectors is subject to disparities
between the distribution of attainment among the
group of potential employees and the skill-content
of current employment; this is done in Table II.7.
The data in Table II.6 present the adjusted coeffi-
cient of variation for the ratio of employment to
each of the categories in the columns. Clearly, a low
(high) value of this coefficient indicates that the
distribution of educational attainment in any of the
categories in question is close to (distant from) the
distribution of educational attainment of those in
employment. The higher the value of this ratio is,
the worse the mismatch of supply relative to the
educational structure of employment. 
Graph II.4: Rates of unemployment by level of educational attainment, 2000; EU–15
Note: As before, ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ are defined as ISCED 1–2, 3–4 and 5–6 respectively.
Source: Eurostat, Labour force survey, 2001.
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Table II.6: The distribution of educational attainment among the population, the unemployed and
non-participants in the labour market compared to that of the employed — 2000 
(adjusted coefficients of variation by order of matching performance)
Population Population Population Unem- Non
15 to 65, 15 to 65, 25 to 34, ployed participants
1995 2000 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3)/(2) (4)/(2) (5)/(2)
Portugal 11.4 8.2 21.4 13.7 28.8 2.62 1.68 3.52
Denmark 14.3 12.9 21.7 29.8 62.3 1.68 2.30 4.81
Germany 21.0 13.4 10.0 37.3 45.9 0.75 2.79 3.43
Luxembourg 15.9 14.0 3.8 42.6 37.8 0.27 3.04 2.70
Sweden 14.6 14.8 19.1 35.9 62.9 1.29 2.42 4.24
Netherlands 12.6 15.0 10.2 44.2 58.8 0.68 2.95 3.93
Greece 13.3 15.3 31.9 31.7 43.2 2.08 2.07 2.82
Spain 16.9 15.4 20.7 14.4 40.3 1.34 0.93 2.61
United Kingdom 13.2 16.5 8.0 47.8 75.5 0.48 2.89 4.56
Finland 23.1 20.1 21.8 51.3 71.8 1.08 2.55 3.57
Austria 16.5 20.6 11.1 42.0 68.5 0.54 2.04 3.33
Italy 19.0 21.1 12.1 18.7 51.7 0.57 0.88 2.45
France 20.7 22.4 16.8 41.1 63.1 0.75 1.84 2.82
Ireland 25.6 24.2 15.0 61.5 67.9 0.62 2.54 2.81
Belgium 29.5 27.7 13.6 49.4 74.5 0.49 1.78 2.69
EU–15 19.5 19.1 8.2 34.1 59.5 0.43 1.78 3.11
United States 24.5 22.4 0.4 68.4 81.7 0.02 3.05 3.65
Japan 5.8 6.2 26.1 22.5 25.2 4.19 3.60 4.04
Note: For the methodology used to compute the coefficients of variation see Box II.1; the years of reference in column (1) for Ireland and the
Netherlands are 1997 and 1998 respectively; all distributions of attainment mentioned in the column headings are compared with that of
employment for three levels of education.
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey, 1996–2001; OECD, Employment outlook, 2001 (on the United States and Japan and for Ireland
and the Netherlands with respect to data before 2000).
Table II.7: The distribution of educational attainment among the population, the unemployed and
non-participants relative to that of sectoral employment, EU–15 — 2000
Employment Population Population Population Unemployed Non-
share, 2000 15 to 65, 15 to 65, 25 to 34, participants
1995 2000 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agriculture, fishing, mining 4.4 1.6 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.3
Manufacturing 20.1 1.3 0.9 1.1 2.8 7.7
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.6
Construction 7.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.9
Wholesale and retail trade, repair 14.8 1.6 1.8 1.2 2.6 6.2
Hotels, restaurants 3.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8
Transport, storage, communication 6.0 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.3 2.8
Financial intermediation 3.4 1.3 1.6 0.4 3.0 4.7
Real estate, renting 8.7 2.2 2.5 0.6 5.0 7.9
Public administration, defense 7.7 1.9 1.6 0.2 3.5 5.9
Education 6.8 3.9 3.7 1.2 6.7 9.5
Health and social work 9.6 2.7 2.8 0.6 5.5 8.7
Other service activities* 5.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.2 2.6
Total 100.0 19.5 19.1 8.2 34.1 59.5
Note: * includes private households with employees and extra-territorial organisations. Due to the absence of sector-level data in the LFS since 1997
the EU–15 average excludes Ireland. Note that none of the distributions mentioned in the column headings are defined by sector but denote
general distributions by level of education (i.e. only employment is sector-specific). Otherwise, the methodology is the same as in Table II.6
(with added sectoral decomposition).
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey,1996–2001.Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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A first observation to note is that, measured in this
way, the overall efficiency of the matching process
between the supply of education and structure of
labour demand in the European Union has been
better than in the United States (see columns 1 and
2). With the exception of the two least performing
countries in this respect (Ireland and Belgium), the
difference between the skill composition of employ-
ment and that of the wider population (aged
15–65) was lower in the European Union than the
United States in both 1995 and 2000. This can be
taken to suggest that the educational attainment of
(potential) labour supply was more closely associ-
ated with the skill content of labour demand in
most EU Member States than in the United States33.
Since 1995, however, the United States has seen a
more pronounced improvement in the employment
efficiency of education output than the European
Union as a whole (the coefficient has declined from
24.5 to 22.4 in the case of the United States but
only by 0.4 points to 19.1 in the case of the Euro-
pean Union).
The aggregate EU experience masks some impor-
tant differences in the matching performance of
individual Member States. The labour markets in
Germany and Portugal, for example, have recorded
considerable efficiency improvements in the
matching of the supply of education to the struc-
ture of labour demand since 1995. In contrast,
performance has worsened in the Netherlands,
Greece, Italy, France, Austria and the United
Kingdom. While most Member States’ labour
markets maintain a closer match between the skill
composition of employment and that of the wider
adult population than found in the United States, it
33 An alternative meaning would be that relatively more persons with high skills
are able, or willing, to enter the labour force in the European Union than in
the United States.
Box II.1. Comparing distributions of educational attainment
In order to compare the skill distribution of employment with that of potential labour supply, we need some measure that
captures the extent of the variation in the relation between each pair of the distributions involved. Ideally, the distribu-
tion of employment over ISCED categories of educational attainment would be mirrored in the skill structure of the popu-
lation of working age, of school leavers and of the unemployed. The extent, then, to which the distributions are dissim-
ilar defines the allocational inefficiency caused by the supply of skills and the matching process on the labour market.
The measure that captures this ‘deviation from a situation of one-on-one distributions’ is the coefficient of variation for
the ratio of the number of people employed on the one hand and those within each of the other categories distinguished
on the other, per level of educational attainment. In the present case, the Eurostat Labour Force Survey allows for a subdi-
vision of educational attainment in three categories: primary through lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary
(ISCED categories 1–2, 3–4 and 5–6 respectively). Calculating a coefficient of variation (standard deviation of the obser-
vations relative to the mean of the series) would, however, produce inconsistent results. Although the three groups are
very different in size, as part of a normal coefficient of variation the dispersion in each would be equally weighed. Thus,
a given dispersion for the typically small group of higher educated people would, for instance, unduly influence the
overall result. For this reason, one should not measure dispersions from the simple unweighted average of the three
ratios, but instead from the overall ratio of the populations compared. The standardisation then, of course, should also
be relative to this ratio. Thus, the size-effect can be solved through the application of weights rather than the use of the
unweighted average of dispersions.
The adopted measure of variation ϕ is defined as:
where the wi ‘s denote employment weights, ei/e0 and the subscripts l, m, and h refer to the level of educational attain-
ment (low, intermediate and high) and e0 = el +e m +e h. In Table II.6 e represents overall employment while second distri-
bution involved (p) refers to the educational attainment of the population (columns 1 to 3), the unemployed (column 4)
or the non-participants (column 5). Table II.7 reproduces the same type of exercise and decomposes the aggregate for
the European Union as a whole by economic sector.European competitiveness report 2002
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appears that these differences are narrowing. Japan
records values, which are well below those of both
the United States and the European Union.
For the European Union as a whole, closer examina-
tion of data for the youngest age cohort in work
(column 3) shows that the distribution of educa-
tional attainment among those aged 25 to 34 is
much closer to the skill composition of employment
than is the case for the wider, adult population. This
suggests that the matching performance for the
European Union as a whole may improve in the
future if this trend is sustained. A condition for the
fulfilment of this potential, however, is an increased
mobility of workers within the European Union (of
which the younger generations are supposedly
more mobile), as this aggregate relationship
between the distribution of attainment for the
young age cohort and skills demand does not hold
equally strong across individual Member States.
While the coefficient for the aggregate EU data is
8.2, it varies from a low of 3.8 in the case of Luxem-
bourg to a high of 21.8 in the case of Finland. It is
also important to note that this potential for an
improved matching is even greater in the United
States, where the educational attainment of the
young cohort virtually matches the skills demand,
while in Japan the young cohort skills distribution is
substantially further from demand than is the case
for the overall population.
The sixth column in Table II.6 illustrates the extent
to which the young cohort’s skills better match the
respective demands. Below unit values depict a
generational matching improvement while above
unit values suggest that the acquisition of skills by
the younger generation has moved further away
from demand requirements. Portugal, Greece,
Denmark, Spain and Sweden seem to have run in
such a situation. For the other Member States —
except Finland which display identical matching
performances for the young cohort and the overall
population — the younger generation seems to be
closer to the needs of the labour market than older
generations.
More alarming, however, is the variation between
the skill composition of the unemployed and of
those not participating in the labour market
compared with those in employment in the Euro-
pean Union, the United States and Japan, as shown
in columns 4 and 5 of Table II.6. The particularly
high values for the European Union (34.1 and 59.5,
respectively) and the United States (68.4 and 81.7,
respectively) reflect the skill selectivity of the accel-
eration in employment growth in the latter half of
the 1990s, while in Japan the coefficients are
substantially lower reflecting the generally poor
employment performance during the period.
Employment growth in the second half of the
1990s has been skewed towards the employment of
high-skill professionals in both the European
Union34 and the United States. Even so, the values
for the EU, both at an aggregate level and for indi-
vidual Member States, are well below those for the
United States and may improve further following
the development and implementation of policies
and programmes to promote social inclusion and
enhance labour market participation.
To conclude this part of the discussion, the data
suggest that, at least with respect to general educa-
tion, the difference in growth performance between
the European Union and the United States in recent
years cannot be attributed to matching effects in
the output of general education and employment.
The considerable growth in service sector employ-
ment and the general upgrading of skills of the EU
workforce between 1995 and 2000 is likely to be
reflected in the matching performance of specific
sectors. While the efficiency of the matching process
has improved for the European Union as a whole,
there have been some marked sectoral develop-
ments. More specifically, differences between the
educational attainment of the adult population and
that of the workforce in agriculture, manufacturing
and utilities have fallen since 1995, as shown in
columns 2 and 3 of Table II.7. In contrast, the degree
of disparity between supply and demand generally
increased in the knowledge intensive and high
education sectors, including financial intermediation,
general business services, and health and social work.
However, the matching performance of all sectors is
considerably better for the youngest age cohort,
indicating that the educational attainment of those
aged 25–35 is more closely matched to the structure
of labour demand than the distribution of attainment
in the wider, adult population. Manufacturing is the
only notable exception here.
Similar trends are found when comparing the skill
composition of the unemployed relative to skills in
sectoral employment. In 2000, there were signifi-
cant mismatches between the distribution of attain-
ment amongst the unemployed relative to employ-
ment in high-tech manufacturing and high educa-
tion sectors (financial intermediation, general busi-
ness services, education, and health and social
work). In contrast, the extent of divergence
between the educational attainment of the unem-
ployed relative to the workforce in construction and
34 See European Commission (2001b), especially chapter 2.Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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hotels and restaurants is very low, and more
favourable than comparative indicators for the adult
or 25–35 age populations. These results reflect the
high incidence of self-employment and short-term
contracts in construction and relatively high labour
turnover in the hospitality industry.
II.4.3 Exploring tertiary skill gaps
In recent years, and as mentioned in the beginning of
this chapter, increasing attention has been paid to
the prevalence of skill gaps alongside high unem-
ployment, and their impact on growth and produc-
tivity (Haskel and Martin, 1996). Skill gaps reflect
poor availability of potential skilled employees within
the existing workforce. The acceleration in the
growth of high-skill employment across the Euro-
pean Union during the second half of the 1990s,
particularly in high-tech, knowledge-intensive and
high-education sectors has contributed to the emer-
gence of skill gaps. As noted previously, the increased
demand for skilled employees has coexisted with
slow growth in tertiary attainment, and high-skill
individuals have been the least likely to be unem-
ployed. The combination of these factors — growth
in high-skill employment, low levels of unemploy-
ment amongst the high-skill workers and relatively
low growth in the attainment of tertiary education —
suggests that tertiary-level skill gaps may emerge
within Member States’ economies as demand
exceeds the supply of high-skill workers.
Table II.8 explores the extent of skill gaps within
Member States’ economies by comparing the pres-
ence of high skill workers in employment against the
same in unemployment (panel A of the table) and in
those in the age group 15–65 that do not participate
in the labour force (panel B). The numerator of the
data is, therefore, the number of employees with
tertiary education in sector j and the denominator is
the total number of unemployed with tertiary educa-
tion (panel A) or those aged 15–64 that do not partic-
ipate in the labour market (these ratios are also
reported measured against the sum of unemployed
and not participants in the labour market at the
bottom of panel B). Since it is impossible to assign the
unemployed or those not participating in the labour
market by sector, these ratios are intended to suggest
the potential recruitment pool from where
employees could be drawn. In other words, skill gaps
are here approximated by the tightness of the labour
market for high skilled workers.
The data suggest that, in general, tertiary-level skill
gaps are most significant in the fastest growing
sectors of the economy — general business services,
and health and social work — across the European
Union, with particularly high values for Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Spain is the only country where this does not hold
true, due to comparatively higher rates of unem-
ployment amongst high-skill workers (relative to the
other Member States). It is also clear that skill gaps
are prevalent in manufacturing across all Member
States, following significant structural changes in
the skill content of jobs as production has been
shifting to more high-tech, innovative manufac-
turing processes. The effect of this shift was particu-
larly pronounced on tertiary-level skill gaps in
Austria and the United Kingdom. In addition, it
appears that public administration and defence may
also face problems in the recruitment and retention
of high-skill workers. Here, lagging adjustment and
monopsony problems in wage formation in the
(semi-) public sector appear to be crucial.
The degree to which skill gaps occur within whole-
sale and retail, transport and financial intermedia-
tion across Member States is much more varied,
and appears to reflect more widespread gaps in
high-skill workers. For example, significant tertiary-
level gaps in these sectors are evident in Austria,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom — countries exhibiting relatively high
levels of tertiary-level skill gaps across all sectors of
their economies. There is little evidence that skill
gaps are emerging in agriculture, utilities, construc-
tion and hotels and restaurants. The first two
sectors — agriculture and utilities — have witnessed
significant job losses in recent years as their respec-
tive industries have undergone significant techno-
logical and structural change.
The most striking result from the data in Table II.8 is
the relatively high occurrence of tertiary level skills
amongst those individuals who are not participating
in the labour market relative to those in employ-
ment compared against the incidence of tertiary
level skills amongst the unemployed. This can be
seen by noting that in Portugal, for example, for 12
high-skilled workers, there is one equally skilled
adult not participating in the labour force. In all
other Member States this ratio is more advanta-
geous, ranging from around four in Luxembourg to
roughly nine in Denmark (see line ‘Total’ in panel
B). This indicates that there is a potential pool of
skilled labour that is not currently active in the
labour market and further measures to enhance
participation may ease some of the pressures
exerted by prevailing skill gaps.
What impact does the existence of these skill gaps
have on Member States’ comparative growthE
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Table II.8.a: An approximation of tertiary ‘skill gaps’ by sector and Member State
(ratios of highly skilled employees by sector relative to high skills in overall unemployment, 2000)
A. Proportions of those with tertiary attainment in employment/unemployment
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Italy Luxembourg The Portugal Sweden United
Netherlands Kingdom
Agriculture, fishing, mining 1.44 0.25 0.46 0.36 0.12 0.43 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.52 0.25 0.30 0.45
Manufacturing 6.76 4.54 4.38 4.31 1.19 2.90 2.19 0.88 1.43 4.99 4.81 3.04 3.58 5.24
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 0.45 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.63 0.19 0.12 0.29 0.42
Construction 1.98 0.69 1.49 1.16 0.38 0.59 0.31 0.23 0.31 1.22 0.73 0.82 0.64 1.36
Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair 3.63 2.91 1.78 1.71 0.91 1.72 1.52 1.26 0.91 5.43 2.98 1.46 2.09 2.62
Hotels, restaurants 0.83 0.34 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.84 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.57
Transport, storage, 
communication 1.78 1.53 0.68 1.36 0.41 0.85 0.69 0.43 0.38 1.80 1.62 1.35 0.99 1.52
Financial intermediation 1.50 2.27 0.82 1.01 0.36 0.65 0.83 0.60 0.77 12.97 2.83 2.13 0.70 1.85
Real estate, renting 4.74 5.24 2.51 5.41 0.96 2.52 2.64 1.67 2.60 12.17 10.98 4.27 5.69 7.04
Public administration, 
defense 2.80 3.04 2.43 3.04 0.78 1.50 1.41 1.61 1.60 5.68 5.58 4.05 2.73 2.95
Education 9.86 7.27 3.11 6.88 1.36 2.55 3.18 2.98 3.99 17.42 10.82 12.35 6.11 7.01
Health and social work 4.91 6.83 3.00 10.15 0.90 3.24 2.68 1.31 2.55 7.28 10.13 6.13 7.46 6.69
Other service activities* 2.91 1.38 1.37 1.71 0.36 0.80 0.96 0.40 0.62 9.66 3.28 1.14 1.82 2.34
Total 43.58 36.54 22.47 37.50 7.98 18.16 16.98 11.83 15.50 80.36 54.87 37.48 32.75 40.06
* includes private households with employees and extra-territorial organizations
Note: The underlying numbers of those unemployed are logically not defined by economic sector; accordingly, the proportions shown indicate the relative ‘recruitment struggle’ for each sector.
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey, 2001.C
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Table II.8.b: An approximation of tertiary ‘skill gaps’ by sector and Member State
(ratios of highly skilled employees by sector relative to high skills in overall non-participants in the labour force, 2000)
B. Proportions of those with tertiary attainment in employment/not participating
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Greece Italy Luxembourg The Portugal Sweden United 
Netherlands Kingdom
Agriculture, fishing, mining 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.10
Manufacturing 1.10 0.87 1.24 1.08 0.69 1.18 0.61 0.47 0.56 0.26 0.59 0.97 0.62 1.13
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09
Construction 0.32 0.13 0.42 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.29
Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair 0.59 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.53 0.70 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.37 0.56
Hotels, restaurants 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.12
Transport, storage, 
communication 0.29 0.29 0.19 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.33
Financial intermediation 0.24 0.44 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.68 0.35 0.68 0.12 0.40
Real estate, renting 0.77 1.01 0.71 1.36 0.56 1.03 0.74 0.88 1.02 0.64 1.35 1.36 0.99 1.52
Public administration, 
defense 0.46 0.59 0.69 0.76 0.45 0.61 0.39 0.85 0.63 0.30 0.68 1.29 0.48 0.64
Education 1.61 1.40 0.88 1.72 0.79 1.04 0.89 1.58 1.56 0.91 1.33 3.95 1.07 1.51
Health and social work 0.80 1.31 0.85 2.54 0.52 1.32 0.75 0.69 1.00 0.38 1.24 1.96 1.30 1.44
Other service activities* 0.48 0.27 0.39 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.51 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.50
Total 7.12 7.02 6.36 9.40 4.63 7.41 4.74 6.28 6.06 4.21 6.73 11.97 5.72 8.62
Non-participants +
unemployed 6.12 5.89 4.96 7.51 2.93 5.26 3.71 4.10 4.36 4.00 5.99 9.07 4.87 7.09
Note: The underlying numbers of those not participating in the labour force are logically not defined by economic sector; accordingly, the proportions shown indicate the relative ‘recruitment struggle’ for each sector.
Source: Computed from Eurostat, Labour force survey, 2001.European competitiveness report 2002
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performance? Graph II.5 plots the extent of skill
gaps, as ‘measured’ previously at the level of
tertiary education, in Member States against their
respective growth performance. The overall pattern
indicates that relatively high tertiary-level skill gaps
tend to be associated with higher rates of growth in
GDP per person of working age. Ireland and Austria
are notable exceptions to this. Ireland appears to
enjoy particularly high growth relative to the preva-
lence of skill gaps amongst high-skill workers
compared with all other Member States while
Austria has experienced relatively low growth in
GDP alongside significant tertiary-level skill gaps.
Skill gaps, in other words, would appear to be a by-
product of the dynamics of labour demand accom-
panying strong economic performance rather than
a possible cause of low economic growth in the
European Union.
II.4.4 Human capital formation 
and economic performance
What is the role of the demand and supply effects
discussed so far in national growth performance
based on human capital formation? Table II.9
reflects an OECD attempt to decompose the change
in growth rates between the 1980s and the 1990s
for most of the EU nations and the United States
with the use of national reduced-form growth
regressions. The results confirm the ‘stock’ effect of
human capital formation. That is, changes in factor
intensity are reflected in that part of the change in
growth rates that can be attributed to human
capital accumulation. 
A striking feature of the data is the prominent role
of trade exposure in explaining the change in
economic growth, which is particularly pronounced
in the case of the United States. The contribution of
this variable to Spain’s growth acceleration is as
large as that in the case of the United States while
Greece and Portugal also display large values. A
further clear difference between the EU economies
and the United States consists of the lesser role that
human capital plays in the change in economic
growth in the latter. Finally, concerning the role of
physical capital formation, the estimates vary
substantially within the European Union whereas in
the United States its contribution ranks second
highest following that of trade exposure.
II.5 Policy and institutions
II.5.1 Introduction
The ongoing process of structural change towards a
knowledge-based, ICT-intensive, economy in virtu-
ally all sectors of the OECD economies underlines
the need for a clear understanding of the ways in
which technology, education, labour market institu-
tions, taxes and trade on the one hand, and
comparative productivity performance on the other,
interact. Taking into consideration the productivity
Graph II.5: Are skill gaps underlying differences in growth performance (1995–2000)?
Sources: Table II.8 (‘skill gaps’) and Eurostat, National accounts 1996–2001 (growth in GDP per person of working age, 1995–2000).
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effects of human capital and the changing skill
content of EU labour markets, this section discusses,
in particular, problems related to fulfilling the
Lisbon targets, and the measures that might be
necessary to stimulate the accumulation of knowl-
edge and skills, to improve the efficiency of their
use and to enhance their social rates of return.
Despite the lack of direct evidence for an unam-
biguous relation between the accumulation of
knowledge per worker and the pace of income
growth, the empirical literature suggests five
distinct mechanisms by which this link is rendered a
complex and conditional one:
— First, the wage signals that — according to
neo-classical theory — underlie the allocational
efficiency and induced supply of human capital,
are likely to be inadequately revealed by the
labour market due to imperfect competition,
bargaining institutions and signalling behav-
iour, causing the demand for education to be
suboptimal.
— Second, the externalities of knowledge are
imperfectly rewarded.
— Third, the acquisition of knowledge itself is
beset by market failure due to poaching35,
externalities and coordination failure.
— Fourth, similar to other inputs and in combina-
tion with ‘technology-gap’ effects that generate
temporary monopoly rents, the productivity
effect of human capital endowments is subject
to classic mechanisms of factor intensity and
comparative advantage.
— Fifth, the efficiency of labour markets and
education systems in matching skills to jobs is
imperfect and likely to remain so, not only
because of institutional influences, information
asymmetries and spatial effects, but because
adjustment in education is considerably less
flexible than the more variable skill-content of
labour demand.
Against the complexity of these relationships stands
the EU economy in which rapid changes in the skill
content of labour demand have given rise to a
35 Poaching externalities occur when the training offered by one firm can be of
use to other firms and workers can easily switch jobs, leading to under invest-
ment in training. 
Table II.9: Decomposition of changes in annual average growth rates of GDP per capita
(contribution of change in explanatory variables over the period 1980s to 1990s in percentage points)
Contribution from:
% change  Investment  Human  Population  Variability  Size of  Trade 
in output  share capital growth of inflation government exposure
per capita 
growth rate
Austria - 0.23 0.37 0.31 - 0.07 0.12 - 0.02 0.37
Belgium 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.17 0.26 0.06 0.24
Denmark 0.34 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.22
Finland - 0.90 - 0.91 0.44 - 0.03 0.05 - 0.13 0.33
France 0.04 0.01 0.35 0.27 0.23 - 0.02 0.42
Greece - 0.06 n 0.57 0.09 - 0.12 - 0.05 0.54
Ireland 1.21 - 0.17 0.54 - 0.75 0.35 0.13 0.46
Italy - 0.06 0.05 0.84 0.36 0.18 - 0.01 0.49
Netherlands 0.97 - 0.04 0.43 0.32 0.07 0.10 0.25
Portugal - 0.15 0.25 0.32 0.02 0.42 - 0.20 0.53
Spain 0.46 0.33 0.90 0.46 0.25 - 0.12 0.67
Sweden - 0.64 - 0.19 0.42 - 0.05 - 0.20 0.02 0.33
United Kingdom 0.01 0.08 0.44 0.05 n 0.03 0.25
United States - 0.19 0.19 0.07 - 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.65
Note: The calculations are from decompositions of differences in growth rates based on the results of multivariate regressions. The sums of the
contributions shown do not correspond to the change in output per capita growth rates because the estimated impact of initial levels of GDP
per capita and the component unexplained by the regressions are not shown. Changes in growth are based on differences in average growth
in GDP per person of working age over each decade. The 1980s include the period 1981 to 1989; the 1990s cover the period up to 1997.
Government consumption as a percentage of GDP is used as a proxy for the size of government due to data availability. This variable is highly
correlated in most countries with tax and non-tax receipts (as a share of GDP) for which, however, country coverage is more limited.
Source: OECD (2000b).European competitiveness report 2002
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lagging supply of skilled workers amidst persistently
high unemployment. Moreover, the pace of human
capital formation relative to the United States has
been disappointing in recent years. As shown previ-
ously, differences in the matching efficiency of the
distribution of schooling and the skill content of
employment cannot account for the difference in
the effectiveness of education inputs. What appears
to have mattered, especially in strategic sectors, are
the effects upon innovation of complementarity
between human and physical capital formation, the
latter of which has been decidedly lagging within
the EU economy. Apart from this, institutional influ-
ences in wage bargaining and monopsony effects in
public sector employment have given rise to
lagging adjustment in the formation and allocation
of high-level skills and even to explicit shortages of
adequately skilled labour to fill existing vacancies.
Finally, the European education catch-up with the
United States has been primarily in the secondary,
intermediate level.
Given these initial conditions, what measures, if any,
could EU governments consider taking in order to
realise Lisbon’s knowledge-based growth?
It should be stressed that while endogenous
growth theory has restored a more prominent role
for policy in promoting socially optimal growth, it
has also pointed to adverse welfare effects of
‘creative destruction’ and uncoordinated R & D
programmes propped up by national interests.
Moreover, skill gaps do not constitute evidence in
favour of policy action, as current outcomes are the
result of a wider set of labour market influences in
which a multitude rather than a lack of institutions
dominate bargaining outcomes. Nevertheless, the
structural problems in the European Union in rela-
tion to the goal of knowledge-based growth
appear to lie in a lagging supply of highly skilled
labour in strategic sectors and the comparatively
low social rates of return to human capital inputs.
Clearly, the problem does not lie in the education
of the European labour force as such, at least in a
majority of Member Sates, but in labour markets,
in inadequate investment in physical capital and in
such issues as the incentives underlying early retire-
ment.
II.5.2 The role of vocational training
Problems of skill shortages in Europe are predomi-
nantly in high-tech industries. Especially here, but
possibly also in knowledge-intensive services,
market failure in the acquisition of skills and
matching problems might be alleviated through
extended vocational training programmes. Within
the European Union as a whole, vocational educa-
tion is primarily at the upper secondary level. At the
time of the last Unesco/OECD/Eurostat question-
naire (in 1994), 11 Member States had a greater
number of pupils in vocational education
programmes than in comparable general education
alone. This was, and still is, a traditional feature of
the education systems in both Germany and
Austria, with some 78 % of students in upper
secondary education participating in vocational
training courses. In Italy, the Netherlands and in
Belgium participation is comparably high, with 73,
70 and 80 % of upper secondary students being
enrolled, respectively. Yet, it also holds for Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom, with more than 50 % of their
upper secondary students (ISCED 3) attending
vocational education programmes. General educa-
tion predominates in Spain, Greece, Ireland and
Portugal with 41, 33, 23 and 23 % vocational enrol-
ment rates respectively.
But how strong is the evidence that vocational
training would actually help to improve the effi-
ciency of job-matching procedures and provide
young people with both the job contacts and the
occupation-specific knowledge they need? Table
II.10 shows to what extent unemployment for the
age cohort 20 to 29 years of age is dependent on
the use of vocational training programmes. With
the exception of Spain, Greece and Portugal —
where low investment in vocational training coin-
cides with higher unemployment among those
participating in vocational training — in all other
Member States data suggests that vocational
training decreases the likelihood of unemployment.
It is clear that for the European Union as a whole,
the rate of unemployment of those not partici-
pating in vocational training is twice as high as that
of those who do (23.5 % against 11.5 %, 
respectively).
There can be no doubt that, on the whole, the
specific vocational knowledge acquired by
students and the information gained by
employers on the ability of possible employees
helps to overcome matching problems. However,
as argued earlier, and more extensively by Broad-
berry and Wagner (1996), there is cause for some
caution here, as a detailed investigation of voca-
tional training programmes shows success to be
greatly dependent on the economic structure of
the industries involved. While extension of the
traditional bonds of on-the-job training for those
still in school to include different parts of business
services may constitute a promising way ofChapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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improving the matching performance of national
labour markets, success is bound to be deter-
mined by the appropriateness of individual
programmes36.
As the largest discrepancies between educational
attainment and the changing skill content of
employment confronts not the younger but the
older age cohorts, appropriate vocational training
for people already in work is a crucial element in
overcoming matching problems and preventing
early depreciation of the employees’ human capital.
Therefore it is necessary to promote the paradigm
of lifelong learning and related to it, the access for
all to relevant vocational training after entering the
labour market, including incentives to facilitate and
stimulate the uptake of vocational training by the
work force.
II.5.3 The private funding of education
Most models of investment in human capital find
that unrestricted competition conditions would not
lead to an efficient supply of skills (see Annex II.1).
However, one might ask whether the private
funding of education may contribute to the match
between skills and jobs, as market incentives
presumably would guide decisions so as to adjust
curriculum choices.
Table II.11 presents data on the share of privately
funded institutions in educational expenditure in
1998. Ranked on the basis of all levels of education,
Greece heads the list followed by the United States
and Japan, while Sweden, Denmark and Portugal
rank lowest. Graph II.6 plots national shares of
private funding (after deducting transfers and
implicit subsidies) against the general measure of
matching efficiency developed in section II.4.2
(where the distribution of the skill content of
employment is measured against that of the educa-
tional attainment of the population of working
age).
The data in Graph II.6 provide no evidence that
private funding as such will help improve matching
since, it is clear, no relationship between the two
variables can be established. There is, of course, a
compelling case for the private funding of educa-
tion in cases where the accumulation of skills is
specific to a given job or employer (specific human
capital) or when it is part of individual efforts to
prevent an untimely depreciation of human capital
through lifelong learning. Therefore, no general
argument can be made for a closer match and
improved labour efficiency through private funding
with respect to general education. 36 Also see European Commission (1997).
Table II.10: The proportion of students in vocational training (ISCED 3) and rates of unemployment, 1994
% of ISCED 3 Unemployment Unemployment
students in non-vocational vocational
vocational training (20 to 29 olds) (20 to 29 olds)
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(2)
Germany 78 16.2 7.6 0.47
Austria 78 na 4.0 na
Italy 73 22.2 15.9 0.72
Netherlands 70 14.8 7.2 0.49
Belgium 68 24.3 19.7 0.81
Sweden 63 21.7 na na
Luxembourg 63 5.7 na na
United Kingdom 58 18.5 10.0 0.54
Finland 54 35.4 23.6 0.67
Denmark 54 17.7 8.5 0.48
France 53 30.0 17.1 0.57
Spain 41 33.9 34.9 1.03
Greece 33 14.3 20.0 1.40
Ireland 23 na na na
Portugal 23 11.2 16.2 1.45
EU–15 59 23.5 11.5 0.49
Source: Calculated from the Unesco/OECD/Eurostat (UOE) questionnaire (1994).European competitiveness report 2002
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II.5.4 Ageing, lifelong learning and fiscal
incentives
In order to support human capital formation, which
is essential for improving medium term growth
prospects in the European Union, and to raise labour
force participation of better educated workers and
improve social inclusion, income taxation could be
an instrument to encourage individual behaviour in
this direction. However, fiscal systems in the Euro-
pean Union typically still reflect the fact that old-age
pensions and housing investment, rather than
human capital, are people’s largest wealth compo-
nents. At the same time, fiscal incentives in favour of
private pensions make early retirement and an associ-
ated depreciation of human capital an attractive
Table II.11: The share of privately funded institutions in educational expenditure by level of education, 1998
(final funds after public-to-private or private-to-public transfers)
All levels of education Primary through post secondary Tertiary
Greece 29.0 33.0 15.0
United States 25.0 9.2 53.2
Japan 24.8 8.3 58.3
Germany 21.7 24.1 7.9
Spain 16.9 10.8 27.9
United Kingdom 8.6 37.3
France 8.2 7.3 14.5
Belgium 8.0 6.0 14.0
Netherlands 7.2 5.7 12.5
Austria 6.0 5.2 1.1
Italy 5.0 1.0 25.3
Sweden 2.7 0.2 10.7
Denmark 2.3 2.1 2.8
Portugal 1.5 0.1 7.7
Note: For Belgium, the United Kingdom and Greece the year of reference is 1997; for Denmark the incorrect alleged weighted average for all types
of education of 5.0 (Education at a Glance, 2001, Table b.3.1) was replaced by the true weighted average according to enrolment.
Source: OECD (2000–01).
Graph II.6: The relation between education matching and private funding
Note: The horizontal axis shows the measure of variation calculated earlier in Table II.6; the vertical axis shows the share of private funding 
in education outlays (for all types of education) given in Table II.11.
Source: Tables II.6 and II.11.
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option. As a result, workers are discouraged from
investing in lifelong learning. While more research is
needed as to the precise trade-off between leisure
and income, a better balance in the fiscal treatment
of the various sources of income will likely provide
incentives for lengthening the time of active labour
market participation while also leading to a more
even distribution of education, work and leisure
across the economic life cycle. All this is particularly
important in view of the ageing problem in the Euro-
pean Union. Adjustment of these incentives in
combination with fiscal deductions for lifelong
learning, therefore, seems an important instrument
in efforts to cope with demographic change while
pursuing the objective of building a knowledge-
based economy37.
Savings accounts placed under a specific fiscal
regime may provide a useful first step as workers
would be able to devote such savings not only to an
early depreciation of their human capital (as is the
present case) but also to its maintenance. As a
result, larger private funds will become available for
adult education. Earmarked accounts for pupils and
students with a government-provided initial capital
to be taken up for schooling purposes at any
moment in life constitute another possibility. In fact,
such a proposal may be seen in relation to
extending vocational training. Agreements to this
effect may be made in collective bargaining, espe-
cially when profit sharing schemes are used in the
acquisition of sector-specific skills.
II.5.5 Matching and mobility: 
the Lisbon/Barcelona strategy
Given the large scope for efficiency gains in the
match between jobs and the education of especially
younger workers in the European Union it is essen-
tial that wider investment in human capital be seen
in relation to enhancing mobility of workers. Two
years after Lisbon, European weaknesses in the areas
of educational attainment, participation in training
and geographic and occupational mobility have
been recognised and a comprehensive Community
policy response is starting to take shape.
The major building blocks for such policy have been
laid out in late 2000 and throughout 2001, with the
conclusions of the Stockholm European Council of
March 2001 constituting a cornerstone. They
include various Commission initiatives in the area of
mobility such as the action plan on mobility38,
followed by the issuing of a recommendation on
mobility39, and the Commission communications
on ‘Making a European area of lifelong learning a
reality”40 and ‘A mobility strategy for the European
research area’41. From the point of view of
addressing skill gaps, of particular relevance is the
Commission’s communication on the impact of e-
economy on European enterprises42. The Stockholm
European Council has also endorsed a report on
common objectives of education and training
systems43, on the basis of which a detailed work
programme is currently being developed jointly by
the Council and the Commission.
Integrating, and building on the elements above,
the Commission put forward an action plan on skills
and mobility44, destined to address the obstacles to
mobility and skill development. It covers a wide
variety of actions, from making education systems
more responsive to the needs of the labour market
to an EU-wide immigration policy. It also includes,
notably, actions on the recognition of learning, the
transferability of qualifications, the removal of
administrative and legal barriers to geographic
mobility — for example through a universal health
card, the development of language and cross-
cultural skills, the promotion of cross-border recog-
nition of qualifications and better information
related to cross-border mobility.
The Barcelona Council of March 2002 further
endorsed the process begun at Lisbon by proposing
a number of initiatives and agreeing to others in
various areas having a direct bearing on the
improvement of education and training, including
lifelong learning and the use of ICT for teaching
and learning, and a range of proposals to
encourage greater flexibility and mobility of the
European workforce. In order to achieve a competi-
tive economy based on knowledge the European
Council set the target of ensuring that education
and training systems across the Union would estab-
lish themselves as the world standard by the year
2010. This will involve initiatives in the areas of
qualifications and skills and the promotion of
language learning and digital skills.
The Council endorsed a more integrated approach
to education, training and research and innovation
within a European knowledge area and called at 
39 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council
(2001/613/EC).
40 COM(2001) 678 final.
41 COM(2001) 331 final, 20 June 2001.
42 ‘The impact of the e-economy on European enterprises: economic analysis
and policy implications’, COM(2001) 711 final, 29.11.2001.
43 Commission Report on ‘Concrete future objectives of education systems’,
COM(2001) 59 final, 31.1.2001.
44 COM(2002) 72 final, 13.2.2002.
37 See Bovenberg (2001).
38 OJ 2000/C 371, 23.12.2000.European competitiveness report 2002
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the same time for adoption of the related sixth
framework programme by June of 2002. Providing
evidence that such pedagogic initiatives are not
being taken in a vacuum, the Council returned to
the enhancement of human resources in the
context of numerous policies; to reinforce the
employment strategy it suggested setting a primary
focus on lifelong learning, especially as this can
increase opportunities for older workers to remain
in the labour market. The Commission action plan
to promote skills and mobility was welcomed,
including those involved in education, research and
innovation. Barriers to professional recognition of
qualifications and non-formal learning should be
lowered, all citizens should be equipped with basic
qualifications, especially those linked to ICTs and
particularly unemployed women.
Initiatives in the area of telecommunications are
directly related to education and learning, including
the request that the Commission draw up a
comprehensive eEurope in advance of the Seville
Council focussing on eLearning, and bring down
the interconnect ratio for school PCs to one per 15
pupils. In the area of research and technical devel-
opment, for example, the Council noted the
Commission’s proposal to better integrate innova-
tion in the European knowledge area, which should
presumably make considerable demands on
teaching and learning systems.
The overall thrust of all these initiatives is to ensure
that EU education and training structures and prac-
tices should set world standards by the end of the
decade thus contributing to the maintenance of a
high level of innovative and high value-added
sustainable employment and output, ensuring that
the Union should become a major world competitor
across a range of such frontier activities.
II.6 Concluding remarks
Europe’s productivity under-performance during the
second half of the 1990s raises the question of
whether the pace of human capital accumulation and
the labour market process of matching educational
characteristics and the skill content of labour demand
have played a role in this development. The present
chapter has reviewed some relevant evidence.
While the theoretical literature suggests that either the
stock or the flow (rate of accumulation) of human
capital can be a decisive variable in economic growth,
the empirical literature does not support conclusively
this conjecture. This is not entirely new since economic
historians have already established that the role of
human capital in 19th century industrialisation was at
best a limited one45. There may be a variety of reasons
for this lack of unambiguous evidence, one of which is,
in addition to accumulation effects, the matching
process between skills and jobs in the labour market
(allocation effects). Thus, interest in human capital in
this context is related to issues of structural change in
the distribution of employment, of the pace and
nature of technological progress and of complemen-
tarities between physical capital and skilled labour in
the production processes of the modern economy.
It appears that differences in the structure, accumu-
lation, and rates of return, of human capital are
related to problems of labour market efficiency, thus
placing human capital formation at the centre of a
wider institutional debate. In a fundamental sense,
the supply of skills concerns a decision by individ-
uals about the type of human capital they are going
to supply over the lifetime (as distinct from the
decision of time allocation between work and
leisure for a given profession). This decision
depends crucially on expected pay and wage differ-
entials, which, in turn, reflect employers’ choices
about techniques and the relative demand for skills
that these choices imply. Labour market signals
about shifts in the demand for particular skills are
manifest in changes in relative wage rates and
simultaneously in excess demand for particular
types of human capital (or skill gaps). Clearly, tech-
nical change and the introduction of new tech-
niques in the economy depend on and require new
skills to realise the associated efficiency gains. The
situation that has emerged regarding the use and
diffusion of ICT in the European Union is a reflection
of this process. Because in the context of rapidly
changing technological and economic circum-
stances the stock of existing skills may quickly
become obsolete, it is essential to have a mecha-
nism through which the stock of human capital is
adapted to these changes. Here, there is an impor-
tant role that lifelong learning can play.
In this perspective, the situation in the European
Union appears to be characterised by two features:
first, by a sector specific under-investment in skill
formation compared to developments in labour
demand, giving rise to skill gaps in certain sectors;
and, second, by institutional deficiencies preventing
the exploitation of the full potential of knowledge-
based growth. Nevertheless, productivity perform-
ance in the European Union in recent years does
not appear to be determined by the matching effi-
ciency of supply of general education skills and the
skill structure of employment.
45 See the survey on British industrialisation by Mitch (1993).Chapter II — Human capital and productivity growth in the European Union
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EU labour markets appear to have been unsuccessful
in fully creating market incentives for educated
workers and in generating the resultant response
from the supply of labour. Part of this problem may lie
in the historical segmentation of the European
economies, but perhaps the largest part must be
attributed to mismatch and narrow wage differentials
resulting from sectoral bargaining and monopsony
elements in the case of the public sector (notably in
health care and education). Labour immobility is also
a crucial factor. Moreover, the slowdown in produc-
tivity growth in recent years has been reflected in
comparatively low returns on human capital, thus
blunting the incentives to pursue higher education,
while a widening of wage differentials in favour of
those skills for which there is excess demand has not
developed sufficiently. Correspondingly, the supply of
skilled graduates from the university system has also
been slow. Finally, a poor record of job creation (until
the end of the 1990s) has coincided with weak invest-
ment and diffusion of new technologies (ICT in
particular) as well as weak innovation performance
and spending on R & D. These considerations suggest
that the European Union is experiencing institutional
problems in developing incentives to an economic
growth path that is intensive in skilled labour.
Several steps have already been taken towards
building a policy framework, at both Member State
and Community level, addressing the weaknesses
identified in the previous sections, notably skill
mismatches and shortages as well as mobility
barriers. However, it becomes apparent that for the
Lisbon strategy to be successful, its scope should
clearly widen beyond concerns about the accumu-
lation of knowledge and skills. It should seek to
examine whether current European fiscal systems
and labour market institutions are suited not only to
accommodate but also to encourage economic
growth based on new technologies and to support
improvements in the stock of knowledge across the
labour force cohorts. After all, as Keynes remarked
in a 1944 address to the Marshall Society, in the
final analysis, economic prosperity depends not on
how brilliant a few people are, but on how large a
scale you are able to produce competent people in
all walks of life.
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This annex reviews the literature on the demand for
and supply of education at the micro-level and its
impact on economic growth.
Schooling, earnings 
and labour supply
The essential premise of human capital theory is
that individuals weigh the cost of education —
forgone labour income and costs such as tuition
fees — against the (time-discounted) benefits from
the higher wage earned over their life-cycle.
Under the assumptions that wages are set
according to the marginal product of labour, an
efficiently working labour market, and of full flexi-
bility in the supply of education, people acquire
skills for as long as the resulting personal benefit
and its social gain exceed the associated cost46. As a
result, a wage structure that reflects changes in the
skill composition of labour demand would lead to a
matching change in the supply of adequately
educated workers.
However, labour market institutions, limited infor-
mation and bargaining under imperfect competi-
tion suggest that these assumptions are not a real-
istic description of the accumulation and allocation
of human capital in market economies. Due to
informational asymmetries, the education level may
act as a signal of ability rather than as a produc-
ANNEX II.1 — Schooling, income and economic growth: theory and evidence
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tivity-enhancing factor47. Under these circum-
stances, educational wage differentials may merely
reflect the value of educational qualifications as a
signal of ability and growth in the economy’s stock
of education does not necessarily increase the
productivity of the workforce. In general, empirical
studies suggest that the ‘signalling component’ of
educational qualifications accounts for only a rela-
tively small part of the wage difference associated
with education48.
The basic empirical approach, in analysing the link
between education and productivity at the micro-
level, is to explain the variation in wages across indi-
viduals, using earnings functions applied to survey
data49. The explanatory variables include years of
schooling, age (or a different proxy for experience)
and other personal characteristics. In most studies a
semi-logarithmic form is used so that the coefficient
on schooling can be read as the private return to
education. The coefficients on schooling found in this
way are typically robust and the finding of a positive
association between earnings and schooling is uncon-
troversial. Table A1 reproduces OECD estimates of
rates of return by country and level of attainment50. 
Standard micro-economic models of human capital
formation disregard education externalities. These
ANNEX II.1
Schooling, income and economic growth:
theory and evidence
47 If employers value certain characteristics of potential employees (such as
ability, stamina or determination) that cannot be observed at the moment of
hiring, but that are negatively correlated with the individual’s cost of
acquiring education, higher education levels may command higher wages
even if education has no effect on individual productivity; see Arrow (1973)
and Spence (1974); game-theoretic refinements were suggested by Riley
(1975), Mailath (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987).
48 Kroch and Sjoblom (1993) analyse the influence of both the number of years
of schooling (human capital) and an individual’s position in the distribution
of education for his cohort (signalling) in an earnings function applied to two
separate panel data sets, to find that only the former has a systematic posi-
tive effect on the wage gaps observed. Moreover, if signalling is the predom-
inant effect, the observed earnings differential should decline with job
tenure, as employers gain insight into workers’ abilities. Although empirical
evidence here is limited, this does not appear to hold.
49 The seminal work here is Mincer (1974).
50 Estimates produced in this fashion typically range between 5 and 15 % with
relatively small standard errors, but with a dependency on time and place.
46 The modern theoretical analysis , investment in human capital along these
lines began in the late 1950s and early 1960s with seminal work by Mincer
(1958, 1962), Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962). See Hartog (1992) for an
overview of this literature.European competitiveness report 2002
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externalities can emerge for a set of reasons. First, it
is plausible that the extent of a worker’s educational
attainment will have a positive effect on the produc-
tivity of others — an effect that is not captured in
the individual’s own wages. Second, as Arrow
(1973), Stiglitz (1975) and Huffman (1977) have
argued, the provision of education may play a role
in allowing a more efficient matching between
workers and jobs through a wider diffusion of infor-
mation. Finally — and probably the most funda-
mental flaw in the micro human-capital model with
respect to external effects — these models see the
stock of education as a mere factor of production
rather than a source of technological innovation —
a function that is essential to endogenous growth.
Human capital represents not only the stock of
workers’ skills but also the embodied technological
knowledge used in the innovation and diffusion of
new products and production processes.
To the extent that technological knowledge is
generated by the learning processes of skilled
workers, the result creates an externality to other
firms due to non-rivalry and the incomplete appro-
priability of knowledge. Improvement in the
average level of educational attainment stimulates
economic growth by facilitating the use of knowl-
edge that is generated by learning elsewhere.
The most straightforward interpretation of the
private returns is that education makes for more
productive individuals, whatever their occupation.
Yet in practice, tertiary education is likely to
contribute little to productivity growth when
employed in lower skilled jobs; thus, the importance
of allocational efficiency is crucial. The balance of
evidence seems to suggest that the contribution of
education to productivity is likely to be real and
substantial, even when educational attainment
externalities are not taken into account.
Market failure and the
acquisition of skills
Situations of imperfect competition or imperfect
information in markets for training may lead to
market failure in training provision and skills acqui-
sition. If workers do not receive adequate compen-
sation for the training they have acquired, private
benefits from skills acquisition fall short of social
benefits, and individual interests will lead to under-
investment in skills from the point of view of social
welfare.
According to the conventional wisdom on human
capital formation51, people pay all the costs and
receive all the benefits from education. In such
conditions, the trainer and trainee share the costs
of training in proportion to the benefit each
receives, ensuring that a socially desirable amount
of education will in fact be provided. In such a
world, general training — that is, general educa-
tion and off-the-job training — that is useful to all
employers should be paid for in full by the
prospective employees, since these are the ones to
reap the full benefits from investing in their educa-
tion. In the case of specific training — one that is
useful only to a specific employer — the costs of
schooling such as vocational training should be
shared by firms and workers, so that workers inter-
nalise the cost of quitting and firms that of a
dismissal. By extension, it is implicitly assumed that
51 See Becker (1962).
Table A1: Rates of return on education by level of educational attainment according to OECD 
estimates, 1999–2000
Men Women
Upper secondary  Tertiary  Upper secondary  Tertiary 
education education education education
Denmark 11.3 13.7 10.5 11.1
Germany 10.8 9.1 7.0 8.4
France 13.5 14.3 17.9 15.4
Italy 11.2 6.5 - -
Netherlands 7.9 12.1 8.4 12.5
Sweden 6.4 11.4 - 10.8
United Kingdom 15.1 18.5 - 16.1
Canada 13.6 8.7 12.7 9.9
United States 16.4 14.9 11.8 14.7
Source: OECD, Economic outlook 2001.ANNEX II.1 — Schooling, income and economic growth: theory and evidence
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all training can be divided into general and specific
components. And since the market is held to
provide adequate incentives for optimal investment
in each of these, it does as much for any combina-
tion of the two.
In reality, there is hardly any training which is useful
to all employers, just as there is no training which is
specific to one single employer, but rather to a
limited class of employers. Because firms are imper-
fect competitors for labour and possess some
market power, workers are paid less than their
marginal products and, hence, do not fully reap the
returns from training. As a consequence, too little
time and effort will be spent in the acquisition of
knowledge relative to the social optimum. More-
over, under-investment in training provided by
employers may occur when the results of this
training are of use to other firms and workers can
easily switch jobs. The greater the mobility of
workers and the greater the market power of firms,
the larger this problem becomes.
Imperfect information and imperfect competition in
the job matching process also lead to externalities.
When applicants are not certain of getting job offers
and employers of getting job applicants, wage
negotiations will depend on the speed with which
jobless workers and vacant jobs are matched, as
well as on the wage which each party expects to
negotiate with other firms or job applicants (the so-
called ‘outside opportunities’). Clearly, the more
skilled workers are available, the faster firms can
expect to attract job applicants. This then raises the
firm’s market power in negotiations, reduces the
worker’s returns from training and leads to lower
than optimal investment in skills.
Finally, deficient investment in human capital due to
some of the mechanisms described above will, in
turn, have negative effects on other variables such
as physical capital and innovation. When labour and
capital are complementary production factors52,
sub-optimal investment in human capital will
reduce the productivity of capital goods and
thereby lead to deficient investment in physical
capital. In the same vein, when firms do not inno-
vate because the workforce is insufficiently skilled,
workers in turn will not acquire sufficient skills
because there is insufficient demand for them from
innovating firms. As a result, a vicious circle where
firms create few skilled vacancies and few workers
acquire skills may lead the economy into a ‘low-skill,
bad-job trap’.
Sectoral productivity,
endowments and trade
Another strand of the literature on human capital
theory and growth, focus on the effects of schooling
on international competitiveness by looking at trade
performance. Since the 1970s, considerable empir-
ical work has aimed to explain the sectoral pattern of
trade of various economies using a model with three
factors of production: physical capital, labour and
human capital. More recently, such analyses have
been enhanced by models which, in addition to
differences in factor endowments, allow for compar-
ative technology differences and thus for the internal
knowledge spillover effects of endogenous growth53.
The empirical evidence suggests that the skill
content of employment has an influence on trade
performance54. Trade specialisation depends on
factor content and thus on the distribution of the
level of educational attainment. Moreover, speciali-
sation also takes place according to the develop-
ment of different skills at approximately the same
level of education or vocational training.
Broadly speaking, there is strong evidence that,
apart from classic factor intensity and resulting cost
effects, cross-country differences in human capital
formation, relative sectoral labour productivity, and
technology (as proxied by such variables as relative
R & D and patenting intensity) do, in fact, exert a
significant influence on the volume and composi-
tion of trade flows.
Concerning the role of human capital on sectoral
productivity, Cörvers (1999), covering 13 manufac-
turing sectors within the European Union, and using
the distribution of low, intermediate and high
skilled employment to measure the human capital
stock of the workforce, confirms the effect of inter-
mediate- and high-skilled labour on sectoral labour
productivity55, together with capital intensity and
firm size. Only in the low-skill category of sectors,
however, does there appear to be a research effect
of high-skilled (R & D) workers on the development
and use of new technologies, resulting in the kind
of employment spillovers stressed in the recent
European Union employment report56.
53 See Baldwin (1971), Branson (1971), Harkness and Kyle (1975), Stern
(1976), Branson and Monoyios (1977), Wolter (1977), Stern and Maskus
(1981), Maskus (1983),Gavelin (1983), Baruh (1986) and Crafts and Thomas
(1986) on the first type (mostly interpreting the non-homogeneity of labour
into a stock equivalence) and Krugman (1986), Cimoli and Soete (1992),
Verspagen and Wakelin (1993) on the second type of appraoch.
54 See Courakis (1991), Maskus et al. (1994). Also see Grossman and Helpman
(1992).
55 Except for high-skilled labour in high-skill sectors.
56 European Commission (2001b), p. 29.
52 A presumption for which the evidence, especially in the case of skilled labour
in manufacturing sectors, is strong.European competitiveness report 2002
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Skills, innovation and
endogenous growth
Since the 1960s, economists have sought to
account for the growth in aggregate output by
measuring the rate at which factor inputs grow and
analysing the extent to which this expansion may
account for the change in income. In the original
analysis, growth that could not be accounted for by
changes in factor inputs was attributed to a residual
held to represent exogenous technical progress (or
the ‘quality of labour’). The 1980s saw the emer-
gence of a group of models seeking to recast the
theoretical basis of growth analysis by explaining
the change in output per head in an endogenous
fashion57. By relaxing the assumption of dimin-
ishing returns and rendering the pace of technolog-
ical progress endogenous to a specified form of
human capital spillovers, productivity growth is no
longer made to rely on exogenous technological
progress. As a result, the pace of technological
change is tied to changes in the stock of human
capital, which, apart from serving as a production
factor, plays a pivotal role in the innovation and
diffusion process58.
The fact that governments determine the institu-
tional and economic environment in which knowl-
edge is developed and diffused, suggests rethinking
the role of policy intervention in determining the
pace of growth. Complicating this is the character
of knowledge as a largely non-excludable, non-
rivalling good, causing it to approach the theoret-
ical position of a public good. In the presence of
knowledge spillovers, unfettered market forces do
not produce optimal outcomes: first in the acquisi-
tion of skills already discussed, second in the diffu-
sion of new ideas.
The empirical literature that has resulted from these
insights can be divided in two complementary
approaches: ‘growth accounting’ and ‘growth
regression’. Growth accounting attempts to distin-
guish the contribution to output growth of different
factor inputs — measured changes in varying ranges
and specifications of inputs are weighted by imputed
factor shares to decompose the growth in income of
economies over time. Growth regression proceeds by
direct econometric estimation of the parameters in
aggregate production functions, using panel data, so
as to identify the common driving forces of growth
across countries and over time.
Growth accounting
Growth accounting decomposes output growth
into a range of components that can be explained
by the growth in factor inputs and a residual that
captures efficiency change — which in turn is seen
as the result of technological progress. In explaining
total output growth, it weighs each input by its
marginal product, proxied by its market remunera-
tion. This basic approach can be extended to any
number of inputs or used in disaggregation of the
labour force into various categories (age, gender
and skill). Thus, concerning the contribution of
changes in skill levels, a decomposition of labour
input by level of schooling is made where changes
in the employment of each class of workers are
weighted by the average income associated with
the educational attainment of this group.
As summarised by Griliches (1997), the essential
assumptions of growth accounting are twofold.
First, it is assumed that differences in observed
market rewards correspond to differences in
marginal product. Second, the imputed factor
contributions in the case of human capital are
based on the premise that differences in market
remuneration across schooling levels do indeed
originate in schooling59. The advantage of the first
assumption is that it allows for easily computable
weights under the assumption of constant returns
to scale and perfect competition. By the same
token, however, growth accounting is unable to
shed light on the importance of externalities, since
output elasticities are computed based on market
rewards. More generally, educational attainment
may have other, indirect, effects on output through
participation behaviour, investment, R & D and the
growth of total factor productivity. Growth
accounting captures none of these indirect effects
and therefore may underscore the overall impor-
tance of educational attainment to growth by
limiting its role to that of a production factor.
Evidence from growth
regressions
Given the restrictive assumptions that underlie the
methodology of growth accounting, the empirical
literature has sought to test the productivity effects
of schooling directly, by including it as a separate
variable in econometric production functions.
Contrary to the methodology of growth ‘accounting’
59 Rather than in factors such as innate ability, which may be correlated with
schooling.
57 See the textbook by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the origins of these
models go back to Usawa (1965).
58 These new theories of economic growth were reviewed in European
Commission (2001a), Annex II.2.ANNEX II.1 — Schooling, income and economic growth: theory and evidence
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described above, growth ‘regression’ provides a
method of testing directly for the productivity
effects of education. By extension, growth regres-
sions are also an effective way of testing the signifi-
cance of the signalling role of education.
The seminal and probably most influential contribu-
tion to this strand of empirical literature is Mankiw
‘et al.’ (1992). Taking, in the authors’ words,
‘Robert Solow seriously’ it sought to test the
explanatory power of the standard neo-classical
growth model, with and without an extension
accounting for the influence of the stock of human
capital. Their parameter estimates60 appear to
suggest that the Solow model ‘is consistent with the
international variation in the standard of living’.
Moreover, the ‘augmented’ model that includes the
accumulation of human as well as physical capital,
provides, according to the authors, ‘an excellent
description of the cross-country data’. As noted by
Temple (2000: 16), the output elasticities that may
be derived from those results suggest that a 10 %
increase in human capital investment (as a share of
GDP) will yield an increase in output per worker of
between 5 and 6 % (result for the OECD sample);
see Table A2 for a survey of parameter estimates.
Growth regressions in general are subject to a
number of important statistical problems and speci-
fication issues. At the same time, the estimates do
not allow for cross-country differences in human
capital effects, and are in fact dominated by the
presence within the sample of numerous less devel-
oped countries and concomitant income gaps (the
fit obtained for the OECD sample, for example, is
considerably less than that for the other two
samples, see Table A2). Moreover, the likelihood of
differences in the nature and quality of schooling
across countries forms an obstacle to the proper
understanding of the mechanisms at work. All
present measures of human capital formation either
rely on years of schooling (which makes graduation
periods crucial), secondary enrolment (underlining
the quality of education argument) or observed
wage differentials (the implications of which were
discussed previously)61.
The empirical literature, which these criticisms
prompted, has sought to correct some of these
shortcomings. First, researchers have used alterna-
tive specifications in modelling the aggregate
production functions. Initially, growth was
regressed on control variables and ‘starting levels’
of accumulation in physical capital, labour and
schooling (as proxied by secondary enrolment or
average years of schooling). The idea was that the
stock of human capital could affect subsequent
growth in a number of ways, most notably by influ-
encing the ability to adopt technology from
abroad62. However, theoretically, the conventional
earnings functions at the micro-level imply that one
should expect to observe a correlation between the
change in output per worker and the ‘change’ in
educational attainment and other factor inputs63.
Some studies have sought to incorporate human
capital effects in standard production functions,
while estimating them under the assumption of
decreasing returns in the steady-state situation. The
initial results for such specifications suggested that
the sought-for association was, at best, a weak one.
Most notably, the empirical study by Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994) not only showed a relationship to be
absent from scatters of income against schooling,
but produced adjusted estimates for separate accu-
mulation effects that appear to support the same
conclusion64; see Table A2.
Measurement errors, data structure and estimation
procedures have also been addressed in subsequent
research. After careful re-examination and adjust-
ment of the available data on average years of
schooling, de la Fuente and Domenech (2001)
produce estimates (for the OECD sample) which
suggest that earlier ‘counterintuitive’ results on
human capital and growth ‘may be due, at least in
part, to deficiencies in the data or inadequacies of
the econometric specification’. In a recent effort,
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) estimate human
capital-extended growth regressions for a panel of
21 OECD countries over the period 1971–9865.
Overall, the results corroborate a significant influ-
ence of human capital effects. However, in the
words of the authors, these ‘are not consistent with
the human capital augmented version of the Solow
model, but rather support an endogenous growth
model à la Uzawa-Lucas, with constant returns to
scale to ‘broad’ (human and physical) capital’66.
Such conclusions rest on the relative size of the elas-
ticity of human capital with respect to income and
the pace of convergence derived from estimated
long-run parameters. Since the Solow model, and
its augmented version, provides exact predictions
for these numbers, a higher value indicates the
presence of externality effects.
62 See, for example, Barro (1991) and the estimates in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), pp. 424-61.
63 See de la Fuente and Domenech (2001).
64 For similar conclusions see Pritchett (1996).
65 In addition, they use an estimation technique -the Pooled Mean Group esti-
mator- which seeks to reconcile the theoretical premises of endogenous
growth theory with the use of panel data
66 Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) 2.
60 Using the Summers-Heston data set, a non-oil producing sample of national
economies and the OECD.
61 Also see OECD (1998), pp. 16–22.E
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Table A2: A survey of derived production function parameters in growth regressions
Levels: ln GDP per person of working age
Human Physical  Conditional N Period Time Country R-square Sample Human 
capital capital convergence dummies dummies capital data
MRW (1990) 0.280 0.310 98 1960–85 No No 0.78 Summers-Heston., secondary 
non-oil att. (Unesco)
MRW (1990) 0.300 0.290 75 1960–85 No No 0.77 Summers-Heston,  secondary att. 
adjusted (Unesco)
MRW (1990) 0.370 0.140 22 1960–85 No No 0.24 OECD secondary att. 
(Unesco)
BES (1994) 0.050 0.853 80 1965 - No na Kyriacou years 
(Kyriacou, 1991)
BES (1994) 0.217 0.643 109 1985 - No na Kyriacou years 
(Kyriacou, 1991)
dlFD (2000) 0.112 0.560 126 (21) 1960–90 No Yes 0.89 OECD years (Barro 
and Lee, 1996)
dlFD (2000) 0.120 0.552 126 (21) 1960–90 Yes Yes 0.98 OECD years (Barro 
and Lee, 1996)
dlFD (2000) 0.269 0.516 126 (21) 1960–90 No Yes 0.90 OECD years (own, 
adjusted B&L)
dlFD (2000) 0.279 0.567 126 (21) 1960–90 Yes Yes 0.98 OECD years (own, 
adjusted B&L)
First differences: d ln GDP per person of working age
BES (1994) 0.063 0.457 78 1965–85 No No na Kyriacou years 
(Kyriacou, 1991)
BES (1994) - 0.059 0.545 - 0.190 78 1965–85 No No na Kyriacou years 
(Kyriacou, 1991)
BES (1994) - 0.043 0.555 - 0.185 78 1965–85 No No na Kyriacou years 
(Kyriacou, 1991)
dlFD (2000) 0.493 0.493 126 (21) 1960–90 Yes No 0.72 OECD years (own, 
adjusted B&L)
dlFD (2000) 0.271 0.373 0.068 126 (21) 1960–90 Yes Yes 0.81 OECD years (own, 
adjusted B&L)
BS (2001) 0.820 0.130 0.140 521 (21) 1971–98 Yes Yes Logl, 1491 OECD years 
(dlFD, 2000)
Note: ‘Conditional convergence’ denotes the parameter-value for initial income levels when included as a regressor.
Sources: MRW: Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990); BES: Benhabib and Spiegel (1994); BL: Barro and Lee (1996); dlFD: de la Fuente and Domenech (2001); BS: Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001).ANNEX II.1 — Schooling, income and economic growth: theory and evidence
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250–265.III.1 Importance of services 
in the economy
The European competitiveness report 2001 included a
study of innovation and productivity performance
in the manufacturing sector67. It concluded that the
European Union lags behind its main competitors,
in particular the United States, in terms of innova-
tive activity and R & D inputs. These weaknesses
were in turn reflected in the EU’s lower overall
productivity growth. Sectoral productivity levels are
in general higher in US manufacturing in compar-
ison to the European Union. In addition, tech-
nology-driven high-productivity industries account
for a larger share of total manufacturing in the
United States, thus contributing to higher overall
productivity.
The present chapter completes the analysis of
productivity developments by focusing on services.
Services are the main sector of economic activity in
all modern economies68, and the productivity and
competitiveness of the services sector are a crucial
determinant of growth and welfare. The role of
many services as inputs in the production of indus-
trial goods (e.g. business-related services, communi-
cations or financial services) also makes them an
important component of competitiveness in the
manufacturing sector69. Finally, as more and more
services are becoming tradable, services play an
increasing role in determining countries’ trade
performance70.
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In the European Union, services account for 69 % of
all jobs and 70 % of total output (see Graph III.1).
The relative size of the services sector in the
economy has continued to increase: in 1990, serv-
ices represented 63 % of the Union’s total employ-
ment and 64 % of total value added. The size of the
services sector varies considerably across the
Member States. The share of services in total
employment ranges from 56 % in Portugal to 76 %
in the Netherlands. In terms of value added, serv-
ices represent between 60 % (Ireland) and 80 %
(Luxembourg) of the total.
With the exception of Luxembourg, the share of
services in the economy in all the Member States is
smaller than in the United States. Until recently,
European services were characterised by higher
productivity growth but lower employment growth
than in the United States. This was seen as a catch-
up process in the European services sector.
However, the recent acceleration of productivity
growth in services in the United States has led to a
renewed widening of the productivity gap between
the United States and the European Union (see
section III.2).
Economists often analyse the issue of productivity
growth in a two-sector economy, consisting of serv-
ices and manufacturing. Baumol’s ‘unbalanced
growth model’ (see Box III.1) starts from the
assumption that the labour-intensity of many serv-
ices makes it difficult to raise labour productivity by
automation. In the manufacturing sector, a faster
substitution of capital for labour will lead to contin-
uously higher labour productivity growth than in
the services sector. As the demand for services
continues to rise despite their higher relative prices,
reflecting the high income elasticity of demand, the
share of services in total employment will increase,
while, ceteris paribus, the employment share of
manufacturing will decline.
CHAPTER III
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67 See European Commission (2001a), especially chapter 4.
68 European Commission (2000a), chapter 4, provides a description of the
evolution of service sector.
69 European Commission (2000a), chapter 4, describes the increasing penetra-
tion of external services and their impact on performance of client sectors.
70 Although the value of conventional cross border trade in services is only
about one-fifth of the value of trade in goods in the EU, trade in services is
expanding more rapidly than trade in goods. European Commission (2000a),
chapter 5, describes the evolution of international services transactions.European competitiveness report 2002
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Sectoral employment and productivity in the European
Union have developed in line with the predictions of
Baumol’s model. In the late 1990s, services employ-
ment expanded at annual rates of close to 2 %, while
manufacturing employment declined (see Graph III.2).
Productivity growth, in turn, was clearly higher in
manufacturing: 1.8 % against 1.0 % in services.
The remainder of this chapter looks at productivity
developments in services, in particular business
sector services, and investigates possible causes
behind the productivity growth differentials against
the United States. The next section III.2 presents
empirical evidence on productivity growth in busi-
ness sector services, and the link between produc-
tivity growth and employment growth; the
following section III.3 looks at some determinants of
productivity growth in services, in particular the use
of ICT, innovation and market liberalisation; the
final section III.4 concludes.
III.2 Productivity
developments in business
sector services
III.2.1. Market services in the EU
This section presents data on productivity growth in
market services (or, as called in official statistics,
‘business sector services’). Market services account
for over a half of GDP, and almost one half of total
Graph III.1: Size of the services sector in the economy, 2000
Notes: Employment shares for France, the United Kingdom, EU–15 and Japan: 1999, and for Portugal: 1998; EU–15 excludes Portugal. 
Shares in total value added for Ireland and Japan: 1999; EU–15 excludes Ireland.
Source: Commission services (national accounts statistics).
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employment in EU–15 (Table III.1). In both the
United States and Japan, market services represent a
slightly higher share of total output and a clearly
higher share of total employment than in EU–15.
The exclusion from the analysis of most public sector
services (such as health and education) is due mainly
to lack of comparable data. This does not mean that
the scope for productivity increases in those services
is any less relevant for the economy; on the contrary,
it may even lead to several secondary benefits, such
as a reduced overall tax burden.
More detailed OECD data on market services
(OECD’s ‘business sector services’) are available for
eight Member States71, allowing an analysis of
productivity growth by sector72. Annex Tables III.A1
and III.A2 show by country the GDP and employ-
ment shares of each sub-sector of business sector
services73. Business sector services account for
between two-fifths and half of GDP in the EU
Member States for which data are available. Their
share in total employment is typically around 10
percentage points lower74.
71 EU–15 excluding Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Sweden.
72 Colin Webb (OECD) kindly provided the unpublished data from the STAN
database.
73 Due to definitional differences and the different base year, the data may
differ from those presented in Table III.1.
74 This difference can be explained largely by Real Estate Activities. A significant
proportion of its value added consists of ‘Imputed Rent of Owner-occupied
Dwellings’. Since there is no labour input associated with owner-occupied
dwellings, the inclusion of ‘Real Estate Activities’ can distort productivity
measures; particularly as volume growth of owner-occupied dwellings is
generally slower than that for other business services.Chapter III — Productivity growth in EU services
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Box III.1: Baumol’s unbalanced growth model
The work of Baumol (1967, 1985, et al. 1985) provides an important foundation of the current understanding of produc-
tivity in services, and of the implications of the increasing size of the services sector for growth and productivity in the
economy as a whole. Baumol, together with Fuchs (1968), pointed to the highly labour intensive nature of many service
activities as a central element behind the observation that aggregate productivity growth in the services sector generally
lagged behind that of the goods sector. The basic argument is that it is often difficult to reduce the labour input into
many service activities (e.g. through automation or technological progress) and so there may be little scope to increase
efficiency (e.g. through capital accumulation, innovation, or economies of scale). Consequently, low productivity growth
may be seen as an innate feature of some — but not all — services.
Baumol provides a stylised model to explain the causes and consequences of the increasing size of the services sector. In
the simplest representation of the model, the economy consists of two industries: a technologically progressive industry
which has a permanently higher growth rate of productivity (initially equated with manufacturing), and a technologically
stagnant industry with zero (or low) productivity growth (initially equated with services).i Further, the model assumes
that labour is the only input, that total employment is fixed, and that wages move in line across the two industries —
driven by productivity growth in the progressive sectors. Over time, less labour is required to produce outputs in the high
productivity growth industry, while labour input remains unchanged (or falls more slowly) in the low productivity growth
industry. As wages, and hence prices, cannot adjust to the lower productivity in the stagnant industry, the relative price
of its outputs will rise. At the same time, however, incomes will also be rising because there is productivity growth at least
in the progressive industry. Two outcomes for the low productivity growth industry are possible:
— Unless the low productivity growth industry is characterised by a high income elasticity of demand, demand for its
output will fall as prices rise and eventually the industry will vanish, provided that it is not subsidised or otherwise
maintained.
— If the low productivity growth industry is characterised by a high income elasticity of demand, rising incomes will
increase the demand for its output and, since there is little or no scope for productivity improvements, the industry
will absorb an increasing proportion of employment to meet this increase in demand. This will be possible because
productivity improvements in the progressive industry will allow labour to shift to the stagnant sector while still
meeting the growing demand for its own output.
This second outcome provides an explanation for the increasing share of services — typically associated with a high
income elasticity of demand and low productivity growth — and the declining share of manufacturing in total employ-
ment. Further, the aggregate economy-wide productivity growth rate will diminish as the employment share of less
productive service sectors increases, since aggregate productivity is given by the sum of employment-share weighted
sector productivity growth rates. Thus, it follows from Baumol’s analysis that:
— Relative prices in low productivity growth sectors will rise faster than in high productivity sectors.
— The share of employment in low productivity growth sectors will increase.
— Economy-wide productivity growth will decline as employment shifts to low productivity growth sectorsii.
In a broader context, the historically observed pattern of strong productivity growth and low employment growth in
European services has been seen to reflect a ‘catching-up’ process towards US productivity levels. As European produc-
tivity levels approach those of the United States, their rate of growth should slow and, as predicted by Baumol’s model,
the share of employment in services will increase.
Notes:
i In an extension to the basic model, Baumol (1985) expands his analysis to allow for service sectors that may show rapid growth of productivity in the short
or medium term. Even here, however, if productivity improvements are ultimately bounded by a fixed labour input, productivity growth will eventually
diminish to some low level.
ii Oulton (2001) demonstrates that this conclusion does not necessarily follow if stagnant industries are producers of intermediate inputs (e.g. business serv-
ices) rather than producers of final goods and services. Under certain conditions it is possible that transferring resources to low productivity growth sectors
that are producers of intermediate inputs may raise aggregate productivity.European competitiveness report 2002
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Within the European Union, the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands display the largest GDP shares in busi-
ness sector services, Finland the smallest. In the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, business sector serv-
ices account for an even larger share of total employ-
ment than in the United States, while Italy, Finland and
Sweden have the smallest employment shares in busi-
ness sector services in the European Union.
Within business sector services, the most important
sub-sector is wholesale and retail trade. In all the
countries covered by the data, the trading sector
accounts for nearly one quarter of the total value
added in business sector services, and its employ-
ment shares are even higher (Annex Tables III.A1
and III.A2). Financial intermediation (which is clearly
more important in terms of GDP than in terms of
employment), and transport and storage are the
next most important sectors within business sector
services.
Graph III.2: Output, employment and productivity in manufacturing and in services in EU–15, 
1995–99
Note: Productivity is defined as value added per employed person. Manufacturing output and productivity excluding Ireland. Services employment
and productivity excluding Portugal.
Source: Commission services (national accounts statistics).
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Table III.1: Market services in total value added and employment in EU–15, US and Japan (1997)
Value added Employment
(ECU 1 000 Million) (millions)
EU (a) US (b) Japan EU (a) US Japan
Market Services 3 485 3 299 2 060 66.9 68.3 34.6
Share of total (%) 52.3 54.8 54.5 46.1 53.7 52.4
Of which (%):
Wholesale and retail trade 12.9 14.2 13.1 14.8 18.7 17.6
Hotels and restaurants 2.9 3.1 6.8 4.0 5.4 9.7
Transport 4.2 3.5 5.2 4.7 3.8 4.7
Communication 2.4 2.7 1.3 2.0 1.0 1.2
Financial services 5.5 5.0 3.5 3.6 3.2 2.2
Other market services 24.3 26.4 24.6 17.0 21.7 17.1
Notes: (a) Earlier years used for some countries for the breakdown of market services
(b) 1996 data.
Source: European Commission (2000b); based on national accounts statistics.Chapter III — Productivity growth in EU services
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III.2.2 Measurement of productivity 
in services
Comparisons of productivity levels across countries
are made difficult by the lack of appropriate sectoral
price indexes and by different national approaches to
measuring real output in the services sector.
Measurement problems have been quoted as a cause
of the so-called ‘productivity paradox’, whereby
during much of the last quarter of a century, consid-
erable investment in new information technologies,
research and development, and rapid technological
change failed to show up as higher productivity
growth in official statistics. Failure to accurately
measure the output of service sectors has been
linked, for example, with the growing heterogeneity
of service outputs (i.e. greater variety of products),
the multi-product nature of service outputs, and
problems of measuring changes in the quality of
service outputs (see Box III.2).
Box III.2: Measurement problems for services productivity
It is well known that there are a host of problems related to the measurement of services’ output in terms of distinguishing
the changes in the quality, prices and quantities of services. As it is necessary to distinguish these elements in order to
measure real output and in turn productivity, estimates of productivity in services are subject to a great deal of uncertainty.
Among the many, often interrelated, measurement issues that have been raised, the following may be mentioned:
— Defining the output of services. It is often difficult to define exactly what constitutes the output of a service in
sectors such as banking and insurance, retail distribution and many business services.
— Aggregation problems. Where a range of services are offered, it may be difficult to aggregate them to arrive at an
overall measure of a firm’s or sector’s output. Typically there is a greater degree of heterogeneity in the output of
services than, say, in manufactured goods. Moreover, outputs may often be customised so that the service offered
may be unique to the individual consumer and hence difficult to aggregate.
— The role of the consumer. It may be difficult to separate the service output from the role of the consumer in solic-
iting the output. The ‘results’ from the service output may depend on the extent and quality of the participation of
the consumer in the service transaction and not of the service provider alone. There is also a question of appor-
tioning productivity gains between the supplier and consumer of services; for example, should productivity gains
made by the user of business services be attributed to the supplier of the services or to the user?
— Adjusting for quality. For many services, output may be measured either on the basis of the number of transactions
performed or on the basis of the outcomes achieved. For example, in legal services output may be considered in
terms of the number of hours billed to clients or according to outcomes of the advice offered in terms of the success-
fulness of legal proceedings. More broadly, it may be possible to observe the ‘characteristics’ of services’ outputs, but
very difficult to measure the quality of these ‘characteristics’. Consequently, changes in prices that may reflect
changes in quality may not be appropriately taken into account and hence lead to overestimates of price inflation.
— The impact of technical change. Technical change brings about changes in the characteristics of services. Typically,
basic statistics on output capture poorly such changes, and in periods of rapid technological change an increasing
proportion of output may not be captured in statistical measures.
Essentially, volumes and prices for services are harder to measure than for goods. Often statistical agencies are required
to rely on relatively crude indicators to measure output and prices (e.g. changes in output may be extrapolated from
changes in labour inputs, while wages and consumer prices may be used to proxy changes in prices). Unfortunately there
are no quick fixes for improving measurement of volumes, prices and quality that could be applied across service sectors.
Rather, given the heterogeneity of services, improvements in price and output measures require proceeding on an
industry by industry basis.
Sources and further information:
OECD (2000), ‘The service economy’, Business and Industry Policy Forum Series, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2001), ‘Innovation and productivity in services’, OECD Proceedings, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2001), ‘OECD productivity manual: a guide to the measurement of industry-level and aggregate productivity growth’, OECD, Paris.
Schreyer, P. and Pilat, D. (2001), ‘Measuring productivity’, OECD Economic Studies, No 33.
Tripplet, J. and Bosworth, B. (2000), ‘Productivity in the services sector’, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.European competitiveness report 2002
64
Hard-to-measure services (e.g. construction, trade,
financial sector, ’other’ market services and govern-
ment) account for a growing share of GDP and
have frequently undergone rapid technological
change, which exacerbates the problem of pricing
the outputs of these sectors. On balance, the avail-
able evidence on measurement ’bias’ for services
points to an understatement of real output growth
and, therefore, real productivity growth by official
measures (Van Ark 2001). What remains unclear,
however, is the extent to which measurement prob-
lems per se, and differences across countries in the
way that official measures of productivity are calcu-
lated, can explain differences in output and produc-
tivity growth between countries.
III.2.3 Productivity growth in the 1990s
Analysing productivity growth rates instead of
productivity levels eliminates some of the above-
mentioned problems, such as the need to find
appropriate currency conversion factors. Available
data on business sector services suggest that in the
latter half of the 1990s, EU countries generally lost
out to the United States both in terms of produc-
tivity growth as well as job creation (Graph III.3). In
each of the eight Member States for which data are
available, productivity growth was significantly
weaker than in the United States. The United
Kingdom and Finland achieved growth rates closest
to those in the United States, with annual produc-
tivity growth at some 2 % against 3 % in the United
States75. In terms of job creation, only the Nether-
lands and Finland registered higher growth than
the United States. In Italy, productivity in business
sector services declined.
The superior US performance in the late 1990s
marked a reversal of earlier developments. The
productivity growth rate more than doubled in the
United States in the second half of the 1990s in
comparison to the first half. In contrast, of the eight
EU countries covered by the data, productivity
growth slowed down in all but the United Kingdom
and France, which registered a marginal acceleration.
At the more detailed sector level, one notes that
across the Member States, the telecommunications
sector stands out as having registered by far the
highest productivity growth in the late 1990s (Table
III.2). Finland, Germany and Denmark also recorded
high productivity growth in financial intermedia-
tion, while in the other Member States productivity
growth in this sector was relatively low or even
negative. In the hotels and restaurants sector,
productivity growth was negative in all the coun-
tries covered except Finland and the Netherlands,
which registered moderate positive growth.
75 The picture relative to the United States improves somewhat when labour
productivity is measured on a value-added per hour basis rather than on an
employee basis. For the US, growth rates on an ‘hours’ basis are broadly
unchanged when compared to an ‘employee’ basis. For France, Austria and
Finland (i.e. where comparable hours and employee data are available),
labour productivity growth rates are typically higher when measured on a
‘hours’ basis, reflecting falls in average hours worked.
Graph III.3: Growth of labour productivity and employment in business sector services, 1995-99
Note: Labour productivity is defined as output per employed person.
Source: Calculations based on the OECD STAN 2001 database.
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The higher productivity growth in business sector
services in the United States as a whole is the result
of stronger productivity growth in the sub-sector of
wholesale and retail trade (see also Box III.4). In the
post and telecommunications sector76, where the
EU countries recorded remarkably high productivity
growth, growth in the United States remained
below that in the European Union throughout the
1990s. In the other sub-sectors, productivity growth
in the United States was close to the EU average. 
III.2.4 Productivity vs. employment
growth
It is interesting to consider the relationship between
labour productivity growth and employment growth
in the context of what it may tell us about supply side
and demand side conditions. Looking at the supply
side, a negative relationship between labour produc-
tivity growth and employment growth is consistent
with decreasing returns to scale, whereas a positive
relationship would imply increasing returns to scale
(see Box III.3). Shifts in the trade-off between
employment growth and productivity growth will be
brought about either by changes in the rate of disem-
bodied technical change (and/or improvements in
efficiency77), or changes in the rate of growth of
capital intensity, or a combination of the two.
Looking at the demand side, there will be a positive
relationship between labour productivity growth
and employment growth if demand — and hence
output — grows more quickly than labour produc-
tivity, and a negative relationship if the opposite
occurs. The price elasticity of demand determines
the extent to which price reductions and improve-
ments in quality lead to increases in demand. The
scope for price reductions in turn depends largely
on productivity growth, though the extent to which
cost reductions are passed on to final prices is influ-
enced by the degree of competition on the market.
If an increase in competition, for example as a result
of market liberalisation, leads to a greater propor-
tion of gains in productivity being passed on to final
prices, this will be observed as an outward shift in
the trade-off between employment and productivity
growth. That is, higher rates of growth in output
(demand) and, hence, employment growth would
be consistent with a given level of labour produc-
tivity growth.
77 It may be noted that efficiency relates to improvements made using a given
technology. Conceptually productivity relates to the quantity of output
produced for a given set of inputs irrespective of the efficiency of use of these
input. However, for measured productivity it is difficult to separately identify
gains in efficiency from improvements made as a result of technological change.
76 Note that the postal service and telecommunications services are conven-
tionally grouped together at the same NACE 64 level, due to historical
reasons and to lack of detailed data (for example, former PTT monopolies).
However, these two activities are very different; the postal sector is labour
intensive while the telecommunications sector is capital intensive charac-
terised by rapid technological progress and innovation, and has been fully
liberalised. This ought to be kept in mind when discussing developments in
the group aggregate.
Table III.2: Labour productivity growth in business sector services, 1995–99
(percent per annum)
Denmark Germany France Italy The Austria Finland United  United 
Netherlands Kingdom States
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade; 
Repairs - 0.1 - 0.3 0.1 - 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.8 0.9 5.9
Hotels and 
Restaurants - 1.4 - 5.9 - 1.2 - 0.9 1.3 - 0.6 0.5 - 0.1 - 0.7
Transport and 
Storage 4.5 3.7 2.9 - 2.6 1.5 2.8 1.7 1.8 1.7
Post and 
Telecommunications 6.2 16.4 9.9 8.9 8.9 4.5 14.1 8.5 3.8
Financial 
Intermediation 4.7 6.8 - 1.4 1.4 - 1.2 1.6 12.6 1.9 4.5
Renting of M&Eq. 
and Other Business 
Activities 2.2 - 1.6 - 0.5 - 0.4 0.0 - 4.3 - 0.9 2.9 0.6
Total Business 
Sector Services 1.2 1.3 0.2 - 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.1 2.0 3.1
Note: Labour productivity is defined as output per employed person.
Source: Calculations based on the OECD STAN 2001 database.European competitiveness report 2002
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Looking at the empirical data for our country sample of
eight Member States and the United States, one finds
no systematic trade-off between employment growth
and productivity growth for aggregate business sector
services during the late 1990s (Graph III.4)78. At the
level of individual sectors, however, the data do indi-
cate a distinct trade-off between labour productivity
and employment growth in the sectors ‘hotels and
restaurants’, ‘transport and storage’, and ‘post and
telecommunications’. Across countries higher (lower)
rates of labour productivity growth are associated with
lower (higher) rates of employment growth79.
The three sectors for which the data indicate a trade-
off between productivity and employment — ‘hotels
and restaurants’, ‘post and telecommunications’, and
in most countries also ‘transport and storage’ — have
a second common feature: they all have low labour
productivity levels. In the remaining sectors of busi-
ness sector services, labour productivity is higher
than the average for the whole economy80.
Comparison between the first and the second half of
the 1990s reveals an apparent upward shift in the
trade-off between productivity and employment in
sectors where such a trade-off existed. Labour produc-
tivity growth rates in the second half of the 1990s seem
to be associated with higher rates of employment
growth in most sub-sectors as well as for aggregate
business sector services, probably as a consequence of
the strong cyclical upswing during this period.
III.3 Factors influencing
productivity growth in
services
III.3.1 Introduction
Various causes have been identified to explain the
divergence of productivity performance in the
80 Sectors which have a larger (smaller) share in total value added than in total
employment have an above-average (below-average) labour productivity;
see Table III.1 and Annex Tables III.A1 and III.A2.
78 After excluding the ‘outlier’ Finland from the analysis for 1990-95, there is
only weak negative correlation for both periods 1990-95 and 1995-99
between labour productivity growth and employment growth.
79 The correlation coefficients for ‘hotels and restaurants’, ‘transport and storage’,
and ‘post and telecommunications’ were –0.740, -0.828 and -0.831 respec-
tively for the period 1990-95, and –0.760, -0.751 and –0.619 for the period
1995-99. The sample included Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US.
Box III.3: Labour productivity growth and employment growth
Given a production function H, gross output Y is produced using a combination of labour (L), capital (K) and interme-
diate inputs (M) and will depend (over time) on the level of efficiency and technical change (A); such that:
Y = H (A, K, L, M) (1)
Assume for simplicity that this can be approximated by the Cobb-Douglas functional form and that, in terms of value
added (V), this can be written:
V = a0 Lb1Kb2 (2)
Then the rate of growth of real value added (v) can be derived from total differentiation as:
v = a +b 1l +b 2k (3)
where a is growth rate of (disembodied) technical change and/or efficiency improvements, l and k are the rates of
growth of labour and capital, and b1 and b2 are the labour and capital exponent in the production function, all adjusted
for the share of value added in gross output.
Rearranging (3), value added labour productivity growth (v — l) is given by:
v — l = a +b 2(k — l)+( b 1 +b 2 — 1)l (4)
Thus, growth in value added labour productivity depends the rate of technical change (a), growth in capital intensity 
(k — l) and employment growth (l).
It follows that, the relationship between labour productivity growth and employment growth is positive if there are
increasing returns to scale in value added (i.e. b1 +b 2 > 1) and negative if there are decreasing returns to scale (i.e.
b1 +b 2 < 1). If either the rate of technical change or growth of capital intensity increase then there will be an upward
shift in the relationship between productivity growth and labour growth.Chapter III — Productivity growth in EU services
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service sector. Among the explanatory factors that
have been pointed to are different growth rates in
investment; the impact of new technologies, in
particular information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT); the pace of structural reforms on
labour, product and capital markets; R & D and
differences in innovation regimes; human capital;
organisational change; and intellectual property
rights (see e.g. Pilat (2001)).
The relative importance of the different produc-
tivity-enhancing factors varies across sectors and
Graph III.4: Relationship between employment growth and productivity growth (%) in business 
sector services
Note: Labour productivity is defined as output per employed person
Source: Calculations based on the OECD STAN 2001 database
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countries. Box III.4 discusses the causes behind the
rapid acceleration of productivity growth in the
retail and wholesale trade sector in the United
States in the late 1990s (which was the main reason
behind the faster overall growth in services produc-
tivity in comparison to the European Union). Factors
such as strengthened competitive pressures,
increased use of information technology and new
working methods were found to have been associ-
ated with the acceleration of productivity growth in
the retail and wholesale trade sector in the United
States. The remainder of this section will take a
closer look at three productivity-enhancing factors
in the services sector: use of ICT, innovation and
market liberalisation.
III.3.2 Use of ICT
Many service sectors are major users of ICT, and
collectively services account for the majority of IT
investment. In a recent analysis of the comparative
productivity performance of OECD countries,
McGuckin and Van Ark (2001) find that most of the
acceleration in US productivity in the second half of
the 1990s can be traced to industries that produce
or intensively use ICT. The group of ICT-using indus-
tries that they identify is dominated by service
sectors81. They conclude that in many European
countries limited productivity growth in industries
that use ICT intensively suggests under-investment
in ICT.
Measurement issues lie at the heart of the debate on
the ‘productivity paradox’ (see also Box III.2 above),
and are highly relevant for productivity analysis in
ICT-using services. The adoption of ICT or e-
commerce can lead to improvements in the quality of
service products (e.g. flexibility to adjust products to
customer needs, user friendliness, temporal and
spatial availability) and in the processes through
which services are produced and delivered. Never-
theless, such improvements may not be reflected by
an increase in the price of the output, or in output per
employee. If the increased utility to the service user of
an improvement in service delivery (quality) is not
appropriately accounted for in measured output,
productivity growth statistics may fail to capture the
improved performance. When services are used as
inputs in other industries, improvements in service
delivery may however be captured as improvements
of measured productivity in the client sector.
81 Wholesale trade, financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding,
activities related to financial intermediation, renting of machinery and equip-
ment, research and development, and other business services.
Box III.4 Productivity growth in retail and wholesale trade in the United States
In a study of productivity performance of the United States, McKinsey Global Institute (2001) examines the causes of the
acceleration of labour productivity in the second half of the 1990s. They note the considerable contribution of wholesale
and retail trade to the acceleration in aggregate productivity growth and examine some possible causes.
With regard to wholesale trade, McKinsey focused on pharmaceutical wholesaling as an illustration of developments in
the sector. They argue that labour productivity growth was partly driven by consolidation, which resulted from the
squeeze of profit margins brought about as a result of increased retailer bargaining power. At the firm level, consolida-
tion stimulated warehouse automation and the optimisation of workforce and warehouse layout. Another important
factor was the increase in the value of the wholesalers’ intermediation role associated with the higher value drugs they
distribute. McKinsey estimated that trends such as the move to higher-value-added services, consolidation, warehouse
automation and substitution to higher-value goods also occurred in other parts of wholesaling.
With regard to retail trade, McKinsey focused on general merchandise retailing. Here, they found that the higher produc-
tivity growth resulted from an increase in the intensity of competition (attributed largely to the continued growth of Wal-
Mart) and from consumer substitution toward higher-value goods (macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, a conse-
quent rise in the disposable income of consumers and growing consumer confidence stimulated consumers to buy more
expensive goods). Wal-Mart is credited with directly causing the acceleration of labour productivity acceleration by devel-
oping a successful format based on ongoing managerial innovations and intensive use of information technology. The
large store format adopted by Wal-Mart generated scale economies, whilst the company continuously competed aggres-
sively on prices in order to gain market share, additional scale advantage and increased negotiating power vis-à-vis
suppliers. It also appropriated its own distribution in order to achieve efficiency gains in logistics operations. The resulting
increase in competitive pressure as the result of Wal-Marts continuous improvements in the business process and cost
cutting forced competitors to copy Wal-Marts best practice.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2001), ‘United States productivity growth, 1995–2000’, Washington D.C., October.Chapter III — Productivity growth in EU services
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Achieving the best results from the introduction of
new technology can depend on the capacity of firms
to undertake accompanying organisational change.
Investment in human capital may be necessary to
provide the skills required to take advantage of the
extensive and increasing use of ICT. More generally,
human capital is an important component of service
sector performance (Pilat 2001). The labour-inten-
sive nature of many services, the high degree of inter-
action with consumers, the high-knowledge intensity
of the services provided, and the importance of tacit
knowledge and experience for innovation in services,
are all factors that point to the need for service firms
to invest in human capital.
III.3.3 Innovation
Innovation is a much broader concept than the intro-
duction of a new product or service. It can cover
applying a new technology to the production of an
existing product/service, changes to production
processes and organisational structures, or penetra-
tion of new markets with an existing product/service.
The importance of innovation for productivity
growth in manufacturing industries was analysed in
the 2001 European competitiveness report (European
Commission 2001a). The present section will focus
on the specific aspects of innovation in services which
distinguish them from manufacturing.
The traditional distinction between manufactured
products and services outputs is becoming increas-
ingly blurred. The increased use and interoperability
of ICT, as well as the growth of electronic
commerce has diminished the relevance of certain
commonly identified characteristics of services, such
as the difficulty to store and transport services and
the need for direct supplier-customer interaction for
service delivery. Moreover, there are good grounds
for thinking that just as service firms in some sectors
are ‘industrialising’ production and acquiring char-
acteristics more typical of manufacturers, so are the
activities of many manufacturing firms becoming
more like services (Coombs and Miles 2000).
Notwithstanding the above, there remain important
characteristics of service industries that distinguish
them from manufacturing and, ultimately, influence
innovation. Among these, the following are
frequently identified:
— The intangibility and information intensity of
service products. Many service products cannot
be stored or embodied in physical products and,
as a consequence, production and consumption
must take place simultaneously. The intangibility
of many services draws much greater attention
to activities such as design and customisation of
services. By implication, innovation in services is
often more closely associated with the way in
which services are delivered than with the devel-
opment of new services, or process improve-
ments which increase output or decrease inputs
(Licht and Moch 1999).
— The client-intensity of services. Many services
sectors rely on a high degree of interaction
between the producer and consumer. Innova-
tions may take place on an ongoing basis,
involving both the producer and the customer,
and be reflected in incremental changes to
service products, processes and delivery. Innova-
tions may only be ‘discovered’ when a service
product is sold to a new client. Alternatively, the
incremental nature of innovations may make it
difficult to trace and identify specific innova-
tions. Arguably, these types of innovation are
poorly captured, if at all, by conventional inno-
vation indicators and measures and so lead to a
misrepresentation of services’ innovation.
— Research and development activity.  R&D
activity by services has grown rapidly over the
past two decades and accounts for an
increasing share of total business spending on
research and development. Nevertheless, in
many service sectors R & D intensity remains
low when compared to manufacturing. Service
firms rarely have R & D departments and tend
to set up product and project development
teams on an ad hoc basis (Coombs and Miles
2000). Services are often less closely associated
with technological change resulting from their
own direct investment in the development of
new technology. Innovation in many services is
brought about primarily through acquired
technology (e.g. ICT), organisational change
and human capital, rather than R & D per se82.
As a result, identifying and measuring the
scope and intensity of R & D efforts in services
is often more difficult than for manufacturing.
— Networking and cooperation. A further factor
that may contribute to low levels of observed
technological innovation in services is the pres-
ence in many services sectors of an over-
whelming proportion of SMEs. In general,
smaller firms have less financial means to invest
82 As major customers of technology, or as a result of their role in the distribu-
tion of new products (for example, retail distribution), service firms are
increasingly seen to be instrumental in influencing the orientation of R & D
effort (Pilat 2001). Howells (2001) provides a brief overview of studies high-
lighting the role of services in innovation processes.European competitiveness report 2002
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in R & D activities and may be more risk averse
in respect to such investments. In an environ-
ment where there can be considerable
economies of scale in R & D activities, coopera-
tion and networking may be extremely impor-
tant for cost sharing and acquiring knowl-
edge83. Furthermore, cooperation within the
sector is important for establishing and imple-
menting technological standards, which in
themselves are necessary for innovation to take
place and be adopted (Pilat 2001).
To date, very little comparable cross-country data
exist on innovation. The Second Community Inno-
vation Survey (CIS2)84 provides one of the few
sources of information on innovation in services for
the EU Member States85. Overall, CIS2 data indicate
that 51 % of manufacturers can be classified as
innovators86, against 40 % of all service enterprises.
The proportion of innovating firms varies consider-
ably across service sectors, with enterprises in ‘high-
tech’ service sectors such as ‘computer services’,
‘telecommunications’, ‘engineering services’ and
‘financial intermediation’ being more likely to have
engaged in innovative activities than enterprises in
‘low-tech’ service sectors such as ‘wholesale distri-
bution’ and ‘transport’ (Graph III.5).
Comparing the proportion of innovators across
sectors with labour productivity growth rates for
individual countries, it appears that productivity
growth rates are generally higher in sectors with a
higher share of innovators (Annex Table III.A3). For
all countries there is a positive correlation between
the ranking of sectors in terms of the share of inno-
vators and labour productivity growth rates.
Although this finding does not tell us anything
about the direction of causality, it is consistent with
the general notion that productivity growth should
be higher in sectors that innovate more.
Policies stimulating innovation and R & D should
aim towards reducing the barriers faced by enter-
prises undertaking or seeking to undertake such
activities. Barriers to innovation found in innovation
surveys include: insufficient access to finance and
risk capital, lack of internal capacity to innovate,
insufficient expertise in applying ICT and high risks
83 This is also true for manufacturing. It is increasingly the case that innovation
is undertaken within networks that bring together both manufacturing and
service firms, often in collaboration with public research and educational
institutions.
84 See EIMS (2001) and European Commission (2001b). The second Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (CIS2) took place in 1997 and covered the period
1994–1996; currently, data for the preparation of the third survey (CIS3) are
being collected..
85 Comparable information for the United States is not available.
86 Enterprises are classified as innovators if they engaged in innovating activities
in the three years covered by the survey (1994–1996). The proportion of
innovators only measures the presence of innovative activity and gives no
indication of the quality of the innovation or whether the innovation was
incremental or groundbreaking.
Graph III.5: Share of firms with innovative activity
(percent of all firms)
Note: The average figure ‘All’ also includes Norway
Source: Based on data from EIMS (2001).
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associated with innovation (Pilat 2001). To the
extent that these barriers to services innovation are
similar to manufacturing, generic policies strength-
ening the general framework for R & D and innova-
tion87 benefit the innovation environment for
service enterprises.
However, the special characteristics of services
compared to manufacturing suggests that some
barriers to innovation present a greater challenge to
services than manufacturing:
— Trade and investment barriers. The intangible
and client-intense nature of services implies that
service products cannot normally be traded in
the conventional sense. Although these charac-
teristics are losing importance due to increased
use of ICT and electronic commerce, it remains
the case that exporters of services are more likely
to supply their products through the establish-
ment of a commercial presence in foreign
markets. Therefore policies aimed at a reduction
of trade and investment barriers would benefit
the service sector as internationalisation increases
the market for domestic firms, promotes the
diffusion of ideas and innovative concepts, and
allows further specialisation of production along
the lines of comparative advantage.
— Access to finance and risk capital. Many service
firms depend on intangible assets, such as
human resources, brands and trademarks, and
know-how which is not protected by intellectual
property rights, and may possess little in the way
of tangible collateral. Intangible assets are diffi-
cult to value and generally are not properly
valued by most accounting standards, which in
turn creates difficulties for service firms when
raising capital. Policies aiming to include intan-
gible capital in accounting standards and poli-
cies stimulating the availability of venture capital
would benefit innovation in services.
— Protection of intellectual property rights. The
ease of imitation and lack of appropriate
protection of intellectual property (IP) has often
been identified as an impediment to R & D and
innovation in services. However, innovation
surveys show that the risk of imitation is not
regarded to be a more serious barrier to inno-
vation in services than it is in manufacturing.
The alleged problems associated with ease of
imitation may only apply to non-technology
intensive services or to the secondary ‘design
features’ of services. Nonetheless, there remains
an issue as to whether existing IP regimes88
require reform so as to better accommodate
R & D and innovation in services, particularly
for non-technology-intensive service sectors.
III.3.4 Market liberalisation
A general consensus is that liberalisation, and
accordingly greater reliance on market mechanisms,
has a positive effect on economic performance.
Price liberalisation should enable companies to
produce more efficiently by more effectively util-
ising factors of production and through the adop-
tion of cost-based pricing. Removing barriers to
entry should encourage new entrants and, hence,
combat x-inefficiency (of incumbent firms), increase
productive and allocative efficiency and stimulate
demand. The beneficial effects of liberalisation often
take place through the adoption of new technolo-
gies, product diversification, innovation and encour-
agement to productivity enhancing investments.
The relatively early and broad reforms are argued to
have given the United States a head start in
comparison to the European Union: by creating
opportunities for profits, deregulation enhanced
investment, led to an expansion of output and
increased productivity. To the extent that it is
possible to generalise given the diversity of national
institutional structures, the pace of regulatory
reform in Europe has been slower and markets
continue to be fragmented89. McKinsey Global
Institute (2001) finds that the net acceleration in
labour productivity growth in the United States can
largely be attributed to services sectors90. Their
analysis places a great emphasis on the role of high
or increasing competition in bringing about the
diffusion of managerial and technological innova-
tions (including ICT).
Historically, many service sectors have been highly
regulated, but over the last two decades there has
been a general trend towards extensive liberalisa-
tion and regulatory reform91. These reforms have
encompassed both sectors characterised by struc-
88 IP regimes used in the service sector are mostly copyrights and trademarks.
Patents are rarely used to protect service innovations. 
89 OECD (2001c) provides a comparison of the burden of different forms of
economic and administrative regulations across countries.
90 Their analysis identifies six sectors which account for 99 % of the net accel-
eration of overall US labour productivity growth (and 74 % of the sum of all
positive sectors). The six sectors are retail trade, wholesale trade, securities
and brokerage, electronics, industrial machinery, and telecommunications.
91 See OECD (2001) for a recent review of the effects of regulation and market
structure on performance in telecommunications, electricity supply, air
passenger transport, road freight and retail distribution.
87 Principal policy elements to strengthen the general innovation framework are
policies to build an innovation culture, to enhance technology diffusion
throughout the economy, to promote networking and clustering, to leverage
R & D better, and to strengthen the innovation system’s capacity to respond
to globalisation (Pilat 2001).European competitiveness report 2002
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tural market competition (e.g. road freight, retail
distribution) and those, often network industries,
where market competition has traditionally been
less prevalent or present only in certain segments
(e.g. rail transport, telecommunications).
To date, empirical analysis drawing on cross-country
comparisons of the effect of regulations and regula-
tory reform on the performance of service sectors is
limited. The available empirical evidence strongly
suggests that liberalisation and regulatory reform in
service sectors makes a positive contribution to
economic growth. Nicoletti (2001), reviewing avail-
able empirical evidence, finds that regulatory
reforms in services can contribute substantially to
improved economic performance and, where
competition-enhancing reforms have gone furthest,
the share of services, employment rates and the
catch-up in productivity growth have been higher.
Further, he points out that regulatory reform has
been associated with technical progress, innovation
and product diversification and that increased
competitive pressure has encouraged productivity-
enhancing investments.
Gönenc et al (2001) provide a review of the empir-
ical analysis on the impact of liberalisation at macro-
economic level and for selected service sectors.
They find that the limited available evidence on the
impact of market liberalisation on performance at
macroeconomic level tends to indicate significant
and positive effects on levels and growth rates of
GDP. Further, with regard to the more numerous
studies of deregulation on industry performance,
they find overwhelming cross-industry evidence of
liberalisation of entry and prices improving static
and dynamic efficiency, enhancing quality and
lowering consumer prices.
Wholesale and retail trade services have traditionally
been supplied in competitive markets, characterised
by low entry barriers, high entry and exit rates and a
large number of competitors of relatively small size.
Over the last decade the sector has been marked by a
rising concentration in some segments of the market
and by a rapid emergence of new forms of competi-
tion, such as e-commerce (Dobson and Waterson
1999; Boylaud and Nicoletti 2001a). Moreover, tradi-
tional distinctions between wholesale and retail distri-
bution are being erased as the two activities become
more integrated and cooperation throughout the
chain from the manufacturer to distribution
increases, particularly with respect to logistics.
The regulatory restrictions in the wholesale and
retail trade sector relate mainly to the requirements
for setting up and opening a business, shop
opening hours and the freedom to set prices. The
degree of concentration in retail markets tends to
be inversely related to the overall degree of regula-
tion (Boylaud and Nicoletti 2001a) Høj et al (1995)
conclude that restrictions on large-scale stores have
a negative effect on efficiency. Restrictions on large
outlets, especially in Italy and to a lesser degree in
France, have led to a higher outlet density and a
smaller average store-size than the structural char-
acteristics of the markets would predict. The strong
positive link between the average size of stores and
the efficiency of the distribution system (Pilat 1997)
suggests that the restrictions on large stores are
likely to have contributed to the low productivity
levels in these countries92.
In the European Union, progress in achieving
greater liberalisation of shop opening hours has
been accompanied by a more restrictive stance on
the expansion of large retail outlets. Restrictions on
opening hours have been relaxed in countries such
as Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany
whilst at the same time there is an increasing
tendency to tighten retail planning rules in tradi-
tionally more liberal countries (European Commis-
sion 2000c).
Empirical research on transport services indicates a
positive relationship between liberalisation (or regu-
latory reform) and labour productivity growth.
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001b) conclude on the
basis of the findings of several empirical studies that
liberalisation of road freight promoted efficiency,
reduced freight rates and enhanced productivity;
countries with a (relatively) liberal market environ-
ment demonstrate higher productivity levels.
Gönenc and Nicoletti (2001) find that the efficiency
of the airline industry and the rate of occupancy of
aircraft seats tend to increase and fares tend to
decline if the regulatory and market environment is
more sensitive to competitive pressures.
Marin (1998) documents the implications of airline
competition for efficiency and airfares in the Euro-
pean internal market. He concludes that countries
which signed liberal bilateral agreements and
deregulated the airline industry early on became
more productive due to more intensive competition
and the implementation of tough adjustment
processes by airlines. He also finds that the intro-
duction of deregulatory measures is initially
followed by short run reductions in efficiency but
eventually leads to long run efficiency improve-
ments.
92 European Commission (2001c) finds that countries having a high proportion
of supermarkets in the distribution system tend to have higher prices.Chapter III — Productivity growth in EU services
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Changes in demand, technical progress and regula-
tory reform have brought about a radical transfor-
mation of the telecommunications industry93. In an
examination of the impact of regulation and market
structure on productivity, Boylaud and Nicoletti
(2001c) conclude that the liberalisation of entry,
and even the announcement of liberalisation, has
beneficial effects on productivity and prices in
telecommunications.
The business services sector (here referring to serv-
ices supplied to other firms, such as legal coun-
selling, accountancy, consulting, computer services
and marketing) in the European Union is highly
fragmented along national borders and tends to
retain a national identity. The fragmentation is
amplified by obstacles to integration in the internal
market, such as licensing regimes, prudential rules,
company laws, access to financial services, employ-
ment law, professional qualifications, advertising
laws etc. These restrictions on market access inhibit
competition and lead to lower productivity and
high relative prices.
III.4 Summary and conclusions
Services are the most important sector in our
economies, accounting for some 70 % of all jobs
and of GDP. The demand for services tends to rise
faster than incomes, indicating a continuous
increase in the share of services in the total
economy. Many service industries are highly labour-
intensive, with allegedly limited scope for raising
productivity through investments in physical
capital. Traditionally, productivity growth in services
has indeed been slower than in manufacturing
industries — though sectoral differences across
service industries are large. Simultaneously, employ-
ment in services has increased at a faster rate than
in other sectors.
Services will be the key to how overall productivity,
employment and output develop in the future.
Looking at market services only, one notes that
between the first and the second half of the 1990s
productivity growth decelerated in EU countries,
while the United States recorded a strong accelera-
tion of productivity growth. Similarly, in terms of
employment growth, the US performance in market
services was clearly superior to most of the EU
countries.
Analysis of the individual sectors within market serv-
ices in the European Union reveals very strong
productivity growth in telecommunications in the
late 1990s. In financial intermediation and in the
transport sector, some — but not all — EU countries
also recorded solid productivity growth rates.
Productivity developed very weakly, and even
declined in some countries, in the hotel and restau-
rant sector as well as in the wholesale and retail trade
sector. The stronger performance of the United States
in the aggregate market services productivity results
from their very strong productivity gains in the
wholesale and retail trade sector, which compare
with weak growth on the European side.
For three sectors within market services, productivity
growth seems to be negatively correlated with
employment growth: hotels and restaurants, post
and telecommunications, and transport and storage.
For the other sectors, the evidence of correlation is
less clear. For the sectors where a trade-off between
employment and productivity growth seems to exist,
one finds an upward shift in this relationship between
the first and the second half of the 1990s: in the late
1990s, a given productivity growth rate seems to be
associated with higher employment growth. This is
likely to be result of the strong cyclical upswing in the
second half of the decade.
To explain differences in productivity growth rates,
many factors have been put forward. These include
differences in the growth rates of investment, the
adoption of ICT, organisational changes, human
capital, liberalisation of product, labour and capital
markets, R & D and innovation, and intellectual
property rights. Many service industries are inten-
sive users of ICT, and the introduction of the new
technologies has led to fundamental changes in the
production and delivery of services. Such changes
are likely to led to increased productivity in the rele-
vant services sectors, but problems in correctly
measuring the output of those sectors may have
hidden part of the productivity gains.
Innovations — introduction of new products, appli-
cation of a new technology, organisational changes
etc. — are an important way of boosting produc-
tivity. Innovation in services may be poorly captured
by traditional measures such as R & D spending,
since services innovations tend to be closely linked
with the way in which the services are delivered,
and may result from the interaction between the
service supplier and the customer. Survey data
nonetheless indicate that high-technology service
firms, such as computer services and telecommuni-
cations, carry out innovative activities even more
often than manufacturing firms.
93 For an overview of the implementation of regulatory reforms in the telecom-
munications sector in the EU, see European Commission (2001d).European competitiveness report 2002
74
Evidence on market liberalisation points to
enhanced productivity and higher growth following
liberalisation measures. Liberalisation, by increasing
competition and making markets more responsive
to change, tends to increase the speed of diffusion
of new productivity-enhancing innovation across
the economy. Many services sectors have tradition-
ally been highly regulated, but the general trend in
the past two decades has been towards extensive
liberalisation and regulatory reform. Structural
reforms put forward at the European Council
meeting in Lisbon in March 2000 call for a continu-
ation of this process. The creation of a genuine
internal market in services is a major challenge for
the European Union.
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ANNEX III.1
Annex tables
Table III.A1: Sector composition of GDP, nominal value added at basic prices in 1999 (% of total)
DK D F I  NL A FIN S  UK  US
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Agriculture 2.6 1.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.1 3.7 2.0 1.2 1.6
Industry 20.0 24.7 20.7 23.3 20.2 23.0 26.9 24.3 23.2 19.9
Construction 4.6 5.5 4.5 4.8 5.7 8.4 5.4 4.1 5.0 4.7
Business sector services 46.5 47.3 48.7 49.5 48.7 46.0 42.6 43.9 49.0 51.3
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 12.9 10.4 10.0 13.3 12.9 12.8 10.4 10.2 11.7 15.1
Hotels and restaurants 1.8 1.3 2.7 3.4 2.0 4.0 1.4 1.5 3.1 0.9
Transport and storage 6.1 3.4 4.2 5.2 4.9 4.9 7.2 5.1 5.1 3.3
Post and telecommunications 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.5
Financial intermediation 5.0 5.0 4.6 5.8 6.2 6.4 3.1 3.5 5.9 8.3
Real estate, renting and other business 
activities 18.3 24.8 25.0 19.6 20.2 15.7 17.5 20.8 20.4 20.3
— of which, real estate activities 10.7 12.1 12.3 10.9 8.2 8.7 11.5 12.3 9.1 10.1
p.m. Business sector services excluding 
real estate 35.8 35.2 36.4 38.6 40.5 37.3 31.1 31.6 39.1 41.2
Community, social and personal services 26.2 21.4 23.2 19.3 22.7 20.4 21.4 25.6 21.6 22.6
Notes: (a) Other business activities includes ‘sewage and refuse disposal’
(b) Real estate activities includes renting of machinery and equipment (M&Eq.)
(c) Data for 1998
(d) Data for 1998
(e) Excluding adjustment for statistical discrepancy; agriculture, forestry and fishing includes veterinary activities; industry includes ‘sanitary
and similar services’; wholesale and retail trade includes restaurants
Source: Calculations based on OECD STAN 2001 database.European competitiveness report 2002
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Table III.A2: Sector composition of employment, number of employees in 1999 (% of total)
DK D F I  NL A FIN S UK US
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Agriculture 1.8 1.4 1.7 3.3 1.6 0.9 2.0 2.8 1.3 1.7
Industry 18.1 23.9 18.0 26.8 15.8 21.6 23.1 19.0 17.6 14.6
Construction 5.8 7.2 5.5 5.3 6.1 8.6 6.5 5.1 4.6 4.9
Business sector services 36.8 38.0 39.5 30.9 47.3 41.7 33.5 33.8 47.4 46.2
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 16.0 15.1 13.1 11.0 17.1 16.5 12.5 12.8 17.1 23.6
Hotels and restaurants 2.8 3.8 3.1 3.2 3.5 6.2 3.0 2.7 5.5 1.4
Transport and storage 4.5 4.1 4.7 3.8 4.3 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.3
Post and telecommunications 2.1 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9
Financial intermediation 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.2 3.7 2.0 2.2 4.3 4.5
Real estate, renting and other business 
activities 8.4 10.2 13.3 7.7 16.4 7.9 8.5 9.4 14.3 11.5
— of which, real estate activities 1.1 0.9 1.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1
p.m. business sector services excluding 
real estate 35.7 37.1 37.9 30.2 46.4 40.7 32.2 32.4 46.2 45.1
Community, social and personal services 37.6 29.4 35.3 33.7 29.2 27.1 35.1 39.3 29.2 32.6
Notes: (a) Other business activities includes ‘sewage and refuse disposal’
(b) Real estate activities includes renting of machinery and equipment
(c) Total number engaged
(d) Agriculture includes veterinary activities; industry includes ‘sanitary and similar services’; wholesale and retail trade includes restaurants
Source: Calculations based on OECD STAN 2001 database.ANNEX III.1 — Annex tables
79
Table III.A3: Ranking of the share of innovators and labour productivity growth rates in 1995–99
Post and  Electricity, Financial  Transport Wholesale  Rank 
telecoms1 gas and water  inter-mediation and storage and retail correlation
supply trade; repairs2
GERMANY
Productivity growth 13245 0.70
Innovative activities 14253
FRANCE
Productivity growth 1243 - 0.40
Innovative activities 1324 -
UNITED KINGDOM
Productivity growth 12345 0.90
Innovative activities 21345
AUSTRIA
Productivity growth 12534 0.11
Innovative activities 15332
DENMARK
Productivity growth 1 2 3 4 0.80
Innovative activities 1 2 4 3
FINLAND
Productivity growth 13254 0.96
Innovative activities 12254
THE NETHERLANDS
Productivity growth 12534 0.60
Innovative activities 12354
(1) Innovation data are for telecommunications only
(2) Innovation data are for wholesale trade only
Source: Calculations based on OECD STAN 2001 database and on the Second Community Innovation Survey (EIMS 2001)IV.1 Introduction
Competition and modern enterprise policy are
complementary parts of economic policy as a
whole. Indeed, they are mutually reinforcing: a
regulatory framework that upholds effective compe-
tition induces firms to enhance their efficiency and
thus enables them to better survive in their markets.
At the same time, measures aimed at further
increasing competitiveness render possible a rise in
the level of competition between independent
market players. As a result, everyone, including
consumers, benefits in many ways. First, competi-
tion at any point in time reduces price differentials,
avoids waste of resources and ultimately leads to
welfare maximisation. Second, dynamic competi-
tion between competitive firms increases the rate of
innovation, creates product diversity that can better
match consumers’ preferences and raises the
economy’s rate of growth.
This chapter discusses the nature and the strength
of the links between competition and enterprise
policies and gives an overview of current issues and
questions in debate. At the outset, Section 2
summarises the legal framework of the links
between the two policies. Section 3 then assesses
these links from an economic perspective. In partic-
ular, this analysis discusses the need to take into
account a dynamic view. Section 4 compares the
United States to the European approach and identi-
fies a number of differences.
Building on these legal, economic and compara-
tive considerations, Section 5 then discusses
current issues in the three main areas of competi-
tion law: merger control, antitrust and State aid.
A few concluding remarks complete the chapter
(Section 6).
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IV.2 Legal aspects of the link
between the EU’s competition
and enterprise policies
IV.2.1 Principles embedded in the Treaty
Article 2 of the EC Treaty sets the overall objectives
of the European Community by stating that:
‘The Community shall have as its task … to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced
and sustainable development of economic activities …
(and) a high degree of competitiveness’.
Article 3/EC sets out the common policies which
should serve to accomplish this task. They include:
‘a system ensuring that competition in the internal
market is not distorted (point (g)) … (and) the
strengthening of the competitiveness of Community
industry (point (m)).’
Article 4/EC describes the principles on which the
Community’s economic policy shall be based. It
mentions in particular that this policy shall be
‘conducted in accordance with the principle of an open
market economy with free competition.’
The Treaty then goes on to postulate special
contents for each of the two fields. As regards
competition policy, the framework is set out in Arti-
cles 81 to 89/EC. In summary, it unconditionally
outlaws cartels and abuses of a dominant position.
However, other infringements of competition rules
can be exempted if they deliver certain benefits to
the economy. This possibility which exists both
under Article 81(3) and Articles 87(2) and 87(3)
reinforces the clear link between competition and
enterprise policies.
CHAPTER IV
Increasing synergy between the EU’s
enterprise and competition policiesIndeed, Article 81(3) provides that agreements can
be exempted if these contribute to improving the
production or distribution of products or to
promoting technical or economic progress and
allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.
Similarly, Article 87(3) gives the Commission the
power to declare aid compatible if it enhances other
Treaty policy objectives, such as regional develop-
ment and industrial competitiveness.
The framework of enterprise policy is outlined in
Article 157/EC under the title ‘Industry’94. This
article forges a structural link between the EU’s
enterprise and competition policy goals. Article
157(1)/EC expressly states that:
‘the Community and the Member States shall ensure
that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness
of the Community’s industry exists’.
It further states that their action must be ‘in accor-
dance with a system of open and competitive
markets’. Article 157(3)/EC on the one hand points
out that all other EU policies shall contribute to the
achievement of enterprise policy objectives and, on
the other, that no enterprise policy measure should
be introduced ‘which could lead to a distortion of
competition’.
From a Treaty perspective, enterprise and competi-
tion policies are thus separate but interdependent
policies which both contribute to the overall objec-
tives of the European Community. In accordance
with the Treaty the Commission should optimise
the synergies between the two policies by
contributing to achieving the objectives of enter-
prise policy in all of its other policies while refraining
from measures which could lead to distortion of
competition.
IV.2.2 The role of secondary legislation in
influencing the link between competition
and enterprise policies
Antitrust block exemptions based 
on Article 81(3)/EC
Article 81(3)/EC served as the legal basis for the
adoption of individual exemptions as well as for the
adoption of block exemption regulations, which
were recently replaced or are currently under
review95. These block exemption regulations
provide for automatic exemptions of agreements
between companies whose combined market share
is below a percentage fixed in each block exemp-
tion, provided the other conditions set forth in
these regulations are fulfilled. The Commission
assumes that agreements, fulfilling the criteria of
these block exemptions, can benefit from the
exemption set out in Article 81(3)/EC. Companies
therefore do not need to demonstrate that the posi-
tive effects on competitiveness compensate for any
possible anti-competitive effects.
Merger regulation96
The merger regulation was adopted in 1989 in
order to create a ‘one-stop shop’ that would facili-
tate the restructuring process of European industry
and increase its competitiveness. This is expressed
in Recitals 3 and 4 of the merger regulation:
‘Whereas the dismantling of internal frontiers is
resulting and will continue to result in major corporate
reorganisations in the Community, particularly in the
form of concentration.’ (Recital 3)
‘Whereas such a development (corporate reorganisa-
tions) must be welcomed as being in line with the
requirements of dynamic competition and capable of
increasing the competitiveness of European industry.’
(Recital 4)
These considerations link the attainment of compe-
tition policy and enterprise policy goals. To achieve
these goals, while maintaining ‘effective competition
in the common market’, the merger regulation
provides for a strict competition test, inspired by
Article 82/EC prohibiting abuses of dominant posi-
tion. Article 2(3) of the merger regulation provides
that a concentration needs to be assessed under the
test of creation or strengthening of a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded. In making this
appraisal, the Commission shall according to Article
2(1)(b) of the merger regulation take into account
inter alia:
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95 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on ‘vertical agreements’,
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 on ‘specialisation agreements’,
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 on ‘research and development
agreements’, Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 on ‘technology
transfer agreements’, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on ‘motor
vehicle distribution’ and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92 on ‘the
insurance sector’ are currently under review.
96 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 as complemented by Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 1310/97.
94 Industrial policy was introduced in the EC Treaty in 1992. The detailed
content of this policy had been outlined in a 1990 Commission Communi-
cation on ‘Industrial Policy in an open and competitive environment’ (Euro-
pean Commission 1990). This document explained that in a market
economy, the pursuit of industrial competitiveness is a responsibility of
companies. Public authorities should restrict themselves to the creation of a
stable and predictable environment favourable to industrial activity.Chapter IV — Increasing synergy between the EU’s enterprise and competition policies
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‘…the development of technical and economic
progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage
and does not form an obstacle to competition.’
In addition, Recital 13 states that:
‘Whereas it is necessary to establish whether concen-
trations with a Community dimension are compatible
or not with the common market from the point of view
of the need to maintain and develop effective competi-
tion in the common market; Whereas, in so doing, the
Commission must place its appraisal within the
general framework of the achievement of the funda-
mental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty.’
These considerations show that the attainment of
the objectives of the Treaty, in particular those of
ensuring undistorted competition and achieving a
high degree of competitiveness, is an important
element of the application of the merger regula-
tion.
State aid secondary legislation
Enterprise policy considerations necessarily have an
influence in the field of State aid. Article 87(3)/EC
permits the Commission, when examining a State
aid measure, to derogate from the general prohibi-
tion on State aid in Article 87(1). Article 87(3)(c) in
particular gives the Commission discretion to strike
a balance between a certain degree of distortion of
competition and the possible beneficial effects
resulting from the aid to the enterprises or the
industry. In this context, regulations, guidelines,
communications and frameworks have been
adopted to define the conditions under which aid
can be found compatible with the common market
and authorised.
This secondary legislation and ‘soft laws’ deal with
horizontal aid (aid for SMEs, employment and
training, aid for environmental protection, aid for
the promotion of risk capital and aid for restruc-
turing of firms), regional aid (including aid to
deprived urban areas and aid for large investment
projects) or aid to particular industries (such as
synthetic fibres, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, steel
and coal). A further regulation defines de minimis
measures, which are held not to affect trade
between Member States and therefore not to
constitute aid in the sense of Article 87(1). In
defining which conditions should apply for an aid
to be considered compatible, and in particular
intensity ceilings for State aid, the Commission is
necessarily making choices which have an impact
on enterprises and on the decisions of economic
operators. The nature of the sector concerned may
have an impact. For instance, the existence of
excess capacities in the market in which the benefi-
ciary enterprises are operating is bound to be taken
into account in assessing whether aid to create new
capacity can be allowed or to restructure an enter-
prise which would otherwise go out of business.
IV.3 Economic aspects of the
links between competition
and enterprise policies
IV.3.1 Economic principles underlying the
Commission’s enterprise and competition
policies
Economic rationale behind enterprise policy
goals
The Commission’s enterprise policy is primarily
based on four closely linked principles: encouraging
entrepreneurial activity, promoting small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), fostering innovation
and keeping markets open97. The entire business
environment should be oriented towards enabling
enterprises to strengthen their competitiveness and
to grow and develop in a way that is compatible
with the goal of sustainable development. This
approach not only helps to define clear targets for
enterprise policy. It also serves to identify areas
where market failures exist and where further
substantial progress is needed. These include the
completion of the internal market, the improved
availability of finance for small, new and innovative
enterprises, an adequate regulatory and administra-
tive framework and a climate more supportive to
entrerpreneurship and innovation.
Specifically, this approach points towards the
promotion of all enterprises (not only industry),
towards keeping in mind the needs of all the
different sizes and types of firms and towards
stressing the dynamic features of the economy. A
sound economy needs a spectrum of enterprises of
various sizes, as each has its specific comparative
advantages in the process of generating and diffu-
sion organisational and technical change. In addi-
tion, the evolutionary argument holds true that the
existence of a large set of different enterprises, all of
which act independently and follow their individual
objectives, implies that unexpected changes in the
economic environment or radical novelties will less
likely be able to destabilise the economy. In fact,
97 See also European Commission (2000a). European competitiveness report 2002
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the opposite holds true: Diversity of enterprises
increases the likelihood that some firms will benefit
from new market opportunities that emerge when
parameters in the economic system change. They
will thus grow and challenge formerly big firms, a
process which benefits competitiveness and compe-
tition.
This widened focus renders it indispensable to
understand that enterprises can both be market
incumbents and potential new entrants, i.e. firms
that are currently active in a market and firms that
might be so only in the future. This latter point is an
essential ingredient of any dynamic perspective.
The competitiveness of enterprises is closely linked
with these efforts at deepening the internal market.
The causal relationship works both ways. On the
one side, strengthening the Internal Market creates
new business opportunities for European companies
and therefore gives incentives to innovate and
compete. On the other side, any improvement of
firms’ competitiveness fosters a market dynamic
that increases the pressure to reduce trade barriers
and to create a genuine level playing field. In other
words, the strengthening of competitiveness and
the completion of the Internal Market are mutually
reinforcing goals.
New ways of organising production processes and
new forms of distribution — often, but not neces-
sarily, forming part of the knowledge-based
economy — push towards enlarged markets,
reduce obstacles to trade and take up market-based
solutions, which are hard for regulators to foresee.
Any enterprise policy that is to keep pace and go
with the grain of these developments needs to build
upon a dynamic, process-oriented approach.
Enterprise policy tries to attain a spectrum of objec-
tives, and it does so with an elaborate toolbox.
Most enterprise policy goals are closely entwined
with competition policy objectives. The question
arises to what extent the economic rationale behind
competition policy is similar and where differences
occur.
Economic rationale behind competition policy
goals
Like enterprise policy, competition policy is one of
the pillars of the European Commission’s action in the
economic field98. While competition is not the single
ultimate goal of EU economic policy, this policy is
built on the principle of ‘a system of open and
competitive markets’99. Competition is thus consid-
ered as a fundamental principle, which enables the
EU economy to achieve the optimum allocation of
resources and the highest possible welfare. The
principle of an open market economy does not,
however, mean blind faith or indifference towards
the operations of market mechanisms. It requires,
on the contrary, constant vigilance aimed at
preserving those mechanisms.
The economic rationale behind this competition
policy approach is built around three basic assump-
tions.
First, competition stimulates economic activity.
Already in 1972, the Commission explained in its
first competition report:
‘Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity
since it guarantees the widest possible freedom of
action to all. An active competition policy makes it
easier for the supply and demand structures continu-
ally to adjust to technological development. Through
the interplay of decentralised decision-making
machinery, competition enables enterprises continu-
ously to improve their efficiency … Such a policy
encourages the best possible use of productive
resources for the greatest possible benefit of the
economy as a whole and for the benefit, in particular,
of the consumer.’
Second, competition policy serves the purpose of
achieving a genuine Internal Market, without compe-
tition distortions from companies and from Member
States. For antitrust, the Commission only assesses
agreements which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market (Art. 81(1)/EC). As regards
State aid, the Commission can challenge aid granted
by Member States when such aid is likely to distort
competition and trade within the EU.
Third, competition policy needs to adapt constantly
to reflect the reality of new markets and business
practices. It therefore must take a dynamic view
which aims at assessing the transformation and
restructuring of European industry on a forward
looking basis in order to protect ‘effective competi-
tion’, as required by the Treaty.
99 Article 4/EC. 98 European Commission (2000b).Chapter IV — Increasing synergy between the EU’s enterprise and competition policies
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IV.3.2 The links between enterprise and
competition policies from an economic
perspective
From a general economic perspective, there exists
no a priori reason for conflict between competition
and enterprise policies. They are both cornerstones
of the EU policy framework for achieving high and
sustainable productivity growth, for that growth
depends on a regulatory environment that enables
enterprises to access new markets and to turn
inventions into innovations. Thus the Lisbon goal
calls for policies that establish an environment
conducive to enterprise growth and innovation
while ensuring that the market players are subject
to uniform rules. Enterprise policy focuses on the
first objective, while competition policy emphasises
the second. But both policies contribute to high
and sustainable productivity growth. Effective
competition does so by inducing firms to search for
efficiency-enhancing solutions that lead to product
and process innovation. Enterprise policy does so by
correcting market failures and enabling more firms
to engage in market transactions, thus increasing
the population of potentially innovative firms.
The nature and the practical application of each policy
have their own emphasis that need to be balanced in
the decision-making process of the Commission. The
following examples underscore this point.
(1) Proper product and geographic market delin-
eation, is crucial for competition decisions. This
is so because it makes it possible to calculate
market shares that convey meaningful informa-
tion regarding market power. In most cases, it
is obvious that the broader the market defini-
tion, the less likely it is that anti-competitive
concerns will arise. While market definition is
not required for enterprise policy, its instru-
ments — such as internal market legislation,
standardisation and benchmarking — may
speed up changes in product and geographic
market structures which should be reflected in
finding the appropriate market delineation for
competition purposes100.
(2) Enterprise policy emphasises the need to foster
innovation by creating widespread and closely
entwined knowledge pools, which in particular
help to raise the R & D potential of SMEs. From
a competition perspective, certain cooperation
agreements may imply anti-competitive behav-
iour such as market foreclosure or hampering
rivals’ innovation capability.
(3) Concentrations and cooperation agreements
between enterprises have the potential to
increase productive efficiencies and thus
competitiveness. For instance, merging firms
may be able to benefit from economies of scale
and scope and from combining complemen-
tary technologies. Moreover, lower costs may
modify market conditions so as to make collu-
sion less likely. Most cooperation agreements
are not problematic for competition and
benefit from exemptions under Article 81(3)/EC
relating to efficiency considerations. The large
majority of mergers is also cleared under the
merger regulation without revealing any
competition problem.
(4) Technological development and innovation, the
drivers of increased productivity, are by their
nature uncertain. Assessing their effects for
future market dynamics and for future compet-
itive conditions is a permanent challenge.
Competition decisions can take such develop-
ments into account to the extent that their
consequences can be predicted with sufficient
certainty. By doing so, the Commission raises to
the challenge of going beyond static snapshots
of market structures at a fixed point in time and
beyond extrapolation of past behaviour.
(5) Overall reduction of State aid to a minimum is a
generally agreed objective in light of their poten-
tial market distortion effects. Yet, market failures
occur and justify targeted state interventions at a
European, national or regional level. A balance
between State aid control and overcoming
market failures needs then to be struck.
Both policies are also faced with the same challenges,
which are presented in the context of the knowledge-
based economy and the emergence of new forms of
production and distribution within the digital
economy. The past years have witnessed the emer-
gence of many new sectors which centre on techno-
logical breakthroughs (examples are information
processing or biotechnology). In addition, new ways
of distributing products have come into existence (e-
commerce). The recent economic literature explains
the mechanics behind these developments and gives
useful insights101. Key aspects that are highlighted
100 Commissioner Mario Monti stressed this recently: ‘The opening up to
competition of markets as a result of European Union liberalisation efforts or
harmonisation resulting from European Union harmonisation directives will
normally result in the widening of the scope of markets at some point in
time. The telecommunications sector offers a very god example of the above
as regards both equipment and services’. Monti, M. (2001a). 101 For instance, see: Luis Cabral (ed.) (2000); Wolfstetter E. (1999).European competitiveness report 2002
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include, for instance, the need to find a compromise
between the openness of markets and the optimal
flow of information within knowledge networks. In
this context, the question of voluntary standards also
plays a role. As regards network industries in general,
the economic effects of first-mover advantages and
path-dependent processes have to be carefully exam-
ined from a long-term perspective, which takes the
different phases of the market evolution into
account. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that
companies do not leverage old monopoly rents into
new markets — a concern to both enterprise and
competition policies.
All these insights point towards the dynamic aspects
of market evolution, knowledge creation and inno-
vation. They call for sound economic reasoning as a
basis for both enterprise and competition policy.
This requirement is now being understood more
and more. In competition policy, it provides the
impetus for the ongoing regulative reforms which
adopt a more economic and dynamic approach to
competition.
IV.4 The US approach to links
between competition and
enterprise policies
IV.4.1 Key comparisons
A growing convergence between EU and US
competition policies
There are a number of institutional and substantive
differences between EU and US competition policies
that are described below. However, it is worth
emphasising that overall there has been an
increasing convergence between the EU and US
systems of competition law and practice102. The
convergence is taking place both in the economic
analysis of competition issues and in a growing
number of substantive and policy issues, such as the
enforcement priority given to tackling cartels. EU
and US competition policies pursue very similar
objectives, with the exception that EU competition
policy is also an instrument to achieve a genuine
European market without internal frontiers103. The
differences described below, however, rarely lead to
significantly different economic outcomes and
potential conflicts.
Different institutional settings 
and material differences
The links between competition and enterprise poli-
cies in the United States take place in an institu-
tional framework different from the EU landscape.
Competition policy is pursued by federal authorities
of which the main are the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) as
well as an extensive three-level system of federal
courts. Competition policy is also pursued by State
authorities (most often State Attorneys-General and
State courts). Different federal authorities also play a
significant role in pursuing industrial policy104,
either as part of the economic policy they pursue
(Department of Commerce) or as a ‘side policy’
alongside their core policy (NASA, Department of
Defence, Federal Communications Commission and
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). A switch of
government permits the appointment of new chair-
persons to these federal authorities and thus may
lead to changes in the application of industrial and
competition policies.
Because of this different institutional setting,
mergers in several specific sectors (such as banking,
airlines and offshore oil production) are subject to
the review of more than one federal body or
agency, some of which may have opposing policy
objectives105. Moreover, US antitrust agencies are
exempted from publishing reasoned decisions when
they clear mergers without remedies. This may facil-
itate a consideration of arguments other than those
based on pure competition policy.
In the EU, as regards competition policy, the
Commission currently has exclusive jurisdiction to
handle anti-competitive practices that affect trade
between Member States. Concerning mergers, the
Commission must adopt and publish reasoned deci-
sions in all cases, even cases that are ‘simple’ from a
competition point of view as they clearly do not
pose any competition problems.
As regards mergers, from a procedural point of
view, the US merger control system differs signifi-
cantly from the EU system because there are no
fixed deadlines within which difficult cases need to
be approved. The second request phase is indeed
not limited in time whereas an EU second-phase
investigation is limited to four months, giving
timing certainty to merging parties.
104 The term ‘industrial policy’ is used in this section instead of ‘enterprise policy’
because the latter concept is unknown in the United States.
105 Example: The acquisition of control in spring 2001 by the Dutch company
ASM Lithography over the Silicon Valley Group was nearly blocked for US
security defence reasons.
102 See: Monti M. (2001b).
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In competition matters, the decision-making
process is also slightly different from the EU process.
The two federal authorities have some administra-
tive powers but, before contesting any merger,
agreement or practice, must seek approval of their
decisions by independent federal courts that review
the evidence and arguments which they submit in
an adversarial procedure where the companies
concerned are involved on an equal footing. In the
European Union, the European Commission has
exclusive powers, as administrative authority, to
decide on mergers reaching certain turnover thresh-
olds and on agreements or concerted practices
affecting trade between Member States. All the
Commission’s decisions, however, are subject to
judicial review by the European Court of Justice.
It is notable that in merger control the US authori-
ties rely on the concept of ‘substantial lessening of
competition’ (SLC-test) for the appraisal of notified
concentrations, as opposed to the dominance test
used in the European Union. On the one hand this
test allows to capture more anti-competitive effects
when compared to the dominance test because no
finding of single or collective dominance is required
to show a significant lessening of competition. On
the other hand, this test allows the competition
authorities to consider the benefits of concentra-
tions for customers. While in practice, differences
seldom occur, it is not guaranteed that the US SLC-
test and the EU dominance test always come to the
same conclusions. In borderline cases, different
outcomes might result. For this reason, the
Commission has invited comments on the merits of
the respective tests in its Green Paper on the review
of the merger regulation.
Subsidies are outside the scope of US
competition policy
In the US, subsidy control is not considered to form
part of competition policy, whether granted by
federal authorities or individual States. There are no
rules in the United States to control subsidies other
than the WTO rules and the general constitutional
limitations, which are much less strict than those
within the European Union, and there is no supervi-
sory authority in charge of monitoring State aid. In
addition, key types of subsidies to enterprises, such
as for R & D, are mostly federal106 in the United
States whereas the bulk of State aid in the European
Union is granted by Member States.
Under EU competition law, the Commission can
challenge State aid granted by Member States
when such aid is likely to distort competition and
trade within the European Union. This reflects the
scope of EU competition policy, which addresses
competition distortions caused by the actions of
Member States and not just economic operators.
One of the specific features of the EU system is the
transparency in the administrative review procedure
when the Commission decides to open a full inves-
tigation. No equivalent system exists in the US.
IV.4.2 Beyond the conventional free
market view: some key US Government
supporting measures to businesses
At first sight, the US economy is run as a free
market, and the federal and States governments do
not support industrial and commercial sectors. In
most cases, this is doubtless true, but it is not the
case with strategic sectors. As mentioned above,
subsidies are not dealt with at all under US compe-
tition laws.
Typically, US subsidy policy is oriented towards
strategic industrial sectors. From an EU perspective,
we can focus on two topics of particular interest: (1)
SMEs and venture capital, and (2) R & D.
In addition, although this subject is outside the
scope of this chapter, these subsidies are often
combined with protectionist measures, such as the
Buy America Act (1933) and similar State legisla-
tion, and the Small Business Act (1953), and with
national security policies which contribute to the
support given to these economic sectors107.
SMEs and venture capital
For promoting innovative American SMEs, US
SBIR108/STTR109 is the most important source of high
tech-based venture capital funding in the United
States (especially for inventors, new start-ups and
early-stage, small businesses). In addition, public
support to US venture capital industry is widespread,
mainly through the Small Business Investments
Company Program (SBIC) of the public Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA) which, at relatively low
cost and in contrast to more ‘direct’ financing mech-
anisms, provides guarantees to financial institutions
107 See European Commission: United States Barriers to Trade and Investment. 
108 Small Business Innovation Research USD 1.2 billion program to provide
grants (no pay back required) to small US business for R & D of commercial-
isable concepts.
109 Small Business Technology Transfer (same as SBIR except cooperation with a
not-for-profit R & D institution).
106 It should be noted that individual States and cities can grant very large incen-
tives to individual businesses to attract new investment projects.European competitiveness report 2002
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which lend to venture capitalists and thereby enables
a leverage of considerably higher levels of funds than
such investors could themselves provide110. In 1999,
around 70 % of all new companies in the United
States which received venture capital funds were co-
financed by SBIC (providing 10 % of the total volume
of VC investments). They thus obtained publicly-
leveraged funds, with a special focus on high-tech
companies. The United States’ early investment
spurred by public funds in technological SMEs
contributed to the US lead in early stage venture
capital and to overall US lead in high-tech venture
capital.
R&D
In the field of R & D, US policy is to subsidise indus-
tries that are considered strategic. This applies in
particular to the aerospace and electronics indus-
tries, but has been used in other sectors as well,
such as the car industry, when a technology gap
with competitors existed.
— The  aerospace industry is the most striking
example of such a deviation from the non-inter-
vention theory. It is now widely admitted111 that
America’s historic dominance in commercial
aerospace, and particularly the large commercial
aircraft sector, arose on the back of defence tech-
nology paid for by the US Government. The
analysis of federal policy for large aircraft
industry shows that, in the past, US companies
derived benefits from a vast amount of public
expenditures in the field of R & D activities, both
from the NASA112 budget and the Department
of Defence (DOD)113 budget, from which they
received more than 70 % of their R & D
expenses.
— The electronic industry and especially the semi-
conductors industry is also considered a
strategic industry that needs a large support to
maintain and strengthen the position of US
enterprises in the global market. A lot of
funding sources could be identified, but it is
possible to focus on two main issues, the
Sematech114 Program, and the funding
provided by DARPA115. It is also common
knowledge that the Internet started in 1970 as
a communication network among research
institutes, the development of which was
entirely funded by the DOD. Even if it can be
argued that there is also a public funding of
research in the EU, within national schemes or
the FPRD, the level of funding is not the same
and the difficulties of coordination can lead to a
dispersion of effects. Furthermore, FPRD is
more oriented to fundamental research than
DARPA funding or Sematech objectives, which
seem to be clearly pre-competitive and
competitive development-oriented.
IV.4.3 The importance of international
cooperation
The brief overview of the nexus between competi-
tion and enterprise policies in the United States
makes it clear that there are some differences when
compared to the European Union. In addition, a
growing number of other countries have adopted
competition rules. As more and more commercial
transactions are falling within the jurisdiction of
more and more countries, there is an increased risk
of inconsistent outcomes and conflicts. In order to
avoid these, the Commission must continue to
strengthen the ongoing bilateral and multilateral
initiatives covering competition policy and related
economic policies, such as between the European
Union and the United States, on the one hand and
under the auspices of the WTO or the International
Competition Network on the other hand116.
IV.5 Current competition
issues of interest to enterprise
policy
IV.5.1 Mergers
The Commission currently intends to review and
clarify to the business community its merger policy
114 Federal support to US high-tech through programs such as Sematech do not
appear to be in line with the WTO Subsidies Code. Sematech, formed in
1987, by the government and major US semiconductors companies aimed at
improving the technological capabilities of US suppliers of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment and to strengthen vertical collaboration between
manufacturers and suppliers. US government spent 100 million dollars a year
for seven years in Sematech.
115 DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Program Agency) has planned to invest
more than USD 641 million on the advanced electronics technology program
and USD 860 million on the materials and electronic technologies program
for fiscal years 2000–02. The sub-programs include clearly dual-use tech-
nologies as manufacturing technology applications, advanced lithography,
MEMS and integrated Microsystems technology.
116 See, e.g., OECD (2001); Council of Economic Advisers (2002).
110 The SBIC program was launched in 1958, SBIR was created in 1982.
111 See for example the Senate Armed Service Committee 1997 report.
112 NASA funding for R&T is officially justified by the inability or unwillingness of
private companies to provide sufficient funding to R&T. NASA aeronautics
expenditure (1992/1997) was USD 7.3 billion of which some USD 3.5 billion
subcontracted to US aerospace industry. USD 3.1 billion had clear civil or
dual use applicability; Lawrence (2001).
113 There is also much dual use between military and civil aeroplanes in a lot of
technological fields where military technologies have spin-off potential. For
example, Mr Condit (CEO of Boeing) confirmed that design tools developed
for the JSF program will be used on new civil programs (Sunday Times,
12/06/00).DOD subsidies to US large aircraft manufacturers through dual
use technologies have been estimated at some USD 550 million per year in
1992–1997; Lawrence (2001).Chapter IV — Increasing synergy between the EU’s enterprise and competition policies
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in the framework of the Green Paper on the review
of the merger regulation. It also reflects on
providing an explanatory notice on (collective and
single) dominance.
Are mergers effective in achieving optimum
size?
Merger proposals are invariably supported by claims
of efficiency as a result of large-scale production or
large-scale distribution and marketing, enhancing,
in this way firm competitiveness. However, internal
(organic) expansion is often a more certain way of
benefiting from scale economies than acquisition
and more likely to be solidly based on long-term
efficiency gains and innovation. In contrast, mergers
as compared with internal growth are often just an
easy way of gaining positions of market power
without necessarily any accompanying efficiency
gains.
But mergers may bring certain advantages relative
to internal growth. First, mergers offer an opportu-
nity to adapt, in a short period of time to a
changing competitive environment. In fact,
although mergers have increased industrial concen-
tration, they often do not lead to permanent
increases in market power. In part this is due to a
simultaneous increase in international competition.
Second, mergers allow firms to avoid part of the
uncertainty and risk associated with the large invest-
ments required to be competitive in a global scale.
Moreover, when firms have to grow in size to
become competitive on a larger geographic market,
they may find it more feasible and efficient to
merge with a company originating from the same
country. This is linked to considerations such as
geographical proximity of production sites,
common language, and common business culture.
Such mergers generally do not create competition
problems if the geographic market is wider than
national. Market definition is linked to the integra-
tion of European markets. The faster the trade
barriers fall and EU markets become integrated, the
easier it will be for companies to consolidate, even
domestically117. Domestic mergers can, in some
cases, create pan-European companies that may
have the potential to further foster the internal
market development. Where domestic mergers raise
competition concerns in markets that are not yet
integrated, these concerns may be alleviated by
adequate remedies that contribute to the successful
development of the internal market.
More generally, mergers that allow a more efficient
combination of assets will enhance the competitive-
ness of the merging firms leading to increased
competition and ultimately consumer welfare gains.
Competition policy has recognised this with the
merger regulation, which offers a one-stop shop to
facilitate industry restructuring. However, a debate
is necessary as to whether verifiable efficiency gains
resulting from a proposed merger can offset any
price increases or other negative effects caused by
the creation or strengthening of a dominant posi-
tion. Raising to the challenge, the Commission has
launched a debate on this issue, in the context of
the Green Paper on the review of the merger regu-
lation. This process will shed light on the treatment
of efficiency gains.
Is merger policy SME friendly?
As regards SMEs, the objectives of enterprise and
competition policy are almost perfectly aligned.
Indeed, the beneficiaries of an efficient merger
policy are frequently other enterprises, quite often
SMEs, as customers of the merging firms. In this
respect merger control provides a powerful tool to
safeguard and protect the competitiveness of
smaller firms by preventing price increases of inter-
mediate inputs resulting from a dominant position
acquired after an upstream concentration.
Moreover, both policies are equally concerned with
the fact that mergers have sometimes been impor-
tant historically in creating positions of market
dominance. Also, there is much evidence to show
that dominant firms have substantial advantages
over new entrants and small competitors. These
advantages are related to factors such as complex
technologies, financial power, access to distribution
channels and customer attachments. Theory does
not give clear guidance on the extent to which
these advantages should be condemned. But
empirical evidence confirms that view that SMEs,
which are unable to compete with a dominant firm
are likely to be forced to exit the market. All efforts
in promoting the creation and development of
SMEs are likely to be ineffective in a competitive
environment dominated by large incumbents.
Furthermore SMEs often provide a source of poten-
tial competition to a large dominant incumbent. In
such circumstances, it must be acknowledged that
the preventive takeover by a dominant firm of a
much smaller competitor, even if it does not lead to
a substantial change in market concentration, may
reduce the future competitiveness of the industry
by eliminating the possibility that the small 117 Monti (2001a).European competitiveness report 2002
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acquired company would, in the future, be in a
position to challenge the large dominant firm.
Does merger policy hinder the rationalisation of
declining industries?
Occasionally the Commission has acknowledged
the different competitive nature of declining indus-
tries in its merger decisions. As it is well known,
declining industries engage in a sort of prisoners’
dilemma exit game. The question of who goes out
first is a difficult, and irreversible, strategic decision.
Even when it is clear to all market participants that
a market is in decline, each firm may decide not to
exit or reduce capacity, expecting that a rival will be
the first one to do so. In such circumstances, there
may be persistently low returns and little innovation
in the industry over long periods. The usual signs
are chronic over-capacity and low profitability.
Outside intervention may be needed to implement
a program of rationalisation to ensure orderly exit.
Such a process may rely heavily on mergers to
reduce the number of competitors and excess
production capacity in the industry. Merger policy
does not stand in the way of such a restructuring,
provided that the process of concentration does not
lead to the creation of a dominant company. Such
an end-result should be avoided, both from a
competition policy and enterprise policy point of
view, as it is well known from economic theory that,
even in declining industries, positions of excessive
market power may persist over a long time to the
detriment of customer, often enterprises from other
industries, and final consumers alike.
However, there is a debate on whether the criteria
used to exempt an anti-competitive takeover
involving a failing firm should explicitly acknowl-
edge the competitive conditions of declining
markets and the benefits to consumers of rationali-
sation.
Do merger rules endanger innovation?
Few economists doubt that dynamic-efficiency
gains from continuing innovation far outweigh the
static gains from marginal-cost pricing. Thus, it has
been argued that in markets where innovation is
frequent, monopoly rents will be constantly eroded
as new products and processes are introduced. In
attempting to determine whether innovation will be
harmed or promoted through a merger, it is neces-
sary to first understand the likely sources of innova-
tion in the relevant sector and subsequently to
decide whether the merger changes the rate or
type of innovation.
On the one side, there are instances where R & D
investment is largely redundant and, after a merger,
some of those resources could be put to better use
in other fields. It is also possible that merger effi-
ciencies could free up resources to be used for
R & D. Combining innovators also may be benefi-
cial when the different innovation strategies being
pursued are complementary, so that a combination
of the two would create a better final outcome. On
the other hand, reducing the number of firms
reduces the likelihood of achieving the most effec-
tive outcome. Several competing research programs
increase the likelihood that at least one firm or
group of firms will innovate successfully. In the
uncertain realm of R & D, some redundancy may be
optimal from a social welfare standpoint.
In conclusion, there is an ambiguous relationship
between industrial concentration and the rate of
effective innovation. Determining what the
combined effect of mergers will be on both factors
is a difficult and challenging task for both merger
and enterprise policy. Therefore a fluent and contin-
uous dialogue is required to assure policy consis-
tency.
Are merger remedies a tool to influence
industry structures?
Mergers that are deemed anti-competitive may be
ultimately authorised if the merging parties enter
into commitments vis-à-vis the Commission with a
view to remedy the competition concerns raised by
the proposed merger. The Commission typically
informs third parties — customers and competitors
— about the remedies offered by the merging
parties and enquires their views on the competitive
impact of these remedies before granting its
approval. Despite the important role played by
replies from third parties, it is the Commission’s
responsibility, as competition authority, to decide
which remedies are appropriate to approve the rele-
vant merger.
Such a decision goes far beyond the binary decision
to approve or prohibit a merger. It must take into
account the structural or behavioural nature of the
proposed remedies and many other factors, which
aim at restoring conditions for effective competi-
tion. Predicting with reasonable certainty which
elements will restore competition after a structural
reallocation of productive assets is quite a complex
exercise. The coordination mechanisms of the
Commission are there to ensure that competition
policy makes full use of enterprise policy expertise
in evaluating the short and long-term impact of
proposed remedies in order to avoid demandingChapter IV — Increasing synergy between the EU’s enterprise and competition policies
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disproportionate commitments or accepting inade-
quate and unworkable remedies to an otherwise
anti-competitive merger.
The Commission has published a notice118, which
sets out the requirements for an effective remedy,
and which assists companies in formulating
adequate proposals to remedy competition
concerns raised by a merger.
Merger control and defence-related industries
The application of competition policy to defence-
related industries is a challenging matter. The EC
Treaty allows Member States to take measures
necessary for the protection of their essential secu-
rity interests which are connected with the produc-
tion of, or trade in, armament, provided that such
measures do not adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding
products which are not intended for specifically
military purposes.
Challenges are linked to competition problems for
industries active in upstream markets, for the whole
supply chain, for Member States that do not have
any significant defence industry and as regards spill-
over effects on non-military products.
IV.5.2 Antitrust
General remarks
Striking the right balance between the competition
and competitiveness goals is a particularly chal-
lenging task for antitrust analysis, as many practices
may restrict competition to some degree but also
create efficiencies. Moreover dominance of firms —
and its resulting potential for abuse — may be,
under certain market conditions, a transitory
phenomenon. Moreover, firms that have a domi-
nant position do not per se abuse that position.
To strike the right balance, the Commission is
rebuilding the legal framework in a way that gives
greater weight to economic reasoning. The new
block exemption Regulations for horizontal and
vertical restraints, the corresponding guidelines,
and the new ‘de minimis’ notice are all based on an
economic approach which focuses on the impact of
an agreement on the market and not on its form.
They are also open to dynamic arguments, in which
the competitiveness goal of enterprise policy and
the competition policy goal meet.
Enterprise policy is not only about economic
contents, but also about formal aspects, such as
legal certainty for firms. Indeed, legal certainty
becomes an economic issue itself if the lack of it
induces companies to curb their investments,
because they can foresee less clearly how their
activities might be regulated. Thus, the rebalancing
of legal versus economic issues needs to be limited
where legal certainty falls below a critical threshold.
Therefore measures — such as explanatory guide-
lines and dissemination of information — are taken
by the Commission to make sure that problems do
not emerge in this regard.
Current antitrust issues affecting the link
between enterprise and competition policies
Some of the concrete issues currently debated
within antitrust will have a particularly strong effect
on the link between enterprise and competition
policies.
(1) The modernisation of Regulation No 17 will
replace the current notification system by a
system of legal exception. Under the new frame-
work, greater freedom to act, but also greater
responsibility will be allocated to enterprises.
They need not notify certain agreements any
more in advance but have to check themselves if
their actions violate competition law. This will
help to avoid time-consuming administrative
procedures, but will also increase the necessity
for rules guaranteeing sufficient legal certainty.
In this context, emphasis must be also on the
coherent application of Community law.
(2) The review of the Transfer of Technology Block
Exemption Regulation (TTBER), which has
recently started, will redefine the balance
between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and
competition policy. The central aim is to find an
appropriate and endurable equilibrium
between both. Cooperation among firms and
the creation of knowledge networks take more
and more complex forms, many of which are
unproblematic from a competition perspective
or cannot be regulated (such as information
flow via observation effects in clusters or via
exchange of personnel). Nevertheless, other
issues, such as pre-emptive patenting or the
creation of closed knowledge pools, can facili-
tate foreclosure of markets or prevent innova-
tion by competitors.
(3) Many systems of distribution, particularly in e-
commerce, currently undergo rapid change,
and new forms of advertising and merchan- 118 European Commission (2001). European competitiveness report 2002
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dising products lead to new solutions, which
are hard to predict ex ante. In many circum-
stances, new entrants are the drivers of such
changes, as their activities increase market effi-
ciencies and foster innovation and competition.
Provided that such welfare-enhancing effects
exist, the interests of new distributors have to
be taken equally into account within legislative
reforms as those of more traditional operators.
(4) The special situation of SMEs has already in the
past been a cornerstone of enterprise policy.
This will also hold true for the future. For
instance, the envisaged modification of the
definition of SMEs takes into account the
sustained need to give special protection to
these enterprises, which often are particularly
innovative and which generate new employ-
ment to a significant degree. This has also been
realised in the reform of the de minimis rules,
which clearly reflect the fact that SMEs will
normally be unable to perceptible affect trade
or diminish competition. In addition, SMEs
have a special interest in participating in infor-
mation-sharing agreements, so that they can
accumulate knowledge that is internally avail-
able in larger enterprises. To sum up, therefore,
SMEs have been and should also in the future
be assessed differently from larger enterprises,
not the least in competition policy.
IV.5.3 State aid
General remarks
The Commission has identified certain objectives for
which State aid can be authorised. These include
horizontal objectives, notably those where aid
addresses market failures. Identifying and addressing
such market failures is also an objective of enterprise
policy. It is widely recognised that general market fail-
ures exist in areas like R & D, SMEs financing and
investment in environmental protection beyond legal
standards. But for large amounts of aid granted to
single companies or for aid granted in sensitive
sectors, the case for the existence of market failure is
much weaker and aid is normally granted for other
reasons, including for social or equity reasons. In
these circumstances, striking the right balance
between competition, competitiveness and other
goals is a particularly challenging task, as the
economic and industrial analysis can always be chal-
lenged. This is generally the situation in sectors facing
over-capacity or declining markets, where the distor-
tions caused by State aid are likely to be more severe
and for which stricter rules of control therefore have
to be applied.
The Stockholm European Council underlined the
relatively high level of aid in the European Union
and called for its reduction. But, from an economic
point of view, not all aid is the same. Some cate-
gories of aid cause more distortion than others. This
fact is already recognised in the State aid rules, for
example through the more generous aid levels
allowed for training, R & D and environmental
protection. The same type of aid may be justifiable
in some sectors and create adverse effects in others.
For instance, investment aid may be justifiable in
rapidly growing sectors but not in sectors in
absolute decline.
Current State aid issues affecting the link
between enterprise and competition policies
From the enterprise policy point of view are of
particular interest:
(1) While subscribing fully the overall objective of
reducing State aid, there is equally a necessity
to render State aid instruments more effective
in overcoming the associated and accepted
market failures. This can be achieved by exam-
ining the efficiency of aid measures from a
macro- and a micro-economic perspective and
by convincing Member States to initiate bench-
marking exercises of their various State aid
regimes. The experience and methodologies of
benchmarking enterprise policies is very rele-
vant in this context. While the justification for
State aid rules must always be essentially the
control of distortion of competition, the
Commission could when reviewing State aid
rules have a more favourable attitude towards
aid regimes which can be shown to be likely to
be more effective.
(2) There is a growing gap between R & D expen-
diture in Europe and its main competitors.
From the enterprise policy point of view, R & D
is not an area where reduction of aid should be
endeavoured. Moreover, in the future the use
of the linear approach of innovation could be
questioned, as the innovation process in enter-
prises is becoming more and more a contin-
uous one, involving interactions between all
fields of research.
(3) Another key question refers to the market
failure in the area of SME financing particularly
as regards the availability of equity capital. The
level of financing of start-up and the earlyChapter IV — Increasing synergy between the EU’s enterprise and competition policies
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stages of innovating SMEs in the European
Union (both in new high-tech sectors and in
traditional sectors) is far behind the United
States119. One of the main market failures
which enterprise policy wants to address is to
create the conditions to bridge this gap, and
the Commission has made it clear that the
philosophy underlying the strategy for devel-
oping the EU risk capital market attributes
primary importance to the creation of an envi-
ronment favourable to creating and sustaining
new and innovative businesses, through struc-
tural and horizontal measures. In addition,
however, the Commission has recognised ‘a
role for public funding of risk capital measures
limited to addressing identifiable market fail-
ures’. The Commission has recently established
new criteria enabling State aid measures for the
promotion of venture capital to finance the
start-up and early stages of SMEs, in its
communication on State aid and risk capital.
The next step will be to evaluate to what extent
this and other instruments have permitted an
acceleration of entrepreneurial activity.
(4) One of the recurring issues in competition and
enterprise policies is the existence of so-called
‘sensitive’ sectors, i.e. sectors suffering from
structural over-capacities or declining markets.
The traditional State aid approach is to consider
these sectors as specific and to address their
problems by specific State aid codes which are
stricter than the general rules. The new State
aid approach is to merge all such sectoral codes
and to treat these sensitive sectors in a
coherent way, recently decided upon at the
occasion of the new so-called ‘multisectoral’
framework120. Whenever a Member State
wants to give large amounts of regional aid to
very big investment projects, the Commission
will examine under this framework the impact
of such projects on the market concerned.
However, the Commission still needs to resolve
the selection of sectors to be regarded as sensi-
tive, and the size of the investment projects
from which a reduction of aid should apply by
reference to the normal regional aid ceilings.
Good knowledge and data concerning partic-
ular industries is of key importance both in
determining and in defending this list.
(5) Finally, the EC Treaty explicitly provides for the
possibility to approve State aid to projects that
present ‘common European interest’ (Article
87(3)(b)). Case-law has been developed on
how to apply this Treaty provision to R & D
projects. Projects of common European interest
can by their nature have a positive impact on
innovation and competitiveness at EU level.
IV.6 Concluding comments
The overview of the interactions between the
competition and enterprise policies of the European
Union shows their synergy and the potential to
further increase it. EU competition policy must
contribute to the attainment of enterprise policy
objective while enterprise policy must not distort
competition. Both policies need to adjust continu-
ously to the new challenges that emerge at an
accelerating rate: new markets, new ways of doing
business, new drivers of growth and of dynamic
competition.
The reformulation of enterprise policy in the light of
the strategy adopted at the Lisbon European
Council, as well as the current revision of major
parts of the competition legislation are occasions to
achieve an even better synergy between both EU
policies.
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environmental pressures may slacken and even
begin to decrease. As society becomes richer, its
demand for environmental quality increases. More-
over, increased economic growth at high levels of
income provides the additional resources that are
needed to better tackle environmental pressures.
Many observers of the main industrialised
economies have therefore identified the phenom-
enon of a so-called environmental Kuznets curve121.
As a country’s real income increases, its emissions of
pollutants and use of raw materials at first increases.
However, emissions and raw material use subse-
quently peak or even begin to decline at higher
income levels.
This chapter examines the relationship between
economic growth and the natural resource use and
emissions of pollutants with regard to EU manufac-
turing enterprises over the last 20 years. Manufac-
turing industry, directly involved in the transforma-
tion of materials into products, has in the past been
considered one of the major contributors to envi-
ronmental degradation. However the environ-
mental performance of manufacturing industry over
the last 20 years has very substantially improved in
response to increased regulation, stronger market
competition, and through investment and better
management of resources by industry itself122.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section V.2
reviews some general considerations concerning the
concept and determinants of eco-efficiency. Section
V.3 examines in detail the actual environmental
performance of EU manufacturing industry over the
last 20 years with respect to two measures of
natural resource inputs — energy and raw materials
— and four measures of the emission of pollutants
CHAPTER V
Sustainable development 
in the EU manufacturing industry
V.1 Introduction
The Brundtland Commission (1987) defined
sustainable development as ‘development that
meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs’. The idea that the management of
natural resources and the environment should be
consistent with the preservation of its reproductive
capacity has become — along with the promotion
of economic and social progress — one of the
fundamental objectives of the European Union as
expressed in the Treaty on European Union.
At the June 2001 Gothenburg summit, European Union
leaders endorsed a strategy for sustainable develop-
ment containing three pillars relating to economic,
social, and environmental development. The integra-
tion of the three pillars into a single strategy was
designed to ensure that in the longer-term economic
growth, social protection, and environmental quality all
developed in a harmonious balance. In this context the
European Council stressed the importance of decou-
pling economic growth from resource use.
The issue of the relationship between output growth
and resource use, widely interpreted also to include
emission of pollutants, is therefore essential to
sustainable development. Is it inevitable that as the
economy grows over time, resource use and emis-
sions of pollutants will have to increase indefinitely? If
so, such economic growth would be ultimately
unsustainable. The earth has limited stocks of non-
renewable resources and a limited carrying capacity
for the absorption of pollutants. Increased growth of
emissions of pollutants would lead to intensifying
environmental damage with potentially irreversible
impacts on human health and biodiversity.
In fact, however, the evidence is that as economic
development expands beyond a certain threshold,
Chapter V — Sustainable development in the EU manufacturing industry
121 See, for example, Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Hettige et al. (1997). 
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European Environment Agency’s Environmental Signals Report. See the
chapter on manufacturing in the 2000 Report (EEA, 2000) and the especially
the summary table (Figure 1.4) in the 2001 Report (EEA, 2001a).— greenhouse gases, acidifying gases, ozone-
precursor gases and ozone-depleting gases; more-
over, comparisons are made where possible with US
industry. Section V.4 then reviews evidence on the
costs to manufacturing industry of improving its
eco-efficiency and Section V.5 provides some
conclusions.
V.2 Eco-efficiency 
and its determinants
Eco-efficiency measures the productivity of resource
use or pollutant emission in an industry. It is defined
as the ratio of economic output to environmental
pressure123. It can be calculated as the quantity of
value-added output divided by the physical quan-
tity of resource input or quantity of emissions of
pollutants respectively:
Eco-efficiency = Output/Environmental pressure
Eco-efficiency is a key concept since it provides a
measure of the wedge between economic growth
and environmental impact. For instance, in the case
of emissions of pollutants, the definition of eco-effi-
ciency can be rearranged as:
Emissions = Output/Eco-efficiency
Therefore, for small percentage changes124:
% growth in emissions = % growth in output — %
growth in eco-efficiency.
Over the longer term of course the percentage
growth in output for most industries will be positive.
Therefore, the impact on emissions crucially depends
on developments in eco-efficiency. If the percentage
growth in eco-efficiency is positive but less than the
rate of output growth, emissions will rise but by less
than output growth and relative de-coupling is said to
have occurred. In contrast, if the percentage growth
in eco-efficiency is greater than the rate of output
growth, emissions over time will actually fall and
absolute de-coupling is said to have occurred. Similar
definitions can be derived for resource use.
It is therefore of great importance to examine the
underlying determinants of eco-efficiency. In
general these will depend on the rate of technolog-
ical progress, the degree of environmental regula-
tion, the extent of competition in product markets,
and upon the investment and quality of manage-
ment of resources by industry itself.
Concerning energy and natural resource use, the
economics of production125 suggests that the use of
inputs of resources by industry will depend on a
number of factors including the following:
— Rate of technological progress. Technological
progress will tend over time to reduce the
requirement for material inputs by improving
processes. Whilst some technological progress
might be applicable using existing equipment,
full benefits from technological progress usually
require investment in new equipment.
— Relative price of material inputs. A rise in the
relative price of one input will tend to reduce
its usage and increase incentives for its substitu-
tion by other inputs, including labour and
capital. Such substitution may require addi-
tional or replacement capital equipment.
— Efficiency in management of resources.
Improved management of resources by firms
may occur either as a result of external compet-
itive pressures or as a result of internal manage-
ment improvements.
— Rate of capacity utilisation. In the short-run,
measured eco-efficiency particularly of energy
use tends to decline in periods of low capacity
utilisation. This is perhaps because it is technically
necessary to keep machines running anyway,
independent of the quantity of production.
Public policy can influence resource use in a number
of ways. One is by directly changing the relative price
of resources through indirect taxes such as an energy
tax. However, public policy also influences the
management of resources by increasing the external
competitive pressures on firms through markets inte-
gration, preserving competition and free entry, and
by encouraging market-based economic reforms.
Finally the public sector can also influence resource
use by providing incentives for the adoption of
resource-conserving production techniques and by
promoting efficiency-enhancing managerial stan-
dards such as EMAS or ISO 14001.
Turning to the emission of pollutants by firms, once
again technological factors will tend to improve the
eco-efficiency of production over time. Moreover,
125 See Fuss and McFadden (1978) and Färe et al. (1994).
123 See OECD (1997), Anite (1999).
124 Because of the non-linear relationship between variables, this relationship will
not exactly hold for large percentage changes.
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the investment decisions and managerial efficiency of
firms will again be important determinants of eco-
efficiency of emissions. However over and beyond
these factors, a major determinant of emissions eco-
efficiency in practice will be the legally- binding envi-
ronmental emissions standards required by public
authorities. Conformity with these standards in
general requires additional expenditure both in terms
of investment and running costs.
A variety of means are available to firms in order to
reduce their emissions in conformity with environ-
ment standards. These include the following126:
— Improved technical efficiency of the production
process. This might occur through technolog-
ical progress or investment in more efficient
techniques, and may also result in savings in
energy and natural resource use. Such effi-
ciency savings may require further investment.
— Substitution of inputs. Examples would be the
substitution of coal and oil fuel inputs by non-
combustion fuels such as renewable energy or
low-emissions fuels such as gas or low-sulphur
fuel oil. The substitution of alternative inputs
may be costly and may or may not require
further investment to upgrade or replace
existing capital equipment.
— Use of additional inputs or processes. Examples
would be the pre-cleaning of materials before
use, requiring additional inputs from capital,
labour, and water and resulting in additional
waste by-products.
— Investment in end-of-pipe emission controls.
Examples would be flue gas de-sulphurisation
and de-noxing technologies. Such technologies
might have the side effect of reducing produc-
tion efficiency.
— Improved management of resources. Improved
management could improve the handling,
timing, and use of resources, including the
optimal utilisation of capacity.
With regard to the control of emissions of carbon
dioxide there is a big technological difference from
the control of standard air pollutants in that end-of-
pipe techniques are currently not available for
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Control meas-
ures for carbon dioxide therefore have to take a
different form, relying on input substitution or
increased efficiency.
The means available for and costs of the additional
reduction of emissions of pollutants differs greatly
between industries and firms127. In particular there
are important differences between controlling emis-
sions from combustion processes and from direct
production processes. Generally emissions from
combustion processes are easier to control than
those from direct production processes, since
combustion is by nature a concentrated and specific
process compared to more diffuse other production
processes. These differences in the costs of emis-
sions control make a strong case for the use of
market-based environmental instruments such as
emissions trading. Such instruments ensure the
achievement of emissions reductions by the lowest
cost means, through giving incentives to firms with
lower emission-reduction costs to make the largest
contribution to the overall reduction in emissions. 
127 For some discussion of the differences in costs of abatement see Hartman et
al. (1997).
126 See, for example, the technical annex to the 1994 Sulphur Protocol (UNECE,
1994) which describes the various means which may be used to control
emissions of sulphur dioxide.European competitiveness report 2002
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in principle this should be stronger with the use of market-based regulatory
instruments.
130 Raising environmental expenditures will reduce both economic growth and
environmental pressures. The latter through both reducing the economic
growth rate and increasing the rate of growth of eco-efficiency.
131 Schematically the public sector will in practice making choices about
exactly what trade-off they wish to make by designing environmental regu-
lations which determine environmental expenditures and hence economic
growth.
128 See Pearce and Palmer (2001) and Jaffe et al. (1995) for recent surveys of the
available evidence on the relationship between environmental expenditures
and conventionally-measured economic growth. Of course, conventional
measures of economic growth do not take account of the non-marketed
social value of environmental improvements (see e.g. Färe et al. (2001), for
the demonstration of such an alternative measure).
129 The so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). For a recent
survey of the evidence on this effect see Jaffe et al. (2000). They conclude that
there is only limited evidence for the existence of induced innovation, but that
Box V.1: The key relationships between environmental expenditures, economic growth,
and the growth of eco-efficiency and environmental pressures
This box examines the key steady-state macroeconomic relationships between environmental expenditures, economic
growth, and the growth of eco-efficiency and environmental pressures. These relationships are illustrated more formally
in a small macroeconomic growth model contained in the Annex V.1.
The first relationship is that between environmental expenditures and eco-efficiency. A certain amount of trend improve-
ment in eco-efficiency might be expected over time as a result of technological progress even in the absence of any envi-
ronmental expenditure. To obtain further improvements in eco-efficiency growth beyond this trend growth rate would
require additional expenditure on environmental protection (or equivalently the progressive adoption of some higher
cost substitute materials or processes). It is likely that progressively increasing environmental expenditures will ultimately
begin to experience diminishing returns to scale. For instance, whilst some initial relatively cheap improvements in eco-
efficiency may be obtained using end-of-pipe techniques, further improvements may entail considerably higher expendi-
tures involving changes to production techniques. Hence, the relationship between environmental expenditures and
increasing eco-efficiency is likely initially to be relatively steep, whilst tending to level off at higher levels of expenditures.
Indeed ultimately there may also be physical or chemical limits to the extent to which eco-efficiency can be improved
given an existing technology.
Looking next at the relationship between the scale of environmental expenditures and the resources available for invest-
ment and economic growth, the currently available evidence would suggest a clear negative relationship to be expected.
Evidence from a number of US studies demonstrates that there is a clear negative relationship in aggregate between envi-
ronmental expenditures and conventionally-measured productivity growth128. That this is almost inevitable can be seen
from the basic consideration that environmental expenditures — whatever their value to society in general — represent
to the firm which incurs them a cost which does not directly provide an output or input with a market valuation. In
general, increased environmental expenditures can be expected to reduce profits and hence the overall resources avail-
able to firms for productive investment. As a partial offset to this overall effect, there is also some evidence that increased
environmental regulation increases the rate of induced technological innovation of firms129.
The implications of the two above relationships taken together is that there is likely to be a clear trade-off between the
rate of economic growth and the rate of reduction in environmental pressures130. Moreover, because of the diminishing
returns assumed for environmental expenditures, this trade-off is likely to become more pronounced as environmental
expenditures increase. Governments may thus make choices about the extent to which they wish to combine economic
growth with the rate of change in environmental pressures131.
An interesting aspect to the trade-off between economic growth and environmental pressures is the extent to which it is
affected by improved economic performance or by improved environmental technology. Improved economic perform-
ance might occur through market integration such as the single market process or through other means of increasing
efficiency such as structural reforms. The result would be to allow a better trade-off between economic growth and envi-
ronmental pressures. In particular the fruits of economic reform would be to allow both a higher rate of economic growth
and a faster reduction in environmental pressures to occur simultaneaously.
Likewise, an improvement in the performance of environmental technology — perhaps through greater investment in
this sector — might allow for an increase in the trend rate of improvement in eco-efficiency. Such a development would
also improve the trade-off between economic growth and environmental pressures, potentially allowing more favourable
developments in each.Chapter V — Sustainable development in the EU manufacturing industry
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V.3 The environmental
performance of EU
manufacturing industry
This section looks at the environmental performance
of EU manufacturing industry over the last 20 years
with respect to natural resource inputs and emission
of pollutants. Two measures of natural resource
inputs are considered, energy and raw materials,
together with four measures of the emission of pollu-
tants, greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting gases,
acidifying gases, and ozone-precursor gases. These
are the only environmental indicators for EU manu-
facturing which are both available for a sufficiently
long time period and cover in a consistent manner all
of the Member States. The analysis is based upon
aggregate data covering the 15 current Member
States132. The analysis uses the longest reliable series
of data available, generally consisting of data from
1980 onwards; 1985 in the case of energy use and
carbon dioxide emissions. Each of the sub-sections
which follow covers a single issue. A brief explanation
of the environmental factors involved is followed by a
description and analysis of the environmental
performance of EU manufacturing industry. Some
comparisons are also made between the environ-
mental performance over the last 20 years of EU
manufacturing industry and that of US industry.
Energy use
Industrial energy use is a key environmental issue
because of the major role of energy in producing
emissions of pollutants, because of the environ-
mental impact of the extraction of energy, and to a
limited extent also because of resource scarcity.
Energy production, predominantly from fossil fuel
sources, is a major contributor to the generation of
the greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, and a host of air
pollutants. The extraction of energy takes up exten-
sive land and is responsible for multiple impacts on
human health and nature. Finally, for existing stocks
of some fuels, notably petroleum, there are relatively
extensive but still finite reserves in existence.
Energy use by manufacturing industry in 1990
made up 31 % of total final energy consumption.
The main contributing sectors were iron and steel
(accounting for 21 % of total manufacturing energy
use), chemicals (19 %), and the non-metallic
mineral industries (13.8 %).
Graph V.1 shows the development of manufac-
turing output, energy consumption, and energy
eco-efficiency since 1985. Despite a rise in manu-
facturing output of some 29 % over the period,
132 The data excludes the former German Democratic Republic prior to 1991.
Adjustments have been made to the analytical data where possible to correct
for the direct impact of German reunification (see data appendix). 
Graph V.1: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: Energy inputs
Index 1985 = 100133
Source: Commission services.
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energy consumption by industry has remained
broadly unchanged. The increase in energy eco-effi-
ciency is therefore broadly of the same magnitude
as the growth in manufacturing output. 
The improvement in eco-efficiency has occurred
despite a substantial reduction in real energy prices
(Graph V.2), which slowed the improvement in eco-
efficiency through substitution effects. Energy prices
would have fallen further however without the
offsetting rise in energy taxes (see Graph V.14).
One of the main reasons for the substantial
improvement in energy eco-efficiency is technolog-
ical progress. In particular, individual energy-inten-
sive sectors have made major contributions to
improving their eco-efficiency including all three of
the largest users, the iron and steel, chemicals, and
the non-metallic mineral industries (the glass,
ceramics, lime, cement industries)134. The rise in
energy taxes and shifts in the sectoral structure of
industrial production are also partly responsible for
the improvement in eco-efficiency.
Compared with the performance of US manufac-
turing industry (see Graph V.3), the energy eco-effi-
ciency of EU industry has been consistently more
than twice as efficient over the entire period
1985–99. The improvement in eco-efficiency in
each economy has been broadly similar.
Raw materials usage
The environmental impact of industry depends
crucially on the quantity of materials taken from the
environment, which subsequently must be returned
to it after use in the form of wastes or emissions.
Measures of these physical materials inputs into
industry have recently been developed in the
context of the derivation of material flow accounts
for the European Union (see European Environment
Agency 2001b, Eurostat 2001c). These measures
differ from the conventional national accounting of
measures of natural resource inputs into industry in
which not all material inputs may be properly
accounted for. In particular, within the national
accounts, the direct extraction of products by
manufacturing industry, such as, for example, clay
for brick making, would be accounted for as a
component of industrial value-added output rather
than as input into the production process.
To derive as accurately as possible a measure of the
non-energy material inputs into manufacturing
industry, the economy-wide estimates of material
flows have been refined to an aggregate including
only industrial minerals and ores. The flows repre-
sent domestic consumption of industrial minerals
and ores measured aggregated by weight in metric
tons.
The data show a close relationship between mate-
rial inputs and manufacturing output until the early
1990s (see Graph V.4). Eco-efficiency over this
134 See the Integration Indicators for Energy (1985–98 data), Eurostat (2001a).
Updating indicators for most recent 1999 data shows the continuation of
these trends.
Graph V.2: EU industrial energy prices 
(without VAT, 1995 prices) Index 1985 = 100
Source: Commission services.
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period was broadly stable. From 1993 onwards
there seems to be some evidence of some improve-
ments in eco-efficiency, as materials usage has
stabilised. Over the whole period, eco-efficiency in
mineral usage has improved by some 12 %, entirely
accounted for by the period 1992–97.
Graph V.3: Comparison of Eco-efficiency of manufacturing: EU versus US energy inputs 
(million EUR per 1 000 TOE)
Source: Commission services.
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Graph V.4: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: Minerals consumption
Index 1980 = 100
Source: Commission services.
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since it would postpone the date of exhaustibility. However it would not alter
the final price at exhaustion (equal to the price of the renewable resource)
nor would it change the rate of change of the natural resource’s price over
time (equal to the interest rate).
135 See, for example, Tietenberg (2000).
136 To illustrate how the model works, for instance, consider the announcement
of new discoveries of the natural resource: this would reduce today’s price
Box V.2: Microeconomic efficiency considerations concerning policies towards natural resources use
and emission of pollutants
The Hotelling theory of the optimal use and depletion of natural resource use provides a baseline for the analysis of the
sustainable development of energy and raw material use135. According to the theory in the absence of externalities, the
price of a non-renewable resource should optimally rise at a rate equal to the interest rate, until it reaches a final price
(at the exhaustion of the stock) equal to that of a higher-cost substitute renewable resource. The interest rate gives the
time preference of society for consumption tomorrow versus today. Theoretically a competitive market would deliver
exactly the required optimal set of prices and rate of depletion. For instance, were the expected rate of price growth
higher than the interest rate, then producers would have an incentive to leave the resource in the ground rather than
market it today. Likewise, were the expected future price lower than the interest rate, then producers would have the
incentive to produce more today136. Users of the material resource would equate its current price with the value of its
marginal product in the production process. The resulting profile of resource prices would be exactly that which is
socially optimal.
Of course, in practice, natural resource markets do not behave anything like this idealised model. Amongst the key distor-
tions in practice are the following:
— Non-renewable natural resource prices are often distorted through oligopolistic suppliers or through price regulation
and subsidies.
— Renewable resources are often over-exploited and may become totally exhausted owing to lack of entry restrictions.
— The full costs to society of the extraction and use of natural resources are often not monetised and are therefore not
taken into account in consumption. An important example of the latter phenomenon is the effects of the use of fossil
fuels in producing carbon dioxide, which contributes to global warming.
In the presence of such distortions, public sector action is necessary to influence resource use and restore optimality. The
theory of optimality suggests that the best public policies are those which directly address the source of the market failure
or distortion, for instance, by correcting prices through taxes which take account of the non-monetised social costs of
their use. Whilst such a rule is useful in principle, in practice, of course, it is difficult to properly calibrate and evaluate
such non-monetised social costs and to make the appropriate adjustments over time in order to respond to socioeco-
nomic developments.
In contrast, there is a very clear public sector role in ensuring the control of emissions of pollutants. This is for two
reasons. First, emissions of pollutants are essentially the unintended by-products of the production process: hence
controlling them has only a relatively secondary value to producers themselves. Second, there is no easy way to establish
an unregulated market for pollutants, which would require the establishing of private property rights over media such as
clean air and water. 
The key policy issues with relation to emissions of pollutants are which threshold to set for the emissions and how to
achieve this threshold in the most cost-effective manner. In setting an acceptable threshold for emissions, the costs and
benefits to society from reducing emissions need to be balanced. In the absence of any emissions controls, the benefits
to society from starting to make emissions reductions would be very considerable and likely outweigh the additional costs
involved. However as further reductions in emissions are required, the costs of these reductions are likely to rise, whilst
the additional benefits to society are likely to fall. The optimal emissions reduction policy would therefore balance the
marginal cost to firms of making additional emissions reductions with the additional benefits to society of such reduc-
tions. Using similar reasoning, the most cost-effective means of achieving such an emission threshold would be to
equalise the marginal costs of emissions between different firms. The most efficient means of achieving this would be
through market-based instruments such as emissions trading.Chapter V — Sustainable development in the EU manufacturing industry
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Emissions of greenhouse gases
Climate is strongly influenced by changes in the
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse
gases, which help to trap infrared radiation in the
lower atmosphere. There is now considerable
evidence that the increased accumulation of these
gases is causing a global warming of the earth.
The main greenhouse gases are water vapour,
carbon dioxide (CO2), ozone methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), and industrial gases such as
halocarbons and others. Non-industrial gases occur
naturally and are essential to life, keeping the planet
some 30° warmer that it would otherwise be. Water
vapour is the largest contributor to the natural
greenhouse effect. However, human activities are
affecting greenhouse gas levels, thereby changing
the earth’s energy balance and enhancing the
natural greenhouse effect to cause global warming.
Emissions of carbon dioxide (mainly due to the
combustion of fossil fuels) are responsible for over
60 % of the EU’s contribution to the ‘enhanced’
greenhouse effect; methane emissions (due to agri-
culture and changes in land use) contribute another
20 %; and nitrous oxide, ozone (generated mainly by
automobile exhaust fumes) and industrial gases such
as sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and halocarbons (CFCs,
HFCs and PFCs) contribute the remaining 20 %.
In 1990 emissions from EU manufacturing industry
made up some 23 % of total carbon dioxide emis-
sions. The major part comes from industrial
combustion of fossil fuels particularly by the iron
and steel, non-ferrous metals, and paper and pulp
industries. A significant contribution to emissions
also comes from industrial processes, particularly
from the production of cement and other mineral
products and from the chemicals industry.
Overall emissions of carbon dioxide by EU manu-
facturing industry have fallen by over 11° % over
the period 1985–2000137 (see Graph V.5). This
compares with an actual increase in total EU
carbon dioxide emissions over the period, largely
the result of the expansion of emissions from the
transport sector, which offset the substantial
reductions from both the energy and manufac-
turing industries.
The reductions in carbon dioxide emissions in
industry are mainly attributable to improvements in
industrial fuel consumption, and reduced emissions
from industrial processes.
The majority of the reduction in industrial CO2
emissions appears to have come from reduced
emissions from industrial combustion. This was
137 The data for emissions, production, and eco-efficiency presented here and in
graph V.5 have been adjusted for the direct impact of German reunification.
German reunification led to a major restructuring and reduction in size of the
industrial sector in the former East Germany. Including data for the former
DDR in the European Union numbers prior to 1991 would add an additional
5.2 percentage points to the reduction in total European Union carbon
dioxide emissions over the period 1985–99 (see Ziesmer, 1996 and Eich-
hammer et al., 2001). (see Ziesmer, 1996 and Eichhammer et al., 2001). 
Graph V.5: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: CO2 emissions 
Index 1985 = 100 
Source: Commission services.
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largely a result of improved fuel efficiency, the
switching to less carbon-intensive fuels such as gas,
and some structural change in EU industry. Some
modest progress was also made in reducing emis-
sions from industrial processes.
The eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry
with respect to carbon dioxide rose over the last
15 years. Overall manufacturing production rose
31 % over the period 1985–2000, resulting in a
rise of eco-efficiency by some 49 % over the same
period.
Reliable data on emissions of greenhouse gases
other than carbon dioxide emissions is only avail-
able from 1990 onwards. Emissions of nitrous oxide
fell by 53 % over 1990–2000, mainly owing to
emissions reduction measures in the chemicals
industry. In contrast, emissions of the less quantita-
tively significant fluorinated gases increased by
36 %, largely as a result of the substitution of
ozone-depleting chloroflurocarbons by HFCs. Over
the same period, carbon dioxide emissions fell by
7.2 %. Overall industrial emissions of greenhouse
gases (measured in CO2-equivalents) fell by 10.5 %
between 1990 and 2000 (see Graph V.6).
Compared with the performance of US manufac-
turing industry (see Graph V.7), the eco-efficiency of
EU industry with respect to greenhouse gas emis-
sions has been consistently more than three times
higher over the period 1990–99. The improvement
in eco-efficiency has been slightly greater in the EU.
Emissions of acidifying gases
The acidifying gases responsible for acid rain consist
in sulphur dioxide (SO2), the nitrogen oxides (NOx),
and ammonia (NH3). Industrial emissions of these
gases can be carried by winds for hundreds of kilo-
metres before being deposited in the environment.
The acids ultimately get deposited either through
dry deposition or along with rain and snow. The
deposition of acid in this manner has been shown
to cause extensive damage to forests and soils. It
also has effects on ground and surface waters and
can result through eutrophication in the impover-
ishment of biodiversity in lakes and rivers. Acid rain
also causes damage to buildings and has been
shown to have deleterious effects on human health.
Industrial emissions made up nearly 16 % of total EU
emissions of acidifying gases in 1990. Roughly three
quarters of emissions came from industrial fuel
combustion, whilst the rest came from other indus-
trial processes. Industrial emissions of sulphur dioxide
largely come from industrial combustion plants
burning fossil fuels, with substantial contributions also
from metal smelters, pulp production, and oil
refineries. Nitrogen oxides are emitted largely by
industrial combustion plants and through acid
production and processing of fossil fuels. Ammonia
was primarily emitted by the organic chemicals
industry, particularly from the production of fertilisers.
Over the last 20 years, there has been a striking
reduction in the emissions of acidifying gases by EU
Graph V.6: EU Industrial emissions of individual greenhouse gases
Index 1990 = 100
Source: Commission services.
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manufacturing138. Overall acidifying gas emissions
fell by some 67 % between 1980–99 (see Graph
V.8). This was principally due to a very substantial
decline by three-quarters in sulphur dioxide emis-
sions. Emissions of nitrous oxides fell by over 30 %,
whilst ammonia emissions fell by nearly 40 %.
Manufacturing industry contributed some quarter
of the total reduction in EU emissions of acidifying
gases over 1980–99. Manufacturing industry’s
emissions fell by a comparable percentage to that
of energy production, but considerably faster than
other sectors such as transport and agriculture.
The overall share of manufacturing in total EU
emissions fell from some 19 % in 1980 to 12 % in
1999.
138 The data for emissions, production, and eco-efficiency presented here and in
graph V.8 have been adjusted for the direct impact of German reunification.
The extent of the impact of reunification on measured eco-efficiency can be
seen in Graph V.9.
Graph V.7: Comparison of Eco-efficiency of manufacturing: EU vs. US: Greenhouse gases
(million EUR per ktonne CO2 equivalent)
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph V.8: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: Acidifying gases
Index 1980 = 100
Source: Commission services.
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The eco-efficiency of manufacturing industry with
respect to acidifying emissions increased very
substantially over the last 20 years. Overall manu-
facturing production139 rose by 32 % over the
period 1980–99, resulting in an increase in eco-effi-
ciency by some 300 % over the period.
The pattern of emission reductions is closely related
to the introduction of emission controls on acidifying
gases, in particular the Large Combustion Plants
directive of 1988. This legislation strictly controlled
the emissions standards of new industrial combustion
plants and required Member States to draw up emis-
sions reductions programmes for existing plants. The
nature of Member State reduction programmes
differed considerably140. Some countries, notably
Germany and the Netherlands had already intro-
duced earlier national legislation. These countries
chose to upgrade their limits on existing plants using
further legislation backed by voluntary agreements
with industry. In other countries, such as France and
the United Kingdom, the targets for emissions reduc-
tions by existing plants were primarily met by substi-
tution of other fuels together with end-of-pipe meas-
ures in a limited number of plants.
Scientific model-based analysis indicates that the
substantial reduction in emissions of acidifying
gases was largely due to shifts to pollution control
measures and the changes in the structure of input
fuels. Wüster (2000) using the RAINS model calcu-
lates that total sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions in Europe were each reduced owing to
pollution control measures by some 20–25
percentage points respectively over the period
1980–2000. Changes in the structure of specific fuel
inputs reduced sulphur dioxide emissions by some
additional 10 percentage points over the same
period. Other reasons for changes in the ratio of
industrial emissions were changes in the structure of
industry and shifts between self-generation of
power and electrical power.
The performance of EU manufacturing industry in
reducing acidifying gases compared favourably with
that of manufacturing industry in the United States
(see Graph V.9). Even taking account of the reduc-
tion in measured eco-efficiency caused by German
reunification, the eco-efficiency of manufacturing in
the European Union is higher and has improved
considerably more quickly than in the United States.
This is despite the impact in the United States of the
sulphur dioxide emissions trading scheme set up
under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The
scheme however commenced only in 1995.
Emissions of ozone precursors
Whilst at the stratospheric-level ozone provides an
essential shield against the sun’s ultraviolet radia-
tion, at tropospheric-level (ground-level) ozone is a
secondary pollutant harmful to both human health
and ecosystems. Ozone forms by the oxidation of
139 Adjusted for reunification of Germany. 
140 See Eames (2001), together with Bültmann and Wätzold (2000) for
Germany, Lulofs (2000) for the Netherlands, and Schucht (2000) for France. 
Graph V.9: Comparison of eco-efficiency of manufacturing: EU vs. US: Acidifying gases 
(million EUR per ktonne acid equivalent)
Source: Commission services.
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volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide
in the presence of nitrogen oxides and sunlight.
Harmful ozone concentrations are a problem
throughout Europe, but particularly in cities and in
the southern European countries. The ozone-
precursor gases consist in the non-methane volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), the nitrogen oxides
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and methane (CH4).
Industrial emissions made up 11 % of total EU ozone-
precursor emissions in 1990, roughly equally divided
between industrial combustion and other processes.
The industrial emissions of VOCs come largely from
the use of solvents in industrial processes, the petro-
leum industry, industrial combustion, with smaller
amounts from the food and iron and steel industries.
Carbon monoxide is produced both from industrial
combustion and through industrial processes such as
iron and steel production. Manufacturing industry is
responsible for only relatively small amounts of
methane emissions.
Despite a rise in EU manufacturing production of
32 % between 1980 and 1999141, its emissions of
ozone precursors fell some 25 % over the period142
(see Graph V.10). Whilst this is not such a substan-
tial fall as that experienced with acidifying gases,
the eco-efficiency of ozone precursors rose by some
80 %. As with acidifying gases, there is a very
substantial difference between the performance of
industry up to 1989, and from 1989 onwards.
Ozone precursor emissions fell by only 9 % in the
first period, with a full 20 % reduction in emissions
taking place in the second.
VOC emissions from solvent use and manufacturing
processes have been reduced through introduction
of best-practice techniques, substitution by water-
based products, and use of pollution abatement
technology. The implementation of the 1999
solvents directive will reinforce these tendencies.
Small reductions in carbon monoxide emissions
have also occurred.
Despite the significant improvements in air quality,
particulate matter and ozone remain a problem and
adopting strategies to combat their impact on the
environment will be a major priority of the next
phase of the EU’s air quality policy. Under the sixth
environment action programme, the Clean Air for
Europe (CAFE) programme aims to develop a long-
term, strategic and integrated policy leading to the
adoption of an European Union Thematic Strategy
on Air by 2004/5.
The improvement in the European Union of eco-
efficiency with regard to emissions of ozone precur-
sors has been less pronounced than that which has
occurred in the United States (see Graph V.11).
Partly owing to differences in continental climates,
the combat of ozone and smog has been a major
141 Adjusted for reunification of Germany.
142 The data for emissions, production and eco-efficiency presented here and in
Graph V.10 have again been adjusted for the direct impact of German reuni-
fication. The limited extent of the impact of reunification on measured eco-
efficiency can be seen in Graph V.11.
Graph V.10: Eco-efficiency of EU manufacturing industry: Ozone precursors
Index 1980 =100
Source: Commission services.
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policy issue in the United States. The implementa-
tion of the re-authorised United States Clean Air Act
of 1977 and the Clean Air Amendment Act of 1990
can be seen to have had very significant impacts on
the eco-efficiency of US industry.
Emissions of ozone-depleting gases
The ozone-depleting substances concerned are the
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocar-
bons (HCFCs), halons, nitrogen oxides and methyl
bromide. Since the 1960s CFCs and halons were
being used in refrigerators, air conditioners, spray
cans, solvents, foams, fire extinguishers etc. HCFCs
have been developed as the first major replacement
for CFCs.
Located between 10 and 50 km above the Earth’s
surface, containing 90 % of all stratospheric ozone,
the ozone layer is essential to life on Earth. It
protects living things from harmful ultraviolet-B
radiation from the sun. The destruction of the
ozone layer was one of the first global environ-
mental problems to be understood by the general
population. Evidence gathered in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, revealed that the ozone layer was
thinning due to human-made chemicals.
The international response resulted in the signature
in 1985 of the framework Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, followed by the
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, which introduced international
control measures for the production and consump-
tion of ozone depleting substances. In 1990, the
Montreal Protocol was revised to provide for the
phase-out by 2000 of the consumption and produc-
tion of CFCs and halons, with certain exemptions
for essential use of halons.
The implementation of the commitments under the
Montreal Protocol is mainly carried out at Commu-
nity level. In 1988 a regulation set down specific
rules for restricting the production, sale and import
of CFCs and halons: a freeze on the production at
1986 levels and then a reduction ultimately to 80 %
of 1986 levels from 1 July 1993. This was strength-
ened in 2000 by Council Regulation (EC) No
2037/2000 to include controls on the production,
importation, exportation, supply, use leakage and
recovery of controlled substances, including a ban
on the production and use of most CFCs, with
exceptions for essential uses.
Due to the adoption of EU legislation following the
international agreement, the production of ozone-
depleting substances by EU industry had declined
by 80–90 % from their peak values in the late 1980s
(see Graph V.12). The bulk of this production was of
chemicals covered by Annex A of the Montreal
Protocol (CFCs and halons), 82 % in 1990. As these
have been phased-out, the importance of the other
chemicals such as HCFCs has increased.
The success of the control of ozone-depleting
substances has been possible because science and
Graph V.11: Comparison of eco-efficiency of manufacturing: EU vs. US: Ozone precursors
(million EUR per ktonne total ozone forming potentials)
Source: Commission services.
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industry have been able to develop and commer-
cialise alternatives to ozone-depleting chemicals. EU
industry has in fact ended the use of CFCs faster
and with considerably less cost than had been orig-
inally anticipated.
V.4 The costs 
of environmental policies
Whilst the last section has documented the substan-
tial progress that has been made in improving the
environmental performance of EU industry, the cost
of this achievement has largely been funded by
manufacturing industry itself. This section therefore
looks at three aspects of costs of environmental
protection: the scale of environmental protection
expenditure; and the other potential costs of envi-
ronmental protection on industry; and the scale of
taxes on industrial energy inputs.
The extensive range of EU and national environ-
mental legislation has increasingly led to a drift
upwards in spending by manufacturing on environ-
mental protection. Consistent and comparable time
series information on environmental expenditure in
the European Union is unfortunately fairly scarce143.
Graph V.13 shows the development in environ-
mental protection expenditures in Germany since
1980. Investment expenditures have averaged at
0.4–0.5 percentage points of manufacturing value-
added, temporarily rising in the late 1980s and
early 1990s partly owing to expenditure on air
pollution control. Current expenditures on environ-
mental protection have consistently risen over time
from some 0.8 percentage points of manufacturing
value-added in 1980 to 1.1 percentage point by the
late 1990s. This is likely to reflect higher operation
and maintenance costs of capital equipment and
increased expenditures on environmental manage-
ment schemes. Total expenditure on environmental
protection has thus risen from some 1.2 % of value-
added in 1980 to 1.5 % of value-added in 1999.
Broadly similar patterns of environmental expendi-
ture are seen in other EU countries for which data is
available, such as the Netherlands and France.
Table V.1 shows the latest (1998) estimates of EU
environmental protection expenditures for manu-
facturing industry and the energy sector144. Overall
environment protection expenditures are equal to 2
percentage points of total industrial value added;
expenditures on preventing aerial emissions alone
make up some 0.6 percentage points of industrial
Graph V.12: EU production of ozone depleting chemicals
Source: Commission services.
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143 See Eurostat (1998, 2001b) and Pearce and Palmer (2001).
144 The estimates for the European Union total cover the manufacturing, mining,
and electricity, gas, and water industries. No separate disaggregation is avail-
able. On average, the manufacturing component makes up some 90 % of
the total expenditure in those countries for which a breakdown is available.
Eurostat (2001) describes the estimate as a ‘low end estimate’.European competitiveness report 2002
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value-added. Within the overall total, some indus-
tries spend considerably more than this, with partic-
ularly high expenditures in the refineries, chemicals,
and paper and pulp industries.
Not all measures that reduce environmental pres-
sures are of course included in environmental
protection expenditure. There is probably some
underestimation due to measurement problems.
Moreover many environmental improvements are
also made as part of the normal expenditures of
companies. This includes investments in new
production equipment, which often are more effi-
cient than the old in terms of environmental
performance. Estimates of such additional expendi-
tures do not exist for the EU, although these have
been found to be substantial in US industry145.
Taxes on industrial energy consumption are deter-
mined at Member State level. Whilst value-added
tax is refunded to industry, specific duties on fuels
have to be paid. In part for environmental reasons,
the majority of Member States have consistently
raised these specific taxes on industrial fuel
consumption since 1985 (see Graph V.14). This rise
has partly offset the fall in world energy prices over
the period. Between 1985–1999, the tax compo-
nent of industrial fuel prices has risen for fuel oil,
natural gas, and electricity to stand at 39 %, 22 %
and 19 % respectively in 1999. The current tax
component of fuel prices makes up a significant
proportion of manufacturing value-added.
145 See Gray and Shadbegian (1995), who suggest environmental protection
expenditures may underestimate actual impacts on industrial costs by a
minimum of 35 %.
Graph V.13: Environmental expenditures of German manufacturing industry 
(% of value added)
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
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Table V.1: Environmental protection expenditure in the EU in 1998
Total industry (including mining and electricity, gas and water)
(EUR 1 000 million) TOTAL INVESTMENT CURRENT
Waste 4.9 1.2 3.7
Wastewater 8.7 2.7 6.0
Air 9.6 4.3 5.3
Noise 0.7 0.4 0.4
Nature 2.2 1.7 0.5
Other 5.9 1.8 4.1
Total 32.1 12.1 20.0
In % of industry value added 2.0 0.8 1.2
Source: Eurostat (2001b).Chapter V — Sustainable development in the EU manufacturing industry
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V.5 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the environmental
performance of EU industry over the last 20 years
with respect to two measures of natural resource
inputs, energy and raw materials, and four meas-
ures of the emission of pollutants, greenhouse
gases, ozone-depleting gases, acidifying gases, and
ozone-precursor gases.
While recognising the limitations of the data
currently available, the result of this study has been
to reveal a significant de-coupling of economic
growth in manufacturing from intensified environ-
mental impact146. There is therefore significant
evidence for the environmental Kuznets curve
hypothesis that environmental pressures stabilise or
even improves at higher levels of income. The most
striking example of this is the progress made by EU
manufacturing over the last 20 years in substantially
reducing its emissions of acidifying gases, such as
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide. Graph V.8
shows that, despite the 32 % rise in manufacturing
production over the period 1980–99, emissions of
acidifying gases declined by 67 %. Similarly, over
the same period, industrial emissions of ozone-
precursors have been reduced in absolute terms by
some 25 %. Production of ozone-depleting gases in
the European Union has now almost ceased. Mean-
while energy consumption has remained broadly
constant since the mid–1980s despite the increase
in manufacturing output. This has contributed to
the reduction that has occurred in industrial emis-
sions of greenhouse gases since the Kyoto baseline
date of 1990. Recent years have also seen some
stabilisation in industrial consumption of minerals
and ores. Overall, the performance of EU industry
compares favourably with that of US industry. In the
extreme case of acidifying emissions, the eco-effi-
ciency of EU industry has increased almost twice as
quickly as in the United States.
Environmental policies have had a clear role in these
developments. For example, the most significant
decoupling of acidifying gases from economic
growth followed the large combustion plants direc-
tive of 1988. Environmental policy played a key role
also in the phasing out of CFC ozone-depleters.
Policy progress has also been made on local air
pollution, albeit at a slower pace. Manufacturing
industry has responded by developing new tech-
nologies, improving its management practices, and
greater investment in pollution prevention tech-
nologies.
The completion of the single market and the
increasing deregulation of markets through the
Lisbon strategy have improved the economic
performance of the EU economy and provided the
resources needed to improve the environment.
These structural reforms have had some direct influ-
146 The partial evidence that is available on the other environmental impacts of
manufacturing suggests important progress has been made in reducing
water abstraction, but that less progress has been made in reducing indus-
trial wastes (see EEA, 2001 and OECD, 2001). Action is currently taking place
to reduce impacts from chemicals.
Graph V.14: EU tax component of industrial energy prices
(%)
Source: Commission services (2001a).
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ence in improving energy-intensity and hence indi-
rectly on greenhouse gas emissions. Increasing
competition from the single market programme has
increased the pressures on firms to improve their
efficiency resulting in pressures to improve their
energy efficiency. Moreover, where it has been
carried out, energy market deregulation has tended
to increase the usage of natural gas with a low
carbon dioxide content.
The environmental improvement has come at an
important financial cost to manufacturing industry
and its customers. Environmental expenditures by
EU industry stood in 1998 at some EUR 32 000
million, some 0.4 % of GDP or 2.0 % of industrial
value-added. A drift upwards in environmental
protection expenditure have occurred since the
early 1980s.
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Berlin.This appendix outlines a simple growth model
outlining the relationships between environmental
expenditures, economic growth, and the growth of
eco-efficiency and environmental pressures.
The growth model is a version of the standard
Harrod-Domar growth model147. Let the growth of
output (Y) be a simple function of aggregate invest-
ment (I):
∆ Y = a*I
where a is the incremental output-capital ratio.
Aggregate investment is given by aggregate
savings:
I = s*(1-e)*Y
where s is the saving ratio from real income taking
account of environmental expenditures, assumed to
be a fraction e of total real income.
Bringing these two equations together, we obtain a
modified Harrod-Domar model for growth in real
output148:
∆ Y/Y = a*s*(1-e)
Let the growth in eco-efficiency (P) be given by the
function:
∆ P/P =
π + F(e)
Where 
π is the long-run or trend rate of improve-
ment in eco-efficiency and F(e) is a concave func-
ANNEX V.1 — A simple growth model including environmental expenditures
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tion in e149. The theory behind the equation is that
to increase the rate of eco-efficiency growth beyond
the trend rate, 
π , requires steadily increasing frac-
tions of output to be spent on environmental
expenditures.
The workings of the model can be shown in Graph
V.A1. The output growth curve represents the equa-
tion for the rate of growth of output: it is a line
declining in e, the fraction of output spent on envi-
ronmental expenditures. The eco-efficiency curve
represents the equation for the growth in eco-effi-
ciency: it has the intercept 
π and is increasing, but
at a diminishing rate, in e, the fraction of output
spent on environmental expenditures.
From the definition of eco-efficiency (see Section
two), we have the identity:
∆ E/E = ∆ Y/Y – ∆ P/P
the percentage growth in environmental pressures
equals the percentage growth in output minus eco-
efficiency.
Hence the rate of growth of environmental pressures
is given by the gap between the two lines on the
graph. To the left of the intersection of the two lines,
the growth of environmental pressures is positive but
less than the rate of growth in output (relative de-
coupling). To the right of the point of intersection,
the environmental pressures are contracting
(absolute de-coupling). Environmental pressures are
of course stable at the point of intersection.
To complete the model, it is assumed that the
government can choose the rate of environmental
expenditures to determine both the rate of growth
of output and environmental pressures. The trade-
ANNEX V.1
A simple growth model including
environmental expenditures
149 F(e) has the properties: F(0) = 0, F(1) < 
∞ , F’(e) > 0, F‘(e) < 0. An example of
such a function is
√
e.
147 See e.g. Wan (1971). The use of alternative technology assumptions would
affect slightly the qualitative results. The Harrod-Domar assumption is consis-
tent with the hypothesis of increasing returns to scale. With a Solow-type
model with constant returns to scale, higher environmental expenditures
would result in a temporary reduction in the growth rate and a lower long-
run level value of both output and capital-output ratio. For alternative
models see Baldwin (1989).
148 In principle, the incremental output-capital ratio, a, may also be an
increasing function of environmental expenditures as suggested by Porter’s
win-win hypothesis. However the impact of this effect on the properties of
the model is likely to be of second-order importance.European competitiveness report 2002
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off curve in Graph V.A2 (and 3) shows the feasible
combinations achievable by the government: as
environmental protection expenditures increase, the
growth in environmental pressures is reduced, but
the economic growth rate declines. The govern-
ment is assumed to have preferences for lesser envi-
ronmental pressures and higher economic growth
given by a series of indifference curves. The govern-
ment optimises by choosing the level of environ-
mental expenditures allowing it to reach the
highest possible indifference curve. Note that the
position of these indifference curves will in general
depend on the absolute level of real income: as
society becomes richer preferences may well
Graph V.A1: A growth model with environmental expenditures
Share of environmental expenditures in output
Economic growth,
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Output growth curve
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Improved
economic performance
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change away from economic growth towards
lowering environmental pressures. This would be
represented by the locus of the indifference curves
moving downwards.
The implications of an improvement in economic
efficiency — perhaps through improved economic
integration or greater market flexibility — can be
shown in terms of the model. Improved economic
efficiency would be shown as an increase in the
incremental output-capital ratio or the saving ratio.
This will improve the trade off between both output
growth and the rate of growth in environmental
pressures. In Graph V.A1, the output growth curve
would pivot upwards (see dotted line) allowing the
possibility of both an increase in the growth rate
and a fall in the rate of environmental pressures.
From Graph V.A2, the trade-off curve would also
pivot upwards allowing the achievement of a higher
indifference curve (again showed through dotted
lines). Given normal preferences, the result will be
both reduced growth in environmental pressures
and higher economic growth.
A similar analysis may be done for the implications
of an improvement in the performance of environ-
mental technology which leads to an increase in the
trend rate of improvement in eco-efficiency (π). This
would result in a parallel movement upwards in the
eco-efficiency curve in Graph V.A1, reducing the
rate of growth of environmental pressures for each
level of environmental expenditure. The trade off
curve shown in Graph V.A3 would pivot outwards in
the direction of improving environmental perform-
ance, improving the trade-off between economic
growth and environmental pressures, and most
likely resulting in more favourable developments in
each.
Graph V.A3: Effect of improved environmental performance 
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Production: Value added in manufacturing output
ESA 95 (National accounts definition NACE rev.1,
section D) in EUR millions at 95 constant prices.
1980–1990: European Union excluding former
DDR; 1991–1999: EU-15 including former DDR.
(Source: Eurostat and Commission services).
Acidifying gases: Industrial emissions of SO2, NOx
and NH3  in ktonnes acid equivalent. EU-15
(including former DDR prior to 1991). (Source:
European Environment Agency: Indicator Fact Sheet
Signals 2001: Emissions of Acidifying Substances,
2001 (updated by EEA, 2002)).
Ozone precursor emissions: Industrial emissions of
NOx, non-methane volatile organic compounds,
CO and CH4 in ktonnes total ozone forming poten-
tials. EU15 (including former DDR prior to 1991).
(Source: European Environment Agency: Indicator
Fact Sheet Signals 2001: Emissions of Ozone Precur-
sors, 2001 (updated by EEA, 2002)).
Greenhouse gas emissions (1990–1999): Industrial
emissions of total greenhouse gases, CH 4, N2O and
aggregation three halocarbons: HFCs, PFCs and SF6 in
ktonnes CO2 equivalent. EU15. (Source: EEA, 2002).
Carbon dioxide emissions (1985–1999): ktonnes
CO2. EU15 (including former DDR prior to 1991).
(Source: New Chronos database, Eurostat, updated).
Energy Inputs: Final energy consumption (all prod-
ucts) by industry in ktonnes of oil equivalent. 1980–90:
European Union excluding former DDR; 1991–99: 
EU-15 including former DDR. (Source: Eurostat, 2001a,
Table 3.4, p. 45 (updated by Eurostat).
Energy Prices: EU-15. (Source: Eurostat, 2001a,
Table 7.6, p. 135).
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Mineral inputs: Domestic consumption of indus-
trial minerals and ores in ktonnes. 1980–90: 
European Union excluding former DDR; 1991–99:
EU-15 including former DDR. (Source: Eurostat —
personal communication).
Ozone depleting chemicals: Industrial production
in tonnes of ozone depleting potentials. EU-15
(Source: Eurostat, 2001d, table on page 68).
US DATA:
Production: Value added in manufacturing output
(National accounts definition) at constant prices of
1995 converted to EUR millions at 1995 purchasing
power parity exchange rates. (Source: 1987–99,
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis;
1980–87, Federal Reserve Board,
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/
erp.html#erp3).
Acidifying gases: Industrial emissions of SO2, NOx
and NH3 in ktonnes acid equivalent. (Source: EMEP:
http://www.emep.int/index_data.html).
Ozone precursors: Industrial emissions of NOx, non-
methane volatile organic compounds, CO and CH4 in
ktonnes total ozone forming potentials. (Source:
EMEP: http://www.emep.int/index_data.html).
Greenhouse gases: Industrial emissions of CO2, CH4,
N2O and three halocarbons: HFCs, PFCs and SF6 in
ktonnes CO2 equivalent. (Source: United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change:
http://unfccc.int/resource/ghg/tempemis2.html).
Energy inputs: Primary energy consumption by
industry in ktonnes of oil equivalent. (Source:
United States Energy Information Administration:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/
total.html#IntlConsumption).
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Other data
Data on environmental protection expenditures in
Germany, Statistiches Bundesamt (personal commu-
nication).
Data on emissions of acidifying gases, ozone-
precursors, and greenhouse gases from former DDR
(1980–94), unofficial estimates of Deutsche
Umweltbundesamt (personal communication).
Details of adjustment of data
for German reunification
The official data on aerial emissions of carbon
dioxide, acidifying gases, and ozone-precursors for
Germany includes emissions from the former DDR
prior to 1991. These official data on emissions there-
fore are contaminated by the effects of the collapse of
East German industry between 1989 and 1991. This
resulted in a very substantial overall reduction in
emissions of pollutants from the previously heavily-
polluting East German industry. To exclude these
effects and to make the emissions data fully compat-
ible with manufacturing production data, the official
German emissions data have been adjusted using
unofficial Umweltbundesamt estimates of emissions
from the former DDR. The extent of these adjust-
ments can be seen in the following table:
150 The number denotes the percentage difference between the growth of emissions of the EU-15 (excluding the former DDR) and the growth of emissions of the 
EU-15 (including the former DDR). The periods taken are 1980–91 in the case of acidifying gases and ozone-precursors and 1985–91 for carbon dioxide.
Effect of inclusion  Effect of inclusion  Impact of inclusion 
of former-DDR  of former-DDR  of former-DDR on growth 
on total EU15  on total EU15  of EU15 emissions 1980- 
emissions in 1991  eco-efficiency in 1991  or 1985- 1991 (%)150
(%) (%)
Acidifying gases + 18.2 - 16.8 - 2.8
Ozone-precursors + 3.7 - 2.3 - 7.8
Carbon-dioxide + 6.4 - 5.0 - 6.0The following background studies were commis-
sioned and used in the preparation of the present
Report:
Baker, P., G. Koop and A. Meijer (2002): ‘Produc-
tivity performance of European market services’.
Van Riel, A., V. Davies, D. Patoir and I. Vogelaar
(2002): ‘Human capital, labour allocation and
productivity performance’.
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ANNEX
Background studies to the European
competitiveness report 2002Additional useful information on the work of
Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and the Enterprise
Directorate-General is available through printed
publications and on the web.
Commissioner Erkki Liikanen, responsible for
Enterprise and the Information Society: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/liikanen/
index_en.htm
Enterprise DG on the web:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/enterprise/
index_en.htm
Cordis (Community Research and Development
Information Service):
http://www.cordis.lu
Enterprise DG work programme:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/enterprise/
work_programme_2001.htm
Enterprise DG’s printed publications:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/
index.htm
Newsletters
Enterprise Europe is a free-of-charge newsletter
published quarterly in the 11 Community
languages by the Enterprise Directorate-General. It
covers the whole range of Enterprise DG’s work,
announcing new initiatives as well as providing
practical information.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/enter-
prise-europe/index.htm
Cordis focus is published twice a month in English,
French, German, Italian and Spanish. It provides a
More information on the Enterprise DG
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review of the main developments in all aspects of
EU research and innovation activities, covering
general policy developments, programme imple-
mentation, calls for tenders and results, events,
legislative activities, and much more.
http://www.cordis.lu/focus/en/src/focus.htm
Innovation & technology transfer is published six
times a year in English, French, German, Italian and
Spanish by the European Commission’s Innovation
Programme, which aims to promote innovation at
Community level and encourages SME participation
under the fifth research framework programme. 
The emphasis is on timely news relevant to these
objectives and in-depth ‘case studies’ of successful
projects.
http://www.cordis.lu/itt/itt-en/home.html
Euroabstracts is published six times a year in
English by the ’Innovation and SMEs’ programme,
part of the European Commission’s fifth research
framework programme. The Innovation and SMEs
programme promotes innovation and encourages
the participation of small and medium-sized enter-
prises in the framework programme.
http://www.cordis.lu/euroabstracts/en/home.html
European trend chart on innovation newsletter.
The trend chart project develops practical tools for
innovation policymakers in Europe. It pursues the
collection, regular updating and analysis of infor-
mation on innovation policies at national and
Community level. The newsletter is published quar-
terly in English, French and German. Further reports
and studies are available on the web site
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/Reports/
More information on the Enterprise DGEuropean competitiveness report 2002
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